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Preface
This study of Pope's poems, an exercise in what I call
reader-responsibility criticism, consists of readings of in-
dividual texts, rather than a single argument concerning
them. Before the latter can be done (assuming that it is
desirable), the texts must be read, and reading entails the
complex and demanding work that I try to describe in my
first chapter. What I offer here is a series of essays planned
as a book. The essays are frankly exploratory and tenta-
tive' and they make no pretense of definitiveness.
Nor have I tried in any sense to be complete in my treat-
ment of Pope's poems. I do not, for example, claim to read
all the major poems. In this regard, the most glaring omis-
sion is probably The Rape of the Lock. One important rea-
son for not including an essay on it is that I have preferred
to treat Pope's own essayistic and more intellectual poems.
Accordingly, in reading The Dunciad I concentrate on the
fourth book, and though I consider many of the Horatian
satires, I focus on the essays and epistles. This procedure
results in a certain lack of balance, since I write about one
poem in each of three chapters, several poems in each of
two others. The differential treatment given the various
poems is, I believe, consonant with their nature and their
respective importance.
IX
x~Preface
The essayistic nature of my efforts, it is only fair to point
out, entails a certain amount of repetition, at least some
of which signals the lack of any straight-line development
or progression in Pope's writing. His texts frequently re-
peat points, as he swerves back, covering ground already
explored. Not only does he completely overhaul The Dun-
ciad, but the later version is itself an inversion of An Essay
on Man, the concerns and strategies of which also appear
in the Moral Essays. A less essayistic, and more argumen-
tative, mode would risk both obscuring the similarities
and flattening out the differences involved in these re-
turns, perhaps positing a progression that in Pope is fitful
at best. Pope's poems do display many important recurring
concerns, some of which I focus on, but we should be wary
of too easily assuming that, "correctly understood," they
form a clear and definite progression.
I do not mean to breathe new life into the notion that
Pope is, despite brilliant flashes, an uneven writer or an
inconsistent and naively contradictory thinker. An Essay
on Man, in particular, has proved to be fertile ground for
those bent on discrediting "the wasp of Twickenham" by
holding up for condemnation the apparent self-
contradictions. Blunders there may well be, in this poem
as well as others. I have no interest in either excusing Pope
or trying to rescue him from his detractors by denying the
force of their criticism. My interest is different: I stress the
heterogeneity of Pope's (and all other) discourse, accept-
ing it and regarding at least much of it as a signifying
structure that we will do well to attend to.
Though interested in the relations among Pope's poems,
the relation of poem to poem (a point that he himself
stresses), I resist the perhaps natural impulse to look for
and expect a neat and coherent whole, whether reading a
single text or a group of texts, such as the Moral Essays.
Along with Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, and oth-
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ers, I prefer to open rather than to close poems-another
reason for choosing the essay form for these studies. The
whole we almost inevitably seek turns out to have a hole
in it.
My procedure throughout involves bringing together
Pope's poems and the interests of contemporary critical
theory, especially deconstruction, and exploring their re-
lations, without positing the latter as the long-sought key
that will unlock the secrets of Pope's artistry. As a matter
of fact, I suggest that as a mode of close reading decon-
struction lacks responsibility unless it includes, as a first
"phase," attention to authorial declarations, which it pro-
ceeds to situate. Such double reading as I describe in the
first chapter by no means excludes ,traditional questions
concerning critical tact, it is not exempt from Pope's surely
right injunction to read sympathetically and generously,
and it certainly does nothing to minimize the reader's ob-
ligations to be informed, rigorous, and scrupulous.
Moreover, in Chapters Two through Six, I do not so
much apply deconstruction as a method for reading texts
as read Pope in light of deconstruction. As it happens, I
wrote the first chapter, explaining the principles of double
reading, only after completing the readings of Pope's
poems. In at least one sense, therefore, the readings pre-
cede the theory. The relation of strategy to reading, theory
to practice, is, then, not a simple one. To describe the re-
lation of deconstructive strategy to the readings that fol-
low, I can think (appropriately enough) of no better ac-
count than Pope's own in writing of the relation of An
Essay on Man to the remainder of the projected "ethic"
poems. That is, adapting Pope's terms from "The Design"
of his theodicy, I might say that the principles of what I
call double reading provide a general map, marking out
the territory, offering a sense of direction, but leaving the
particulars to be "delineated" as we attend closely to the
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topography that is Pope's poems. What Pope adds, 1 re-
peat: in the first chapter "I am ... only opening the foun-
tains, and clearing the passage. To deduce the rivers, to
follow them in their course, and to observe their effects"
is the task of the succeeding chapters.
One other point concerning my strategies and proce-
dures here, "vhich has to do with the essayistic nature of
the chapters: 1 regard the critical essay as more than a
medium for the elucidation of other texts. It has, or should
have, value in its own right as an art form (I esteem the
possibilities of the form, not my execution of them). At the
same time, elucidation of the texts that have occasioned it
remains a crucial function of the critical essay, and I have
tried both to shed some light on Pope's poems and to di-
rect attention to a way of reading and responding that will
prove productive (rather than authoritative).
I should comment, finally, on the tone and style of these
essays. As the relatively small number of references to the
rich and illuminating commentary on Pope may imply, I
have written not just for the "professional Popean." 1 have
written as well for that elusive (and perhaps illusive) gen-
eral reader that all commentators hope to interest.
Whether or not either type of reader will approve, 1 have
tried not to take my treatment of the subject too seriously
(I like to think that Pope would approve). Thus the tone is
sometimes light and playflli. Th.at difference from most of
the scholarship on Pope* may suggest that the quests in
my title allude to nlY own desires as well as refer to Pope's.
In any case, the question of the "proper" is raised: What
is the reader's "proper" stance before poems encountered?
*My discussion is related to-different from but certainly indebted to-May-
nard Mack's "On Reading Pope" (College English, 7 [1946], 263-73) and
George S. Rousseau's "On Reading Pope" (in Alexander Pope, ed. Peter Dixon
[Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1972 ], pp. 1-59).
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What sort of "answerable style" is "proper"? As I have
already suggested, the issue of critical tact is unavoidable,
and in developing my response to reading Pope I have
tried to be temperate as well as responsible.
The debts I have incurred in making this study are many.
First of all, I want to thank three (somewhat different)
teachers and mentors, to whom all readers of Pope are
mightily indebted: the late Irvin Ehrenpreis, Maynard
Mack, and Aubrey Williams. If there is a genius loci of the
essays, it is probably Geoffrey Hartman, whose generous
encouragement and support of this project and others it is
a pleasure to acknowledge. I want to thank, too, Joel
Weinsheimer, especially for invitations to speak and to
write on Bathurst. I do not imply that any of these critics
would accept my readings or positions. Without the good
offices of Sandee Kennedy, I might well still be typing the
first draft of the second chapter; graciously, with amazing
patience and consummate skill and efficiency, she tran-
scribed my hieroglyphical handwriting 011to an ATMS.
Without the personal and professional support of my for-
mer chairman, Gerhard Zuther, my labors would have
been harder, my life far more difficult. Finally, I gratefully
acknowledge the continuing support of the University of
Kansas, especially for summer grants through the General
Research Fund and for a sabbatical leave, during which
most of the writing was completed.
My discussion of Sober Advice from Horace draws on
material that first appeared in Papers on Language & Lit-
erature 15 (1979): 159-74; and my discussion of An
Epistle to Bathurst is a revised version of an essay pub-
lished in The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpreta-
tion 24 (1983): 65-78. I am grateful to the editors for per-
mission to incorporate this material here. An earlier
version of my discussion of An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot
xiv~ Preface
appeared in my book Reading Deconstruction/Deconstruc-
tive Reading (University Press of Kentucky, 1983).
A note on the text: Throughout I have used, and quoted
from, the Twickenham Edition of The Poems ofAlexander
Pope, ed. John Butt et aI., 11 vols. (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, and London: Methuen, 1939-69).
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~ Chapter One
Double Reading Pope
Several years ago I wrote an essay on Pope and Deism that
I hoped would be a prolegomenon to a study of the poet's
religious positions. 1 That discussion, in which I concluded
that it is "highly improbable" that Pope ever was, like his
good friend Bolingbroke, a Deist, received some attention,
and the positive response encouraged me to go beyond
saying what Pope was not to (I hoped) an eventual defini-
tive statement concerning what he was, religiously. For
years 1 dutifully tried to pinpoint what is peculiar to Chris-
tianity, Deism, and Catholicism; to sort out the Christian
and the perhaps Deistic strains in Pope's thinking; and to
distinguish the Catholic from the non-Catholic elements
as \vell as the Erasmian Catholic from the Thomistic. My
goal was to resolve the dispute concerning Pope's appar-
ently equivocal position on matters religious, to settle once
and for all questions regarding his faith. I thus tried to
make some absolute distinctions concerning Pope's reli-
gious thinking-even though I could not (and still cannot)
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draw such clear and definite lines between differences in
my own thinking.
Though the difficulty of the task I set for myself was
considerable, I persevered, my efforts revolving about the
only "unwobbling pivot" I was ever able to locate, Pope's
determined and pervasive anti-sectarianism and the
parts-whole figure that structures it and so many other
aspects of his writing. I persevered, that is, until I began
reading critical theory, eventually becoming a practitioner
of (and an occasional apologist for) deconstruction, vari-
ously depicted as "degenerate criticism," a form of "her-
meneutical high-jinks," and a sophisticated mode of close
reading having enormous potential for changing-for the
better-the way we regard all texts, human and social as
well as graphic. It was, just this "affirmative" nature that
attracted me to deconstruction. And though, as I have ar-
gued elsewhere,2 deconstruction certainly prizes historical
and scholarly research, building on it rather than ignoring
or rejecting it, it did bring in its wake-at least for me-a
new set of attitudes, priorities, and goals.
With regard to my specific interests in Pope, three
points emerged clearly. First, like Paul de Man, who
writes in Allegories of Reading that he "began to read
Rousseau seriously in preparation for a historical reflec-
tion on Romanticism" only to find himself "unable to pro-
gress beyond local difficulties of interpretation," 3 I gradu-
ally realized that I could say nothing about Pope's
religious positions until I had more carefully read his texts
(the correspondence as well as the poetry, the former re-
quiring interpretation no less than the latter). Complex,
difficult, and equivocal, these texts demand the most scru-
pulous attention. Second, after learning to read more
closely and rigorously than I had before, and then begin-
ning to read Pope with SOUle of the care that he devoted to
the writing of his texts, I came reluctantly to regard many
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questions concerning his religious positions as neither
very interesting nor particularly important, especially as
they tend to reduce to narrow doctrinal and institutional
considerations. The search is often for what Prufrock calls
"a formulated phrase" by which the poet, a particularly
intriguing specimen, is "pinned and wriggling on the
wall" for all to observe and to judge. Finally, I realized, as
my interests shifted toward language, that in reading we
are always in the "presence" of religious and theological
concerns, even if they are not thematized or explicitly
stated. This is so because, as Derrida maintains, "the age
of the sign is essentially theological": "the intelligible face
of the sign remains turned toward the word and the face
of God." 4 It may be that what language has to "say" about
God and religious questions will turn out to be at least as
interesting and important as the declarations we make. In
order to find out, we have to read.
We thus return to my first, apparently unexceptionable
point, which deserves some clarification. Surely no one
would dispute that we must carefully read a writer's texts
before attempting an interpretation of his or her intellec-
tual, political, or religious positions, but, as I have hinted
by italicizing the word, I mean something quite specific by
the term reading. First of all, my sense is akin to what de
Man describes as "genuinely analytical reading," which
he distinguishes from paraphrase, "the mainstay of all
critical reading." Whereas, de Man asserts, the purpose of
paraphrase "is to blur, confound, and hide discontinuities
and disruptions in the homogeneity of its own discourse,"
paralleling the author's efforts to conceal and divert "what
stands in the way of his own meaning," the reading this
critic solicits "would no longer blindly submit to the te-
leology of controlled meaning." 5 De Man thus calls for a
reading that refuses to rest satisfied with an elucidating
account of an author's meaning but goes on, reading
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"against the grain" (that is, in my formulation, against the
explicit declarations) and so producing the text's decon-
struction.
For de Man, reading "has to go against the grain of
what one would want to happen in the name of what has
to happen." 6 In the following paragraphs, I turn the figure
somewhat differently, and the particular turn I give to de
Man's formulation suggests that I am describing one par-
ticular approach to a general position or movement and
so justifies, I believe, my covering again some territory
that is increasingly known to a wide range of readers.
Though I think it faithful to basic principles and strategies
of deconstruction, and certainly in line with the exposition
I offered in a recent book,? the position I take places em-
phasis, highlights points, and works out strategies that
other deconstructionists might quarrel with. Derridean
deconstruction is not de Manian deconstruction, and
many deconstructionists, of whatever "school," may resist
my particular insistence on reading with and against the
grain, which is an abstraction from and a schematization
of a textual field that in fact is richly'integumented. Suf-
fice it to say here that the shape given to deconstructive
strategies in these pages derives from my understanding
of deconstruction as an affirmative and eminently practi-
cal (as well as impure) activity with important implica-
tions for our ethical and social lives.
Whatever their exact contours, the positions that I and
others (somewhat differerltly) name deconstruction are
often misunderstood. For lTIany, the refusal to "submit to
the teleology of controlled meaning" is tantamount to
opening the floodgates, welcoming subjectivism and even
solipsism, and allowing the reader to determine meaning.
Anarchy is supposedly loosed, as anything goes and a
sophomore's dilated meaning is just as good as the distin-
guished scholar's. Such a reading of de Man's account,
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however, grossly misrepresents what he calls for. What
many fail (or prefer not) to see is that the refusal to "sub-
mit to the teleology of controlled meaning" need not in-
volve neglect or ignorance of authorial meaning. Rather
than subjectivism or irresponsibility, deconstruction (at
least as it is practiced in impure form by a critic like Geof-
frey Hartman) may more properly be considered a type of
what I call reader-responsibility, a term that both avoids
any suggestion of aesthetic distance and in fact implies
the "call" and the "burden" placed on the reader to keep
texts alive and to respond in meaningful ways to the pos-
sibilities opened Up.8 At any rate, you can't deliberately
read against the grain until you know the grain.
Derrida makes essentially the same point, writing in Of
Grammatology that "reading must always aim at a certain
relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he
commands and what he does not command of the patterns
of the language that he uses."9 That an author, no matter
how skillful and meticulous, is never fully in control of his
or her language results from many factors, important
among them being what Geoffrey Hartman calls "the
equivocal character of words." 10 Derrida goes on to spell
out the necessity of employing traditional interpretive
procedures: without "all the instruments of traditional
criticism ... critical production would risk developing in
any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost any-
thing. But this indispensable guardrail has always only
protected, it has never opened, a reading." 11 Though some
deconstructionists apparently prefer to think otherwise,
proudly announcing "the death of the author," Derrida in-
sists that "the category of intention will not disappear." He
adds, however, that though "it will have its place, ... from
this place it will no longer be able to govern the entire
scene and tIle entire system of utterances." 12 Intention, in
other words, is to be situated. Like de Man, then, Derrida
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thus advocates a kind of double reading, and, according
to Derrida, that reading consists of a relationship that "is
not a certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light,
of weakness or of force, but a signifying structure that crit-
ical reading should produce. " 13
One must first, therefore, attend to what Derrida, in Of
Grammatology, calls the text's declarations: its explicit
meanings, more or less coinciding with the author's ap-
parent intentions. This constructive "step" or "phase" 14
tries to get inside a text to determine, among other things,
how it is made; it considers both meanings and the en-
abling conditions that allow meanings to be produced.
Pope's point in An Essay on Criticism is of immense value
in this initial "phase" of reading: he insists that we read a
text "With the same Spirit that its Author writ" (1. 234).
But having thus followed the grain, one goes on, not being
bound (as Pope suggests) by authorially controlled mean-
ings' to "open" a reading. Thus defined, reading consists
of attending to both what an author "commands and what
he does not command of the patterns of the language that
he uses" (I follow Derrida in calling the latter the text's
descriptions). Only this both/and process, 1 would argue,
exercises reader-responsibility, attending to intention but,
rather than being limited to it, proceeding to situate it in
a discourse that it no longer dominates. The two "steps"
or "phases" of this both/and process exist in tension, nei-
ther dominating or controlling the other. It is not, then,
that reading against the grain comes to replace the de-
clared or intentional meanings. Is a neglect of textual de-
scriptions any less irresponsible than a neglect of autho-
rial declarations?
Though it is only in the past twenty years or so that we
seem to have been particularly concerned with what ex-
ceeds a writer's conscious grasp and control, these "de-
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scriptions" are hardly less important than the author's
declarations, and they tell their story in all texts, no matter
the writer or the period. To understand exactly how textual
descriptions come about, let us turn-briefly-to Der-
rida's accounts of the production of slippage in language
and of the linguistic excess that a writer, no matter how
careful, is unable to control. Derrida uses several closely
related terms in treating this (rather humbling) situation,
whereby mastery eludes us. Among these terms are differ-
ance and the "trace." He extends Saussure's seminal anal-
ysis of the differential character of language ("In lan-
guage," according to the linguist, "there are only
differences, without positive terms"),15 coining the term
differance to describe what in Positions he calls "the sys-
tematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of
the spacing by means of which elements are related to
each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and
passive (the a of differance indicates this indecision as con-
cerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed
by or distributed between the terms of this opposition)
production of the intervals without which the 'full' terms
would not signify, would not function." 16 Indeed, Derrida
shows that "Differance is what makes the movement of
signification possible":17 "Without a retention in the min-
imal unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining
the other as other in the same, no difference would do its
work and no meaning would appear. It is not the question
of a constituted difference here, but rather, before all de-
termination of the content, of the pure movement which
produces difference. The (pure) trace is differance." 18
A notion cognate to differance, and particularly impor-
tant to an understanding of Pope, is supplementarity. In a
section of the Grammatology entitled "That Dangerous
Supplement," Derrida explains its strange logic:
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The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching
another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence. It cumulates
and accumulates presence. It is thus that art, techne, image, rep-
resentation, convention, etc., come as supplements to nature
and are rich with this entire cumulating function....
But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It
intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if
one fills a void. If it represents and makes an image, it is by the
anterior default of a presence. 19
As Barbara Johnson has written, Derrida's analysis of sup-
plementarity, in exemplary readings of its production in
Of Grammatology and Dissemination, is "nothing less
than a revolution in the very logic of meaning." She ex-
plains:
The logic of the supplement wrenches apart the neatness of the
metaphysical binary oppositions. Instead of ''A is opposed to B"
we have "B is both added to A and replaces A." A and B are no
longer opposed, nor are they equivalent. Indeed, they are no
longer even equivalent to themselves. They are their own differ-
ance from themselves. "Writing," for example, no longer means
simply '''vords on a page," but rather any differential trace struc-
ture.... "Writing" and "speech" [for example] can therefore no
longer be simply opposed, but neitller have they become iden-
tical. Rather, the very notion of their "identities" is put in ques-
tion.
As a result, Johnson writes, the supplement "carries the
text's signifying possibilities beyond what could reason-
ably be attributed to [an author's] conscious intentions."2o
Supplementarity thus produces what exceeds conscious
intention, what goes beyond authorially controlled mean-
ing. This excess has, in fact, a particular character and
effect, resulting in a textual description that wars with au-
thorial declaration. Involved, moreover, is something other
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and greater than local contradictions-a point particu-
1arly important in considering Pope, who has frequently
been charged with inconsistency and self-contradiction.
To quote Barbara Johnson again, "Derrida's reading
shows how Rousseau's text functions against its own ex-
plicit (metaphysical) assertions, not just by creating am-
biguity, but by inscribing a systematic 'other message' be-
hind or through what is being said." 21 Texts thus are
divided within, differing from "themselves," and that self-
difference is a matter, not of an isolated inconsistency,
contradiction, or error, but of a systematic narrative or
story being told that undermines the more or less explicit
declarations.
That internal division "wrenches apart" all oppositions,
including the apparent opposition I have just posited be-
tween authorial declaration and textual description. Rob-
ert Magliola has recently accused J. Hillis Miller of un-
wittingly lapsing into just such logocentrism when he
"organizes his criticism as constructive (the positing of a
monologic reading) and deconstructive (the subversion of
this reading)." Produced, claims Magliola, "is a closed
pattern structured as a formal opposition." 22 Whether or
not this pattern actually occurs in Miller's practice,23 it is
not inherent in deconstructive criticism. The supplement
produces a both/and situation, supposed oppositions
being revealed as "their own differance from themselves."
What this means in the case of declaration/description is
that each term is already divided within, the monologic
reading already containing within it its own deconstruc-
tion, just as the deconstruction contains the monologic in-
side it; that (therefore) there is a ceaseless oscillation be-
tween the two readings, each being deconstructible in
terms of the other; and that the reader is unable to decide
between them, to determine the priority of the one over
the other.
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Further, the systematic description written through
what is being declared does not result from the willful im-
position by the reader of a theory or meaning "extrinsic"
to the text. Contrary to the allegations of opponents of
such double reading, the "systematic 'other message'" is
there, in the textual description-though it requires the
work of the reader for its story to be "heard." The reader
is thus actively involved, helping to present that story and
being, as Roland Barthes claims, "no longer a consumer,
but a producer of the text."24 The reader-text relation is
another both/and situation: despite the claims of both ob-
jectivists and subjectivists, the former privileging the text
just as the latter make the reader determiner of meaning,
both reader and text are involved in a story of struggle for
mastery.25
This way of understanding reading as the story of the in-
eluctable involvement of both reader and text seems es-
pecially suitable in the case of Pope. It may at last allow
us to bring the reader into the study of Pope's poetry, from
which he or she has heretofore largely been excluded. I by
no means wish to deny or minimize the contributions of
work produced under the powerful influence of New Crit-
icism, which in one form or another has dominated Pope
studies for decades, but increasingly we are aware of the
price paid for those notable achievements. Certainly the
flesh-and-blood reader, in a specific historical situation
with a panoply of desires, has mattered little (or so it has
been assumed and argued) in the determination of poetic
meaning. Frederick M. Keener maintains that the
twentieth-century reader of Pope has by and large effaced
himself or herself before the poems: "Elegant, aloof, most
modern criticism of Pope reads as if it emanated not from
twentieth-century America or England but from some
miraculously undisturbed eighteenth-century estate, what
Double Reading Pope~ 1 1
Hugh Kenner has called 'the professional Popeans'
Natchez-Augustan manor'''; the goal, according to
Keener, has been to read Pope's poems as if one were his
"ideal contemporary": "the critic becomes a chameleon
on the poetry, bringing out color but himself disappearing
in the process."26 Certainly Pope studies would benefit, as
would some more austere forms of deconstruction, from
Geoffrey Hartman's insistence on the chiasmic relation-
ship of critic and text, a situation, indeed, of interrelation-
ship in which texts receive their strength from the strength
they give.27 In relating Pope and theory, and in shuttling
between Pope's poetry and the formal ideas of recent crit-
ical theory, I have tried in these essays to keep Hartman's
teaching in mind, though I grant the limitations of my
effort as well as the need (unfulfilled here) to consider the
relationship of Pope's texts and their readers in light of
work currently being advanced by the so-called new his-
toricism.
At any rate, deconstruction holds out the possibility, not
only of correcting the situation Keener laments and bring-
ing the reader and his or her historically situated interests
(for example, interest in deconstruction) into the interpre-
tive process, but also of considering other neglected con-
cerns. One of the several opportunities deconstruction
offers the student of Pope is precisely the consideration
of concerns and strategies largely unremarked. Among
them, as it happens, are Pope's ways of involving and im-
plicating the reader in the production of his meanings
(about which more shortly) and his not-infrequent way of
both de-mythologizing and even deconstructing. De-
mythologizing occurs prominently in An Essay on Man as
Pope shatters various myths concerning man and his ca-
pacities' and deconstruction appears in, for example, the
Epistle to Burlington as Pope describes Bubo's mansion as
a "standing sermon" against "Magnificence" (11. 19-22).
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What Pope does here, and elsewhere, parallels what de-
construction involves: he reads against the grain. In the
chapters that follow, I explore various relations Pope's po-
etry has with deconstruction. Deconstruction exists within
Pope's poems in at least three ways: like other texts, Pope's
deconstruct themselves; Pope sometimes adopts positions
and offers statements that, as in Burlington, clearly paral-
lel deconstruction; and such a poem as Dunciad IV offers
an intriguing twist by providin_g the occasion to read de-
construction in light of Pope.28
Far from entailing an imposition of theory or of the
reader's desires on (helpless) texts, deconstruction actually
shares witll Pope some fundamental attitudes and strate-
gies. One central concern of deconstruction-differ-
ence-is also, in its many forms, one of Pope's major con-
cerns. Focusing on difference, as I will do in this book, is,
then, a way of being faithful both to Pope's apparent in-
tentions and to the strategy of reading that I believe cur-
rently offers the deepest arId richest "approach" to texts.
Difference is, first of all, a prominent fact about Pope's
life. He was different: Roman Catholic in an Anglican
country, unusually short, hunchbacked, prone to disease
(in An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, he writes movingly of "this
long Disease, my Life," 1. 132), acutely sensitive, and
greatly talented-these and other well-rehearsed facts
contributed to Pope's difference. However, and to what-
ever degree, his personal difference affected his writing,
Pope's poems in various ways involve quest(ion)s of differ-
ence: for example, a desire of personal distinction and dif-
ferentiation, efforts on behalf of cultural discrimination,
and attempts to preserve and enhance social and political
order. In the poetry difference functions not merely as
both a major theme and a goal but also as an important
strategy involving the reacler. A number of Pope's poems
are so constructed as to call into play, test, and increase
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the reader's ability to make certain necessary distinctions
and discriminations. No matter the particular operation of
difference, apparent throughout Pope's poetry is a deter-
mined opposition to equivocation (in Arbuthnot he re-
serves his severest criticism for Sporus, "one vile Antithe-
sis. / Amphibious Thing!" [11. 325-26]).
Characteristic of Pope, in fact, is a quest of clear, dis-
tinct lines and absolute differences. Typically structured
around binary oppositions, Pope's poems explore relations
between inside and outside, proper and improper, truth
and un-truth, reading and writing, self and other. Pope's
declared position generally is that the difference between
the terms in such oppositions can be determined and
stated unequivocally. Like that of the "theoretical" man in
Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, Pope's appears to be the
"unsllakable faith that thought, using the thread of logic,"
can "separate true knowledge from appearance and er-
ror." 29 No matter how fine it is, and no matter the difficulty
we have in perceiving it, there is always for Pope what An
Essay on Man calls "th' insuperable line" (I. 228), estab-
lishing difference.
That contemporary critical theory shares Pope's interest
in and work with difference should already be apparent
from my discussion above of deconstruction. In fact, there
is a "tradition of difference," which J. Hillis Miller has de-
scribed in a review essay on M. H. Abrams's Natural
Supernaturalism. Obviously indebted to Saussure, this tra-
dition maintains that difference, rather than identity or
sameness, is originary: "similarity arises from difference
rather than difference from similarity." I quote from Mil-
ler's important elaboration on this point:
The situation of dispersal, separation, and unappeasable desire
is the "original" and perpetual human predicament. The dream
of primal and final unity, always deferred, never present here
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and now, is generated by the original and originating differen-
tiation. The beginning was diacritical.
Such an alternative pattern to the one Abrams traces would
deny that the One comes first. It would deny the existence of
"opposites" which are fragmented parts of an original whole. It
would deny that history has a goal of reunification. In place of
the notion that the origin is unity, Nietzsche, Deleuze, or Der-
rida would put the idea of a primal difference or differentia-
tion.... In place of the notion of opposites ("Without contraries
is no progression," said Blake), Nietzsche would put the idea of
degrees of difference, differentiated forces which are not oppo-
sites, but points on the same scale, distinctions of the same en-
ergy, as reason is nature deferred or separated from itself.
"There are no more opposites:" wrote Nietzsche, "only from
those of logic do we derive th.e concept of opposites-and falsely
transfer it to things."
Even that most stable notion of univocity and identity, the
self, is deconstructed by the "tradition of difference," as
Miller explains: "In place of the notion of the unity of the
thinking subjectivity so essential to the project of the hu-
manization of metaphysics, Nietzsche would put the idea
of a multiplicity of forces struggling for dominion within
the 'self': 'The assumption of one single subject is perhaps
unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a
multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is
the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general?
A kind of aristocracy of equals, used to ruling jointly and
understanding how to command?/My hypothesis: The
subject as multiplicity.'" Miller points out that "this alter-
native scheme, with its various aspects or motifs, has al-
ways been present as a shadow or reversed mirror image
within the Western tradition." 30 To reveal its operation in
Pope's poems, and to narrate the story it produces there,
is a major goal of this book, which might be considered
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an extended meditation on Miller's account of the "tradi-
tion of difference."
But even if a "tradition of difference" must be rigorously
distinguished from a "tradition of identity,"31 common
sense alone suggests that sameness and difference do not
and cannot exist in the other's absence, indeed that they
have no meaning apart from each other. They are, there-
fore, always already related, and that relational structure
owes nothing to man and his efforts. Differance names the
structure wherein sameness is inhabited by-contains a
"trace" of-difference, just as difference is inhabited by
and contains a "trace" of sameness. Relation thus derives
from differance, rather than from human effort: because
entities (linguistic, social, human) differ not only from one
another (though not absolutely) but also from "them-
selves," differences between them are mitigated, and,
there being no absolutely distinct, univocal identities, re-
lation exists. It is available to us (like-or as-grace?) if
only we will accept it. Pope's poems tell this story.
~ Chapter Two
Fair Art's
"Treach'rous Colours"
The Fate of "Gen 'rous Converse"
in An Essay on Criticism
How better to begin a critical reading of Pope's poems
than by attending to what he writes about reading?
Though he thematizes reading most prominently in the
moral epistles and satires of the 1730S, Pope's first major
poem, An Essay on Criticism, already offers clear insight
into a range of related issues. Here Pope treats not only
reading but also language, the relation of language to
thought, the relation of readers to texts, and much more.
In discussing the Essay, I shall focus on this matter of re-
lations, particularly the kinds of relation obtaining within
the various differences that serve to structure the poem.
On Reading Generously
The remarkably rich commentary published on An Essay
on Criticism both provides the occasion and prompts the
desire to reread it. I begin with one of the strongest recent
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readings of the Essay, that by David B. Morris. Entitled
"Civilized Reading: The Act of Judgment in An Essay on
Criticism," this study is important not only for its carefully
considered argument that Pope's poem merits a place of
some distinction in the history of literary theory but also
for its own sensitive-and civilized-analysis of the poem
as poem. 1 As he perceptively focuses on the role of gener-
osity in the poem and in the theory it elaborates, Morris
reminds us of Pope's important use of the parts-whole
problem,2 particularly in directing attention to the reader-
text relationship thematized in An Essay on Criticism.
Though he does not develop the point, Morris suggests
that the poem, in discussing the act of reading, tells us
how it itself is to be read.
Morris's account runs somewhat as follows: Interpreting
pride as the virtual opposite of the generosity Pope advo-
cates, Morris claims that the "effect of pride, within the
context of Pope's Essay, is always a pressure toward par-
tiality and fragmentation, blocking comprehensiveness of
vision. In its pressure against wholeness, pride radically
constricts understanding by attaching us to cherished
opinions and to favored fragments." 3 Generosity plays the
hero to the villain pride in this critical story, permitting
the necessary attention to the whole. It makes possible
"an equitable judgment by consciously rejecting whatever
is incomplete and partisan." 4 Questions remain, however,
as Morris recognizes. I-Iow, he asks,
can the critic gain access to the author's mental processes and
undeclared purposes which are required for understanding the
"Whole" work? Pope's answer to this difficult question is the
power of sympathy. Sympathy, like friendship and virtue, is a
necessary characteristic of the generous critic. As an aspect of
generosity, it permits the critic to achieve a close emotional and
intellectual kinship with the author under study: "No longer his
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Interpreter, but He." The generous critic reads with a sympa-
thetic understanding, which, when perfectly attuned, allows a
presumptive reconstruction of authorial plans and purposes and
processes which complement a judicious study of the text. 5
In Pope's own words: "A perfect Judge will read each Work
of Wit / With the same Spirit that its Author writ" (11. 233-
34). Even if the idea is parodied in A Tale of a Tub,6 all
authors devoutly wish for such sympathetic involvement
on the part of their readers.
This "civilized" position may be as attractive to readers
as to authors. The call for generosity and sympathetic
understanding suggests humanity as it entails a subordi-
nation of the individual (or to use Pope's term, the part) to
the whole, a giving of the self to something outside and
larger. Certainly it is consonant with Pope's thematic fo-
cus, not only in An Essay on Criticism but also in An Essay
on Man and the later Dunciad, as well as with his insis-
tence on the moral qualities of the poet, all of which links
him to that humanism that Aubrey Williams and others
have ably described. As Morris argues, the task that Pope
holds out for readers is the difficult one of subordinating
oneself to and melding with the "Spirit" of the author.
This "generous" position perhaps calls to mind what I
wrote in the opening chapter concerning the need to at-
tend to authorial declarations, first of all reading with the
grain. But if the parallel initially appears close between
the two positions, it soon ends, since I go on to propose
what is evidently contrary to Pope's theory. Indeed, the op-
posite of such generosity of spirit as Pope advocates would
seem to be not only the partiality, prejudice, and pride that
he explicitly condemns but also the (apparently) correla-
tive effort I manifest, whereby, after first attending to au-
thorial declarations, we proceed to read against the grain.
If the strategy I labeled, immodestly enough, reader-
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responsibility criticism first reads "With the same Spirit
that [the] Author writ," it later sets out deliberately to vio-
late that spirit. Ungenerously perhaps, it turns against the
"Spirit" with which the author wrote, reading contrary to
it, in fact.
If we read deconstructively, proceeding as I have urged,
are we not then implicated in and convicted of the pride
that Pope attacks? An answer to that question may not be
so easy as supposed by those polemicists who regard
"speculative" or "creative" criticism, and deconstruction
in particular, as proud and overbearing, if not actually Sa-
tanic. This is not the place to debate the issue, but in pass-
ing I direct attention to, among other contexts for under-
standing deconstructive strategies and desires, Richard A.
Lanham's account of "the rhetorical ideal of life," defined
as both dramatic and competitive.? Here I shall argue that
if we limit our reading of An Essay on Criticism to Pope's
own declared "Spirit" and the principles he supports, we
will not only miss much but also end with at best a par-
tial-and impoverished-sense of the considerable
achievement that is the Essay. At the same time, I insist
that Pope has much to teach all readers about reading,
including deconstructionists and traditional scholars.
Reading "With the same Spirit that [the] Author writ" re-
mains essential (at least as a first "step").
The Style Is the Man
I begin with what we might call, borrowing terms from
Pope, the poem's "Gen'rous Converse" (1. 641). This
phrase, which the Twickenham Edition glosses as "well-
bred intercourse," occurs toward the end of An Essay on
Criticism as Pope describes the "ideal critic," one who,
while avoiding the pride and partiality the poet has
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lashed, bodies forth those qualities he has praised
throughout. "Unbiass'd" and "Blest with a Taste . .. un-
confin'd," the "ideal critic" enjoys ''A Knowledge both of
Books and Humankind" (II. 633,639-40). A whole person
himself, in other words, such a critic effects an intercourse
between qualities not always found combined in one man:
he is "Still pleas'd to teach, and yet not proud to know,"
and "Tho' Learn'd, well-bred; and tho' well-bred, sin-
cere; / Modestly bold, and Humanly severe" (II. 632,
635-36).
An Essay on Criticism works toward a similar wholeness,
blurring some distinctions too easily assumed to be abso-
lute and seeking "Gen'rous Converse" between the various
dichotomies it develops, including wit/judgment, poetry/
criticism, sense/sound, and thought/language. The exact-
ing scholarship on the poem has, of course, long pointed
to the complemerltariness Pope works hard to establish be-
tween the poles of such dichotomies. Characterized by an
apparent flexibility and a preference for "the complica-
tions rather than the simplifications of artistic truth,"
Pope's poem may be said "to harmonize the extremes and
variables of critical thinking," aiming toward a "critical
synthesis" and "the reconciliation of conflicting critical
moods."8 Complementariness, as well as generosity, ap-
pears when Pope declares, for instance, that "The Sound
must seem an Eccho to the Sense" (1. 365) and that "The
gen'rous Critick fann'd the Poet's Fire" (1. 100). Similarly,
to take one more example, Pope writes that, even if "often
... at strife," wit and judgment are "meant each other's
Aid, like Man and Wife" (11. 82-83).
Pope's entire effort in the Essay may stem from a per-
ceived threat to such "Gen'rous Converse." That is, Pope
addresses situations, mainly critical ones, of course, where
complementariness has deteriorated into opposition.
Thus he charges, for example, that if in a better past "The
An Essay on Criticism~ 2 1
gen'rous Critick fann'd the Poet's Fire, / And taught the
World, with Reason to Admire," the present is different,
indeed "fallen":
Then Criticism the Muse's Handmaid prov'd,
To dress her Charms, and make her more belov'd;
But following Wits from that Intention stray'd;
Who cou'd not win the Mistress, woo'd the Maid;
Against the Poets their own Arms they turn'd,
Sure to hate most the Men from whom they learn'd.
[H. 102-7]
Against such antagonism Pope directs his efforts in the
Essay, not only arguing, as we have already glimpsed, that
wit and judgment are bound together, but also demon-
strating that fact in writing criticism as poetry.
Noticing such attempts to effect complementary rela-
tions between dichotomous pairs, we approach an intel-
lectual controversy that serves as a crucial backdrop
against which An Essay on Criticism should be read. As is
apparent in Pope's criticism of various tendencies to sepa-
rate wit and judgment, language and thought, he chal-
lenges the attempts, in the work of philosophers and of
members of the Royal Society alike, to drive a wedge be-
tween res et verba. As Aubrey Williams has written,
"Slighting the theory that sense informs words, like the
soul the body, the [seventeenth] century moves from Ba-
con's view that 'words are but the images of matter' to the
Royal Society's repudiation of words in favour of things.
From being the means to wisdom, words become obstacles
to knowledge."9 The tendency to divorce words from
things, leaving language only a secondary ~nd decorative
function, received powerful support from Peter Ramus's
influential re-definition of rhetoric. Ramus diverted in-
vention and disposition from rhetoric to logic, which left
22 c1\. Quests ofDifference
the former only the diminished duty of "gilding the mat-
ter, the function of mere 'style' and delivery." 10 In philos-
ophers like Hobbes and Locke, the powerful drive to sun-
der words and things takes the form of a debate over the
respective capacities of wit and judgment, though the re-
sult is the same: an implicit "trivialization of poetry it-
self." 11 In such philosophers, according to Williams, "the
faculty of Wit and the figurative language it inspires are
seen as unrelated to truth and real knowledge, to 'things
as they are.' Since figurative language is of the essence of
poetry, the denial of its ability to express truth is the denial
of the value and dignity of poetry. At best, the main role
of Wit or of poetry becomes (as in Ramistic theory) the
mere ornamentation of those truths provided for it by the
judgment." 12 Since the humanist considered "the 'word'
as 'wisdom' expressed," it was most important that any ef-
fort be confronted that would "empty eloquence of its wis-
dom, squeeze out of the word the thought it was believed
to embody." 13 The way in which the humanist-rhetorical
tradition regarded the word-thought relationship appears
with particular clarity in the mid-century British Educa-
tion, written by Thomas Sheridan, Swift's godson and fa-
ther of the famous playwright. Stressing the "intimate
connection between ideas and words," Sheridan claims
that "the union of the soul and body are [sic] not more
necessary for any useful purpose in life, than the union of
oratory and philosophy for their mutual welfare." Some-
what more specifically, he writes, echoing Pope's particu-
lar concerns in An Essay on Criticism, that there is "such
an intimate connection between ideas and words, lan-
guage and knowledge, that whatever deficiency, or fault,
there may be in the one, necessarily affects the other....
[May not the] corruption of our understandings [be ow-
ing] to those of our style? Are not our minds chiefly stored
An Essay on Criticism c1!\, 23
with ideas by words, and must not clearness or obscurity
in the one, necessarily produce the same in the other?" 14
In Dunciad ~ Pope presents as an accomplished fact
the "decline of rhetoric into mere verbalism," 15 critic,
schoolmaster, and Dulness herself joining together in
proudly proclaiming that "on Words is still our whole de-
bate" (1. 219) and that they thus wage "war with Words
alone" (1. 178). In An Essay on Criticism it is, less dramat-
ically, a real and present danger. Directly addressing the
perceived threat to wit, poetry, and figurative language,
Pope pointedly defines "True Wit" as
... Nature to Advantage drest,
What oft was Thought, but ne'er so well Exprest,
Something, whose Truth convinc'd at Sight we find,
That gives us back the Image of our Mind.
[II. 297-300]
He is unsparing in lashing those who "unskill'd to trace /
The naked Nature and the living Grace, / With Gold and
Jewels cover ev'ry Part, / And hide with Ornaments their
Want of Art" (11. 293-96). Similarly, Pope rebukes those
who "for Language all their Care express, / And value
Books, as Women Men, for Dress" (11. 305-6). Frequently
employing the familiar metaphor of dress, which in fact
becomes in the Essay the metaphor of metaphor, Pope fol-
lows a long and distinguished line of critics who so depict
expression, Dryden, for one, writing that "expression ...
is a modest clothing of our thoughts, as breeches and pet-
ticoats are of our bodies." 16 In the Essay, Pope defines
"true Expression" as that which, "like th' unchanging
Sun, / Clears, and improves whate'er it shines upon, / It
gilds all Objects, but it alters none. / Expression is the
Dress of Thought" (11. 315-18).
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Reading such declarations in the context of the
humanist-rhetorical tradition and the various contempo-
rary assaults upon it, Aubrey Williams finds only comple-
mentariness. For Pope, he maintains, words embody
thought. On this argument, the same notion informs bod-
ies, Nature itself, and "expression"; that is, just as Nature
figures forth God, so,
In some fair Body thus th' informing Soul
With Spirits feeds, with Vigour fills the whole,
Each Motion guides, and ev'ry Nerve sustains;
It self unseen, but in th' Effects, remains. [H. 76-79]
Claiming that "the style is the man," Williams evidently
means that style, or "expression," mirrors perfectly and
reflects accurately what one is, just as words incarnate
thought. By no means mere ornamentation (as Hobbes,
Locke, and others had recently proposed), despite the in-
side/outside, contained/container dichotomies that the
metaphor of dress implies, words and the expression they
constitute are, in this rather "Christian" formulation, not
detachable from thought, sense, and meaning, even if
thought can somehow exist without, and precede, lan-
guage.
The Skidding of Meaning
But is the relationship one of embodiment and incarna-
tion, as has been supposed? It is certainly true that at least
at times in An Essay on Criticism Pope insists on the insep-
arability of thought and language, as well as of inside and
outside. In one important passage, however, occurs a de-
scription establishing not the embodiment of preexistent
thought in language but their interimplication. I refer to
An Essay on Criticism c1\. 25
those verses in which Pope parallels poetry and painting,
detailing the catastrophic effect of time on both media. 17
As in one, so in the other, Pope declares; since we have
only ''failing Language," "such as Chaucer is, shall Dry-
den be":
So when the faithful Pencil has design'd
Some bright Idea of the Master's Mind,
Where a new World leaps out at his command,
And ready Nature waits upon his Hand;
When the ripe Colours soften and unite,
And sweetly melt into just Shade and Light,
When mellowing Years their full Perfection give,
And each Bold Figure just begins to Live;
The treach'rous Colours the fair Art betray,
And all the bright Creation fades away! [II. 482-93]
Though time initially exerts a positive effect on the artistic
media, in fact mellowing "Colours" to "full Perfection,"
they eventually "fade" and ultimately disappear. As the
"Colours" do so, Pope admits, they "betray" and, indeed,
un-create the art that they make. Such destruction is pos-
sible in written texts, "fair Art's" "Colours" being equally
"treach'rous" in them, only if, of course, language and its
figures do much more than enhance, dress, or gild
thought. Rather than body forth a preexistent thought,
"Colours" are inseparable from it because they create it.
But the interimplication described in this passage does
not principally characterize the relationship that obtains
between language and thought in the Essay. If it is not one
of interimplication, it is not unproblematically of insepa-
rable links, either. Consider carefully the frequent dress
metaphor that we have already noted. This particular
metaphor clearly suggests a dichotomy and, indeed, an
opposition of words and thought, with the latter existing
as the inside, the former the outside. This opposition ap-
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pears in Pope's remark in I 726 in a letter to Broome that
"the most poetical dress whatever, will avail little without
a sober fund of sense and good thought." 18 Paralleling var-
ious comments in An Essay on Criticism, this statement
points to a hierarchical opposition in which thought is not
only depicted as distinct from language but also privileged
as prior to its formulation and expression in language. As
a "fund," thought comes first, lies at bottom, and serves as
ground. Repeating this familiar position, Williams writes
that in the understanding of the humanist-rhetorical tra-
dition "speech reproduced thought in words" (my italics).19
No matter the argument elsewhere concerning the insep-
arability of words and thought, this statement reveals not
only the logo- and phonocentric privileging of speech but
also the assumption that thought is distinct from, prior to,
and possible apart from language.
Even if "'tis hard to say" (1. I) what certain differences
are and to make necessary discriminations, it is clear that
Pope regards thought and expression as distinct, albeit re-
lated, entities. Consider, first, some lines I quoted earlier,
perhaps Pope's clearest statement on the relationship of
language and thought: "true Expression, like th' unchang-
ing Sun, / Clears, and improves whate'er it shines upon, /
It gilds all Objects, but it alters none."20 To echo Paul de
Man writing in quite a different context, these lines must
be read, not simply paraphrased.21 To begin with, note
that, even if, in clearing, improving, and gilding the ob-
jects it shines upon, the sun does not "alter" those objects,
it obviously changes their appearance and thus inevitably
our perception of and reaction to them. With expression,
in any case, the situation is different: to claim either that
expression does not "alter" or that it does amounts to the
same thing; it assumes that expression and thought or
meaning are distinct and separable and that thought is
prior to its "expression" in language.
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Essentially the same position appears in the following
couplet: "Launch not beyond your Depth," Pope advises,
"but be discreet, / And mark that Point where Sense and
Dulness meet" (11. 50-51). When read "analytically," as de
Man recommends, Pope's assumption emerges clearly: it
is that such differences as those between sense and dul-
ness are absolute and that, though at some point they
meet, they remain distinct. If they meet at some point, it is
only because they are absolute distinctions. Were they
each other's differance, as Derrida has argued concerning
all binary oppositions, they could not meet at a point. For
Pope, clearly, the desire is to mark the place where meet-
ing occurs, and his act of creating the opposition sets
meaning in place and keeps it from what might truly per-
mit "Gen'rous Converse" and fruitful (if not well-bred)
intercourse.
There are, though, no clear, distinct, and absolute lines
of demarcation between dulness and sense (which is not
to say, of course, that they are indistinguishable). Mean-
ing refuses to stay still and in place; instead, it skids, and
so no "point" exists where sense or dulness is simply "it-
self" or where these differences meet as distinct entities,
let alone oppositions. I am reminded of the blind/insight-
ful Hack who comments in A Tale of a Tub upon "how
near the frontiers of height and depth border upon each
other," how "one who travels the east [eventually runs]
into the west," and how "a straight line [is eventually]
drawn by its own length into a circle." 22 It is not, then, that
sense and dulness, like those other pairs of difference
treated in An Essay on Criticism, are simply linked, for the
idea of linking presupposes distinction and, ultimately,
separation. Rather, they are always already interimpli-
cated, bound together, and cross in a constant movement.
That this is so, that meaning refuses to stay in place, be-
comes clear in the second verse of the couplet we are read-
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ing: "Mark," Pope advises, "that Point." A mark is, by def-
inition, "a visible impression or trace upon something,"
and "to mark" is, for example, not only to notice or to
heed but also (therefore) to single out, to make distinct, to
put a mark on, "to trace or form by or as by marks" (Ran-
dom House Dictionary). If one marks a point, does that
point exist prior to the act of marking? The point marked
may be, in other words, constituted and brought into
"being" by the mark. The mark is, of course, writing, and
as mark, writing is creative in a manner and to an extent
that Pope certainly does not declare. Pope's language es-
tablishes, however, that marking, that is, writing, is per-
formative, as well as mimetic. Pope creates the point be-
tween sense and dulness.
Another couplet in the Essay makes even clearer the
power of performance. I refer to lines 574-75, where Pope
grants the performative nature of his own earlier claims
that knowledge and "the Seeds of Judgment" are born
with human being, though "by false Learning is good
Sense defac'd" (11. 20, 25): "Men must be taught as if you
taught them not; / And Things unknown propos'd as
Things forgot." Rather than a faithful mirroring of reality,
Pope's claims regarding inherent judgment and knowl-
edge are propositions: one proposes that the unknown is
what one knew but forgot. The inside thus loses its privi-
leged status, for performance, supposedly an outside per-
haps analogous to "dress," emerges as creative in the same
way as language.
Playing the Part
The power of performance, as of language, appears in the
textual description woven by An Essay on Criticism. Pope's
declarations, however, constitute quite a different story.
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They tell, often at least, not of a complementary relation-
ship, as has been claimed, but of a particular kind of un-
generous relationship between thought and language.
That relationship Derrida depicts as characteristic of our
familiar dichotomies. "In a classical philosophical oppo-
sition," he writes, "we are not dealing with the peaceful
coexistence of a vis-iI-vis, but rather with a violent hier-
archy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologi-
cally, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand." Crucial to
dichotomies, according to Derrida, is "the conflictual and
subordinating structure of opposition." 23
The dichotomies that structure An Essay on Criticism
participate fully in the situation that Derrida describes.
Not only thought/language but also sense/sound, wit/
judgment, poetry/criticism, and (hardly surprising) whole/
part reflect this characteristic hierarchical and opposi-
tional structure. Thus, if in "proper" poetry, "The Sound
must seem an Eccho to the Sense," the latter is privileged,
given priority (both metaphorically and literally), and
made dominant over sound, whose function is simply to
repeat. The relationship Pope stresses between parts and
whole captures that operative in the other dicllotomies.
That is, as he does later in both An Essay on Man and
Dunciad IV; where the issue also figures prominently, Pope
reverses the hierarchizing that installs a favorite part in the
privileged position: "Most Criticks," he writes in An Essay
on Criticism, "fond of some subservient Art, / Still make
the Whole depend upon a Part" (11. 263-64). What mat-
ters, Pope insists, "Is not th' Exactness of peculiar Parts; /
'Tis not a Lip, or Eye, we Beauty call, / But the joint Force
and full Result of all" (11. 244-46). The part must, then,
sacrifice itself and submit to the whole.
Even if at first it appears generous and complementary,
the relationship of wit and judgment is characterized by
the same hierarchical structure. Though Pope claims that
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they are "meant each other's Aid, like Man and Wife," he
precedes this complementary account with the somewhat
less generous statement that wit contains within itself the
judgmental faculty or ability: "Some, to whom Heav'n in
Wit has been profuse, / Want as much more, to turn it to
its use" (11. 80-81). That judgment is thus subordinated to
wit is perhaps even clearer in the version of these lines that
appeared in the poem from 171 1 to 1743: "There are
whom Heav'n has blest with store of Wit, / Yet want as
much again to manage it." Unlike Hobbes and Locke, as
well as certain of Pope's enemies who decried the alleged
confusion in these lines, he obviously refuses to divorce
wit and judgment. But the relationship between them is
not so generous as is sometimes supposed.
Nor is that between poetry and criticism. As we have
seen, Pope declares the complementariness between
them: in ancient Greece, at least, "The gen'rous Critick
fann'd the Poet's Fire." But if "Criticism the Muse's Hand-
maid prov'd, / To dress her Charms, and make her more
belov'd," its function was nevertheless subordinate, sub-
servient, and so parallel to that involving expression and
thought. The dress metaphor establishes criticism as, like
language and expression, an outside whose task is to en-
hance an inside. Criticism thus seems marginal.
Pope himself is, of course, writing criticism, but he does
so-the obvious perhaps bears repeating-in poetic form,
which indicates the privilege he affords poetry. Just as wit
includes judgment, so poetry thus encompasses criticism.
Indeed, from the beginning of the Essay, Pope contends
that only those skilled in writing (poetry) should evaluate
writing or teach others how to write: "Let such teach oth-
ers who themselves excell," Pope declares, ''And censure
freely who have written well" (11. 15-16). Writing well is,
then, for Pope a necessary license for a critic. In this re-
gard, the ideal is Horace:
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He, who Supream in Judgment, as in Wit,
Might boldly censure, as he boldly writ,
Yet judg'd with Coolness tho' he sung with Fire;
His Precepts teach but what his Works inspire.
[II. 657-60]
Moreover, in writing criticism, Pope brings together wit
and judgment, exhibiting wit in performing the critical
function and demonstrating-indeed, embodying-the
proper way to make critical judgments. As a matter of fact,
Pope draws in the attributes of the "ideal critic," amassing
to himself the qualities he praises. If any doubts remain
that the "speaking voice" ofAn Essay on Criticism embod-
ies those features Pope singles out as crucial in a critic,
they are surely dispelled as he ends the poem with an ex-
plicit account of himself. Acknowledging the support of
his friend Walsh, Pope recalls the earlier portrait of the
"ideal critic":
The Muse, whose early Voice you taught to Sing,
Prescrib'd her Heights, and prun'd her tender Wing,
(Her Guide now lost) no more attempts to rise,
But in low Numbers short Excursions tries:
Content, if hence th' Unlearn'd their Wants may view,
The Learn'd reflect on what before they knew:
Careless of Censure, nor too fond of Fame,
Still pleas'd to praise, yet not afraid to blame,
Averse alike to Flatter, or Offend,
Not free from Faults, nor yet too vain to mend.
[II. 735-44]
Made clear in the poem's ethical appeal is Pope's intention
to achieve in and by means of it what he describes Lon-
ginus as accomplishing:
Thee, bold Longinus! all the Nine inspire,
And bless their Critick with a Poet's Fire.
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An ardent Judge, who Zealous in his Trust,
With Warmth gives Sentence, yet is always Just;
Whose own Example strengthens all his Laws,
And Is himself that great Sublime he draws.
[lI. 675-80]
The ideal is, then, inside An Essay on Criticism. The
implications of this fact require careful consideration, es-
pecially as they bear on the parts/whole relationship. That
fact, in turn, is related to the way the poem imperialisti-
cally seeks closure and totality. The Essay not only tells us
how it is to be read (with the "Spirit" with which Pope
wrote, properly subordinating parts, however interesting
and compelling in themselves, to the whole), but it also
closes in upon itself, reflexively. What is involved as a re-
sult we need now to consider.
As it aggrandizes, privileges, and celebrates poetry, An
Essay on Criticism becomes what Cleanth Brooks has
called, referring to another poem, "an instance of the doc-
trine which it asserts." Like Donne's "The Canonization,"
which Brooks discusses, the Essay, in other words, "is both
[an] assertion and the realization of the assertion." 24 If
we read the poem, as Pope evidently intends, as a self-
reflexive embodiment of its own theoretical principles and
thematic assertions, we perform, according to Jonathan
Culler, the critical move "in which the text is shown to
describe its own signifying processes and thus said to
stand free as a self-contained, self-explanatory aesthetic
object that enacts what it asserts." 25
For the New Criticism, of course, whose contribution to
Pope studies has been quite impressive, a poem's perform-
ance, dramatization, or embodiment of its own doctrines
and themes signals its wholeness, totality, and "organic
unity." Brooks's image for the free-standing, complete aes-
thetic object, which almost religiously fuses being and
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doing, is, of course, the well-wrought urn. Against such a
possibility, Derrida, de Man, and others have recently
mounted compelling arguments denying that discourse
can ever fully account for itself, or become present to it-
self, in an act of self-referentiality or self-possession. Per-
formative and constative, doing and being, it has been
claimed, cannot coincide. Either an excess or a lack al-
ways prevents closure.
Why this is so, and one reason (out of two or three we
shall consider) why An Essay on Criticism does not achieve
the closure and totality it seeks, becomes clear with the
help of Culler's discussion of Brooks's essay on "The Can-
onization." Culler shows how, in Donne's poem, an excess
prevents it from closing itself in. With "The Canoniza-
tion"-the point applies equally to An Essay on Criti-
cism-the excess occurs in the poem's becoming what it
asserts and thematizes. The apparent unity and totality
that Brooks labels a well-wrought urn exceeds "itself," for
in celebrating itself as whole, the poem incorporates into
what it is that very celebration. It may even be, as Culler
claims, that "if the urn is taken to include the response to
the urn, then the responses it anticipates ... become a
part of it and prevent it from closing." 26 At any rate, a self-
reflexive text like An Essay on Criticism becomes other
than-because more than-that whole it celebrates itself
for being. Produced is self-difference: as Culler puts it,
"The structure of self-reference works in effect to divide
the poem [from] itself."27
Such self-reflexivity as characterizes Pope's Essay is
produced by folds, by the poem's folding back upon itself,
trying to fold itself up. When a text engages in such an
effort, as Derrida has shown, "it creates . . . an 'invagi-
nated pocket,' in which an outside becomes an inside and
an inner moment is granted a position of exteriority."28
Invagination Derrida defines as "the inward refolding of
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La gaine [sheath, girdle], the inverted reapplication of the
outer edge to the inside of a form where the outside then
opens a pocket." 29 The process of invagination is so com-
plex that Derrida proceeds to "situate the place, the locus,
in which double invagination comes about, the place
where the invagination of the upper edge on its outer face
... , which is folded back 'inside' to form a pocket and an
inner edge, comes to extend beyond (or encroach on) the
invagination of the lower edge, on its inner face ... ,
which is folded back 'inside' to form a pocket and an outer
edge."30 Adopting Derrida's formulation, we might say
that when An Essay on Criticism seeks to do and be what
it describes and advocates, folding back upon itself, it cre-
ates an invaginated pocket. The outside thus becomes an
inside, but if the outside comes inside, the inside is, then,
not simply an inside. Nor is the outside merely an outside.
As Derrida writes, putting the copula "under erasure,"
"The Outside~ the Inside."31 The implications should be
clear as well for such oppositions as thought and expres-
sion, which enlist under the inside/outside figure. Since
the parts of such dichotomies function not as opposed ab-
solute distinctions but as each other's differance, a "trace"
of the "one" always inhabiting the "other," there is no
point at which completion or closure is or can be attained.
One need not, however, subscribe to Derrida's decon-
structive insights (as compelling as they seem) to reach the
same conclusion. From quite another angle, in fact, we
can appreciate how An Essay on Criticism fails to achieve
wholeness and closure. Recall, to begin with, that as
David B. Morris and others have suggested, the Essay in-
structs the reader in how to read it. But if it does so, in one
sense as writing it violates its own instruction in reading.
Despite, that is, Pope's reiterated insistence that the reader
"Survey the Whole," the poem fails to do what it asks the
(its) reader to do: it does not subordinate all its parts to the
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whole. Indeed, the Essay as we have it could not have been
written on Pope's declared principles, and if it is read only
according to them, as Morris for one suggests, much is
missed-so much that Pope himself obviously relishes.
The point has to do with the purposiveness/play opposi-
tion that Pope sets up, and the best example of what
amounts to a subversion (or deconstruction) of that oppo-
sition as well as of the whole/parts hierarchy occurs, iron-
ically enough, in the poem's second section (lines 201-
559). I say "ironically" because the whole/parts opposition
is itself the center of discussion and in fact the organizing
principle of the entire section, serving to link the seem-
ingly disparate topics treated. Here the pyrotechnical dis-
play of wit and "expressiveness," offered by an ambitious
young poet, calls attention to itself, with the effect that the
reader inevitably looks at it, rather than through it to some
putative whole to which it contributes and supposedly
submits.32 Interestingly, just before he discusses and dem-
onstrates the "expressiveness" poetry can achieve, Pope
criticizes those "Who haunt Pamassus but to please their
Ear, / Not mend their Minds; as some to Church repair, /
Not for the Doctrine, but the Musick there" (11. 341-43). I
quote the most strong-willed and unsubmissive lines:
These Equal Syllables alone require,
Tho' oft the Ear the open Vowels tire,
While Expletives their feeble Aid do join,
And ten low Words oft creep in one dull Line,
While they ring round the same unvary'd Chimes,
With sure Returns of still expected Rhymes.
Where-e'er you find the cooling "Western Breeze,
In the next Line, it whispers thro' the Trees;
If Chrystal Streams with pleasing Murmurs creep,
The Reader's threaten'd (not in vain) with Sleep.
Then, at the last, and only Couplet fraught
With some unmeaning Thing they call a Thought,
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A needless Alexandrine ends the Song,
That like a wounded Snake, drags its slow length
along.
Leave such to tune their own dull Rhimes, and know
What's roundly smooth, or languishingly slow;
And praise the Easie Vigor of a Line,
Where Denham's Strength, and Waller's Sweetness join.
True Ease in Writing comes from Art, not Chance,
As those move easiest who have learn'd to dance.
'Tis not enough no Harshness gives Offence,
The Sound must seem an Eccho to the Sense.
Soft is the Strain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the smooth Stream in smoother Numbers flows;
But when loud Surges lash the sounding Shore,
The hoarse, rough verse shou'd like the Torrent roar.
When Ajax strives, some Rock's vast Weight to throw,
The Line too labours, and the Words move slow;
Not so, when swift Camilla scours the Plain,
Flies o'er th'unbending Corn, and skims along the
Main. [Il. 344-73]
These verses obviously problematize Pope's criticism of
those who privilege language, conceits, numbers, and so
forth, sacrificing a poetic whole to such parts. They in fact
become excessive, Pope's own "part" here refusing, despite
his repeated declarations, to subordinate itself to a reign-
ing purposiveness. A purpose does, of course, exist for
Pope's display of "expressiveness," but no such purpose
can account for the extent of that effort. Like the Alexan-
drine Pope ridicules, at least much of what he writes in
the quoted verses is "needless." In them, at least, play
triumphs over simple purposiveness. But I do not suggest
that this play represents some failure of critical judgment,
that Pope "wanted, or forgot, / The last and greatest Art,
the Art to blot" (Epistle to Augustus, II. 280-81). Far from
it; failure to appreciate the excess the lines represent is an
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impoverishment of Pope's achievement, which transcends
any simple sense of unity and wholeness. One final point:
The view of language implicit in this "excessive" passage
differs from that Pope declares in the poem. Whereas he
generally privileges thought and sense over "expression"
and sound, here, in looking at rather than through lan-
guage, he approaches the Dunces' concentration on words
as such.
Will Equivocation Undo Us?
Of course, as we have seen, Pope typically reverses the hi-
erarchy being established by philosophers and scientists
and privileges wit at the expense of judgment, poetry at
the expense of criticism. Yet at the same time he elevates
thought above language and "expression," which contra-
dicts the "at" view of language implied in the long pas-
sage I just quoted. Indeed, the privileging of thought looks
in a direction different from that implied in the privileging
of wit and poetry; it looks away from poetry, in fact, and
toward philosophy, the very position Pope is concerned in
the Essay to confront and repudiate. Does Pope end up,
then, doing what he indicts others for doing, threatening
the very existence of poetry, in spite of himself?
The answer, confusingly enough, seems to be both yes
and no. That is, an answer depends on whether you refer
to the declaration or the (different) description. It would, I
believe, be an oversimplification as well as a distortion to
assume, therefore, that the equivocation or ambiguity re-
sults from Pope's immaturity, lack of control, or intellec-
tual confusion, with all of which he has been (unfairly)
charged and damned. The bottom line is that An Essay on
Criticism equivocates; more, it oscillates, from one posi-
tion to its supposed opposite. Even if such equivocation
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and oscillation are both more prominent and more blatant
than in certain other texts, equivocation characterizes all
texts, though the particular features and operation differ
considerably. And even if Hamlet claims that "equivoca-
tion will undo us" (~i.120-21), equivocation may be un-
avoidable.
Most important to grasp is the essential structure in all
such oppositions as function in the Essay and Western
thinking generally: the opposed pairs are not separable
and distinct but interimplicated. Lest some misunder-
standing remain, I repeat what the best scholarship on An
Essay on Criticism has long maintained: at the "level" of
declaration, Pope refuses to divorce wit and judgment, po-
etry and criticism, thought and expression. At the same
time, however, the relationship between the "poles" in
each dichotomy is not altogether complementary or
simply generous. In each instance, in fact, a hierarchy ap-
pears, Pope normally reversing the privilege that at the
time was being increasingly accorded to judgment and
straightforward, referential language. With the dichotomy
thought/language, however, Pope seems, in spite of his
declarations to the contrary, on the side of his philosoph-
ical and scientific opponents. The latter position becomes
clear through the kind of close reading that takes us be-
yond or behind Pope's declarations to the "counter" story
being told by the textual description and that leads us not
simply to a confirmation of Pope's declarations (i.e., op-
positional terms are not separable) but to a position differ-
ent from the declared one: namely, that the oppositional
terms are not distinct but, rather, related as each other's
differance. It is not, then, that wit and judgment can be
combined and should be in order to prevent certain disas-
trous consequences. Rather, they always already are re-
lated, bound together, a "trace" of the "one" inevitably
appearing in and inhabiting the "other."
~ Chapter Three
"Some Strange Comfort"
Construction and Deconstruction
in An Essay on Man
Many of the concerns that structure An Essay on Criticism
continue in An Essay on Man. Whereas the earlier poem
reveals Pope's commitment to certain distinctions and op-
positions, his theodicy revolves around his commitment to
the notion of the "proper." This complex idea is itself re-
lated to Pope's central argument in An Essay on Man con-
cerning God's impartiality, which runs counter to the hu-
man desire for and expectation of preferential-and
differentiating-treatment. The work of difference in this
later poem, in both Pope's declarations and the textual de-
scription, is more complicated, in part because, in An Es-
say on Man, deconstruction appears in those declarations,
as an important theme.
The Vanity of Human Wishes
In "The Design" of An Essay on Man, Pope writes:
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There are not many certain truths in this world. It is therefore in
the Anatomy of the Mind as in that of the Body; more good will
accrue to mankind by attending to the large, open, and percep-
tible parts, than by studying too much such finer nerves and
vessels, the conformations and uses of which will for ever escape
our observation. The disputes are all upon these last, and, I will
venture to say, they have less sharpened the wits than the hearts
of men against each other, and have diminished the practice,
more than advanced the theory, of Morality. If I could flatter
myself that this Essay has any merit, it is in steering betwixt the
extremes of doctrines seemingly opposite.
Pope's account here of his approach to religious, philo-
sophical, and ethical questions may be read as an allegory
of the way the reading of his own poem should proceed,
or at least the first "phase" in which we attend to "the
large, open, and perceptible parts," at the expense of
"such finer nerves and vessels" as constitute the narrow
institutional and doctrinal questions that I formerly
wished to study. Respecting Pope's desire to avoid the con-
tentions and disputes arising from consideration of vari-
ous "finer" differences, I begin with large issues, perhaps
the largest ones possible. These include the question of
how an ordinary mortal looks at and conceives of his or
her world, his place in it, and his relation to everything
around him: in short, how he feels about and in (to use
Pope's term) a "universe" that is certainly daunting and
a-mazing. 1
For assistance in this complex undertaking, I draw on
Herbert N. Schneidau's Sacred Discontent: The Bible and
Western Tradition. With the insights of several disciplines,
including critical theory, Schneidau explores the pervasive
implications of differences between Hebraic and Biblical
thinking, on the one hand, and, on the other, classical and
pagan. The latter, he argues, possesses a mythological
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consciousness, which characteristically "affirms conti-
nuity throughout all realms of existence." Positing a "con-
tinuum," "a cosmic ecology of universal interdepen-
dence," the mythological consciousness assures us that
"nothing is really fortuitous or meaningless, at bottom."2
Entailed is a cybernetic view of a closed world, into which
nothing new or threatening-like the kerygma-can
break.
"To discover myth," writes Schneidau, "is to apprehend
a sense of hidden significance and continuity, to feel that
one is stumbling on a treasury of lost and fascinating sym-
boIs, or even to discover that the whole world is a system
of correspondences: in short, myth tantalizes us with the
suggestion that the world is a language which, when illu-
mined, we can learn to read." 3 With its linked analogies
and correspondences, mythological thinking "exhibits
strong metaphorical tendencies. The enmeshing and in-
terlocking of structures is coherently expressed in poetic
evocation of transferable, substitutable qualities and
names. In this world, movement tends to round itself into
totalization, impelled by the principle of closure." 4
The Bible, Schneidau claims, is radically different. To
put the matter in terms that (at least superficially) recall
both Pope's point in An Essay on Man that we look "thro'
Nature, up to Nature's God" (3.432) and his satire in The
Dunciad directed against those who are not "to Nature's
Cause thro' Nature led" (4.468), the Bible insists that
signs "point beyond the natural order, even where that or-
der includes what we would call the miraculous. We are
not being invited to contemplate the powers of nature, as
we are by mythology: another realm of existence alto-
gether is what is suggested. Yahweh is not incarnated in
the appearances, nor do they function as symbolic keys to
him: they are neither continuous with him in any sense,
42 c1\. Quests ofDifference
nor analogous to his essence. The 'cosmic continuum' is
deliberately broken, the forms are arbitrary signals, and
the arbitrariness is the point." 5
The point may also be Saussure's, who showed that the
relation between word and thing, signifier and signified,
despite our expectation, is merely arbitrary.6 In any case,
in opposition to the comforting, closed mythological
world view found all around them, the ancient Hebrews
privileged openness, contingency, and the arbitrary. Their
thinking, accordingly, inclines toward the metonymical; as
Schneidau writes, aphoristically, "Where myth is hypotac-
tic metaphors, the Bible is paratactic metonymies." 7
Among other things, for the Hebrews an unbridgeable
gap exists between the world of the gods and human cul-
ture. No institution, even their own, no matter if divinely
ordained, is sacred and exempt from questioning (is there
a parallel here to Reb Derissa's claim that there is nothing
outside textuality?).8
In place, then, of the "cultural glue" of the mythological
consciousness, writes Schneidau, "what the Bible offers
culture is neither an ecclesiastical structure nor a moral
code, but an unceasing critique of itself. For this critique
a certain cost must be paid: we habitually call this cost
'objectivity,' but its original name was alienation. This cri-
tique ... evolved from deliberately chosen and painfully
intense experience of alienation: as the prophet's sense of
Yahweh weighs him down, he sees man as dust, man's
strivings as futility, and he feels chosen, set apart, es-
tranged." 9
Unsettling, like the Hebrews themselves, who were al-
ways wandering, never settled, this vision is not likely to
comfort or reassure. To use terms by now familiar: Yah-
wism, Hebraism, and a certain Christianity are a matter
of absence, rather than presence, both the Ark and the
Tomb always already being empty. Moreover, the relent-
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less"sacred discontent" of the Bible is not merely different
from the mythological consciousness; it also deliberately
confronts such thinking and actively pursues a process of
disillusioning us concerning one myth after another.
Though there has been much talk, particularly in this cen-
tury, of the need to de-mythologize the Bible, the Bible, as
Schneidau argues, actually de-mythologizes us, shattering
the myriad myths, illusions, and other consolations that
we generally believe sustain us. The Bible is a relentless,
unceasing critique of all our vanities.
Against Partiality, or the Work of Disillusionment
Almost everything we know, or at least have been taught,
about Pope would suggest that he belongs with those sub-
scribing to the mythic notion of a "cosmic continuum." He
does, after all, valorize the myth of the Great Chain of
Being, an idea that Schneidau mentions. 10 Still, we should
not-as I have already hinted-too quickly consign the
poet to the category of those in need of de-mythologizing
or deconstructing. Whatever our later disposition, we
should first attend to Murray Krieger's recent (though
largely undeveloped) suggestion that characteristic of the
eighteenth century is "a widely accepted myth and, in the
period's best minds, the deconstruct[ion] of that myth
(often in spite of-or along with-some lingering alle-
giance to it)." 11 As an example of such deconstruction,
Krieger cites An Essay on Man. This poem, he writes,
seeks to use the epistles after the first to modify that epistle,
which seeks utterly to reduce our confusing reality to the clarity
of a perfect, if unresponsive, art world (''All Nature is but Art,
unknown to thee"). What follows casts back intimations about
the vanity of that confident human projection of cosmos which
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fills the first epistle. In the earliest lines of the second epistle
there is an abrupt shift to the fragile human perspective against
which the confident projection of Epistle One can no longer
stand so confidently. Indeed, in light of those magnificent lines,
very little confidence in human knowledge can be left
standing. 12
But the first epistle may not be quite so clear or confident
as Krieger thinks, nor what follows quite so shaky, at least
not in the terms posited in this suggestive account. It is, I
think, too simple a story to claim that the important dif-
ferences in An Essay on Man lie between the first epistle
and the other three.
The entire poem may be seen, in fact, like the acts of
Yahweh in Schneidau's formulation, as "an agent of dis-
illusionment," 13 with clear de-mythological and even de-
constructive elements. These elements appear in various
ways and at various levels of significance. We might note,
to begin with, the anticipation of deconstructive insights
in such lines as ''All feed on one vain Patron, and enjoy /
Th'extensive blessing of his luxury" (3.61-62), which suc-
cinctly establish the interdependence and interimplication
of host and parasite that J. Hillis Miller has discussed. 14
At one point, Pope even seems to anticipate the Derridean
position that, though logocentric notions must be decon-
structed, they cannot be avoided or eliminated: only put
sous rature. Thus, in discussing the relation of virtue and
vice, Pope maintains that the distinction is by no means
an absolute difference, capable of being arrested or frozen
as an opposition:
Tho' each by turns the other's bound invade,
As, in some well-wrought picture, light and shade,
And oft so mix, the diff'rence is too nice
Where ends the Virtue, or begins the Vice.
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In keeping with deconstruction, in fact, Pope proceeds to
argue even so that virtue and vice do not merely collapse
into one another, becoming indistinguishable. They re-
main different though not absolutely distinct, being (in my
terms) each other's differance:
Fools! who from hence into the notion fall,
That Vice or Virtue there is none at all.
If white and black blend, soften, and unite
A thousand ways, is there no black or white?
Ask your own heart, and nothing is so plain;
'Tis to mistake them, costs the time and pain.
[2.211-16]
Probably the poem's most important, and certainly its
most sustained, work of disillusionment (and de-
mythologizing) appears in the famous opening lines of
Epistle II. Here Pope depicts man, the object (or subject)
of mankind's "proper study" (1. 2) as, if not what Derrida
calls La brisure (the hinge), certainly a both/and creature,
one therefore that shares the basic nature of deconstruc-
tion:
Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the Sceptic side,
With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest,
In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast;
In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer,
Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus'd;
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd;
Created half to rise, and half to fall;
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Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
Sole judge of Truth, in endless Error hurl'd:
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world! [II. 3-18]
Again like de Man and other deconstructionists, Pope rec-
ognizes that, though humankind must render judgments
and make decisions, they will inevitably be erroneous. Er-
ror is simply as unavoidable as what precedes it, the need
to decide.
Pope's de-mythologizing efforts in An Essay on Man, to
which the passage just quoted contributes importantly,
have not, I believe, been sufficiently appreciated in the
commentary. It is clear, of course, that Pope attempts to
put human beings "in their place," disabusing us of vari-
ous grandiose illusions concerning our power and posi-
tion. This he does by directly confronting anthropocen-
trism, claiming, as above, that we possess a both/and
nature, rather than the single, univocal one we often
proudly claim. Indeed, he writes, "Two Principles in hu-
man nature reign" (2.53). Just as we exist in tension (the
ancient idea of metaxy, as Eric Voegelin reminds US),15 be-
tween the angels above and the beasts below us, so we are
composed of both self-love and reason, being passionate
as well as reasonable creatures. Of the two, moreover, pas-
sion is the stronger (2.76), and, perhaps against rationalist
pufferies then circulating, Pope declares, "What Reason
weaves, by Passion is undone" (2.42). He goes on, in fact,
to deny that anyone is preeminently virtuous (or com-
pletely vicious): "Virtuous and vicious ev'ry Man must
be, / Few in th'extreme, but all in the degree" (2.231-32).
Further deflating us is the "ruling passion," "The
Mind's disease," which is "cast and mingled with [our]
very frame" (2.137-38). No matter how much we claim to
follow reason, we are ruled by "one master Passion in the
breast," which "Like Aaron's serpent, swallows up the
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rest" (2.131-32): before the ruling passion, we are essen-
tially helpless. With it our vaunted autonomy is nothing
more, nor less, than a fiction.
Nature its mother, Habit is its nurse;
Wit, Spirit, Faculties, but make it worse;
Reason itself but gives it edge and pow'r;
As Heav'n's blest beam turns vinegar more sowr;
We, wretched subjects tho' to lawful sway,
In this weak queen, some fav'rite still obey.
Ah! if she lend not arms, as well as rules,
What can she more than tell us we are fools?
Teach us to mourn our Nature, not to mend,
A sharp accuser, but a helpless friend!
Or from a judge turn pleader, to persuade
The choice we make, or justify it made;
Proud of an easy conquest all along,
She but removes weak passions for the strong.
[2.145-58]
The implications of the ruling passion are no less devas-
tating to our proud claims that virtuous actions proceed
from a single, conscious choice: "Nature gives us (let it
check our pride) / The virtue nearest to our vice ally'd"
(2.195-96). We are, simply put, thoroughly mixed-and
not so grand-creatures, lacking the autonomy of all-
determining reason and having "light and darkness in our
chaos join'd" (2.203). And "What shall divide" this chaos?
Pope asks. The answer is not supportive of anthropocen-
tric claims: "The God within the mind" (2.204). As
Epistle I insists, employing the theatrical metaphor so im-
portant to the whole poem,16 God directs the play that is
human existence, having given us a script and assigned us
a role. Our task is to play the assigned part. What ulti-
mately matters, to both us and the whole, is how well we
act our part.
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Somewhat as in An Essay on Criticism, Pope plays again
on the idea of "part," "parts," partiality, and impartiality.
In doing so, he continues his de-mythologizing efforts. As
Milton does in his own theodicy, Pope declares that the
purpose of his poem is to "vindicate the ways of God to
Man" (1.16; less juridical, perhaps, Milton wrote "jus-
tify"). Pope's vindication entails developing the point, con-
tra God's detractors, that "Man's [not] imperfect, Heav'n
in fault; / Say rather, Man's as perfect as he ought" (1.69-
70). The point involves, in turn, the claim that no one
rank, part, or link in the Great Chain of Being occupies a
favored position; none is better than any other. Using a
notion crucial to An Essay on Criticism, Pope iterates and
reiterates that God is impartial. Indeed, he suggests, im-
partiality is the defining characteristic of Order: "HEAv'N'S
great view is One, and that the Whole" (2.238).
God thus sees "with equal eye, as God of all" (1.87),
and in fact "connects, and equals all" (1.280). Man, how-
ever, wants-and expects-partiality and preferential
treatment both for his species and for himself as an indi-
vidual-in other words, he wants God to treat him differ-
ently from the way He treats other creatures and other
individuals. Man is even willing, so strong is his partiality
and individualism, to practice "Th' enormous faith of
many made for one; / That proud exception to all Nature's
laws, / T'invert the world, and counter-work its Cause"
(3.242-44). In the face of such expected favoritism, Pope
asks, "can a part contain the whole?" (1.32).
Pope seems to have written An Essay on Man as a re-
sponse, not only to those who slight God, but also (and
perhaps more directly) to those who in a sense expect too
much of Him. Since much of the following discussion
bears on the point, I shall here simply cite some of the
ways, from throughout the poem, in which Pope directly
confronts those who expect God to be partial to them, to
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treat them differently. For example, in lines that may re-
flect the influence of his Deist friend Bolingbroke, Pope
turns the anthropocentric hope for special blessing into
the special blessing of hope:
Hope humbly then; with trembling pinions soar;
Wait the great teacher Death, and God adore!
What future bliss, he gives not thee to know,
But gives that Hope to be thy blessing now.
Hope springs eternal in the human breast:
Man never Is, but always To be blest. [1.9 1-96]
Such lines as these problematize the charge of easy opti-
mism frequently levelled at the poem, including, of
course, by Voltaire in Candide.
Elsewhere Pope is more pointed in answering those
who expect God to single out man from among all His
creatures for special favors and so to treat him differently.
Contrary to what man all too often believes, other crea-
tures were not made for him:
Has God, thou fool! work'd solely for thy good,
Thy joy, thy pastime, thy attire, thy food?
Who for thy table feeds the wanton fawn,
For him as kindly spread the flow'ry lawn.
Is it for thee the lark ascends and sings?
Joy tunes his voice, joy elevates his wings:
Is it for thee the linnet pours his throat?
Loves of his own and raptures swell the note:
The bounding steed you pompously bestride,
Shares with his lord the pleasure and the pride:
Is thine alone the seed that strews the plain?
The birds of heav'n shall vindicate their grain:
Thine the full harvest of the golden year?
Part pays, and justly, the deserving steer:
The hog, that plows not nor obeys thy call,
Lives on the labours of this lord of all. [3.27-42]
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Pope's .. response to anthropocentric desires and expec-
tations climaxes in the final epistle. Here he confronts the
Providentialist view, at the time receiving wide circula-
tion,17 that God intervenes in the "particular" situations
of individual men and women by, for example, preserving
them from various natural disasters:
Shall burning lEtna, if a sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires?
On air or sea new motions be imprest,
Oh blameless Bethel! to relieve thy breast?
When the loose mountain trembles from on high,
Shall gravitation cease, if you go by?
Or some old temple, nodding to its fall,
For Chartres' head reserve the hanging wall?
[11. 123-30]
Such thinking as he answers here reflects, in Pope's view,
nothing else than pride. God simply does not operate in
the ways man wants and expects. Pope says that His ways
are "equal to all" and impartial, and he makes clear that
riches are no more a sign of God's favor than poverty is an
indication of His disfavor. Apparently being in some
senses in-different, He is not involved in our lives in the
manner our vanity posits.
Yet, Pope asserts in a passage that may serve to sum-
marize his point, precisely such vanity and pride charac-
terize both our sermons and our prayers:
Here then we rest: "The Universal Cause
'~cts to one end, but acts by various laws."
In all the madness of superfluous health,
The trim of pride, the impudence of wealth,
Let this great truth be present night and day;
But most be present, if we preach or pray.
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The last couplet here seems especially pointed as it indi-
cates both the depth and the pervasiveness of our natural
but ultimately selfish quest for special favors from God.
"0 P BI·"ur roper SS
The design of An Essay on Man thus makes impartiality
the basis of its vindication of God and His order. Accord-
ing to the succinct, and elliptical, argument presented in
the first epistle, certain consequences follow logically from
the premise that "ORDER is Heav'n's first law" (4.49). Pope
writes:
Of Systems possible, if 'tis confest
That Wisdom infinite must form the best,
Where all must full or not coherent be,
And all that rises, rise in due degree;
Then, in the scale of reas'ning life, 'tis plain
There must be, somewhere, such a rank as Man;
And all the question (wrangle e'er so long)
Is only this, if God has plac'd him wrong? [II. 43-50]
According to this argument, the existent order by no
means creates imperfection; on the contrary, "Our proper
bliss depends on what we blame" (1. 282): that is, our hap-
piness is actually dependent on God's impartiality in cre-
ating separate ranks and in providing our own (proper)
place in the nature of things. Though we may lack (and
would like) some of the attributes characteristic of other
ranks, we are given what is proper for our particular sta-
tion. Relatively, then, though not absolutely, we are per-
fect. It follows, obviously, that in this system based on
clear and distinct difference all other ranks enjoy the same
relative perfection. Such is the central argument of Epistle
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I, the remaining epistles proceeding to detail the exact na-
ture of man, being faithful to "The proper study of Man-
kind" (2.2). "The Design" to the poem declares unequiv-
ocally that "to examine the perfection or imperfection of
any creature whatsoever, it is necessary first to know what
condition and relation it is placed in, and what is the
proper end and purpose of its being."
The "condition and relation" of man Pope explains in
the opening of Epistle II: he is "Plac'd on this isthmus of
a middle state" (1. 3), between the beasts and the angels,
his happiness hanging on his grateful acceptance of his
middle state and nature. "To reason right," Pope asserts in
a line often misunderstood because taken out of context,
"is to submit" to that nature and condition (1.164). In
other words, "The bliss of Man (could Pride that blessing
find) / Is not to act or think beyond mankind" (1.189-90).
Our "Pride ... reas'ning Pride" is the source of "our
error" (1.123) in being dissatisfied with our relative per-
fection. It impels us to seek what no rank has, absolute
perfection.
All quit their sphere, and rush into the skies.
Pride still is aiming at the blest abodes,
Men would be Angels, Angels would be Gods.
Aspiring to be Gods, if Angels fell,
Aspiring to be Angels, Men rebel. [1.124-28]
When men do not find what they yearn for, they blame
God for their condition, necessitating such efforts as
Pope's to "vindicate the ways of God to Man" (1.16). Pope
finds the familiar human response ridiculous:
Go, wiser thou! and in thy scale of sense
Weigh thy Opinion against Providence;
Call Imperfection what thou fancy'st such,
Say, here he gives too little, there too much;
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Destroy all creatures for thy sport or gust,
Yet cry, If Man's unhappy, God's unjust;
If Man alone ingross not Heav'n's high care,
Alone made perfect here, immortal there:
Snatch from his hand the balance and the rod,
Re-judge his justice, be the GOD of GOD! [1.113-22]
"Is Heav'n unkind to Man, and Man alone?" Pope asks:
"Shall he alone, whom rational we call, / Be pleas'd with
nothing, if not bless'd with all?" (1.186-88).
Pope's argument involves the explicit claim that differ-
ence among the ranks of existent things, far from connot-
ing imperfection and leading to unhappiness, is actually
essential to each creature's "bliss." Pope makes clear the
implications of this point for man:
Heav'n to Mankind impartial we confess,
If all are equal in their Happiness:
But mutual wants this Happiness increase,
All Nature's diff'rence keeps all Nature's peace.
[4.53-56]
Indeed, Pope claims the necessity of social, political,
and economic differentiation, echoing Ulysses' famous
speech, in Troilus and Cressida, on the role of distinctions
in human existence ("0 when Degree is shaked / Which
is the ladder to all high designs, / The enterprise is
sick!").18 Whether or not like Shakespeare, Pope would
evidently preserve class differences as essential to social
order: "Fortune's gifts if each alike possest, / And each
were equal, must not all contest?" (4.63-64).
Whatever we think of this particular position, it is
Pope's claim that we have our own place in the grand
scheme of things and that it is proper in that it is both our
own and appropriate to and for us: "God, in the nature of
each being, founds / Its proper bliss, and sets its proper
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bounds" (3.109-10). As we have seen in circumstance
after circumstance, underlying Pope's argument is the be-
lief that what ultimately matters is not what an entity is or
how it is placed but rather what it does and how it acts in
its given situation. As he says in discussing the fact and
relation of reason and self-love, maintaining that the for-
mer merely restrains whereas the latter motivates and
urges:
Nor this a good, nor that a bad we call,
Each works its end, to move or govern all:
And to their proper operation still,
Ascribe all Good; to their improper, Ill.
Operating Properly
[2.55-58]
Man's "proper operation," the part he has been assigned
to play, entails the recognition that he is by no means an
island unto himself. Quietly transforming the Great
Chain of Being into "the chain of Love" (3.7), Pope asserts
that mutual dependency characterizes our "universe" (his
terms echo those used to describe Nature in An Essay on
Criticism):
Nothing is foreign: Parts relate to whole;
One all-extending, all-preserving Soul
Connects each being, greatest with the least;
Made Beast in aid of Man, and Man of Beast;
All serv'd, all serving! nothing stands alone;
The chain holds on, and where it ends, unknown.
[3. 21 - 26]
As for man in particular, he is, Pope maintains, dependent
on others for the satisfaction of his needs, material and
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otherwise, and ultimately for the "proper operation" of his
own and his kind's being:
Heav'n forming each on other to depend,
A master, or a servant, or a friend,
Bids each on other for assistance call,
'Till one Man's weakness grows the strength of all.
Wants, frailties, passions, closer still ally
The common int'rest, or endear the tie:
To these we owe true friendship, love sincere,
Each home-felt joy that life inherits here. [2.249-56]
In such dependency resides man's opportunity for the
happiness that is his "being's end and aim" (4.1). To
achieve it, he must accept the opportunity and act on it.
God built it into the very nature of things, having "fram'd
a Whole, the Whole to bless, / On mutual Wants built
mutual Happiness" (3.111-12).
Pope's is no mean insight: the bliss that it is in man's
nature to seek for himself derives from his acceptance of
his fate as coming "into being with his entry into related-
ness, which is his entry into humanity." 19 It all begins,
paradoxically, from self-love, which "but serves the vir-
tuous mind to wake" (4.363). If properly "operated," it
will, like the expanding circles created by a pebble
dropped into a lake, "rise from Individual to the Whole"
(4.362), moving outward, Pope claims, from "Friend, par-
ent, neighbour" (4.367) to
His country next, and next all human race,
Wide and more wide, th'o'erflowings of the mind
Take ev'ry creature in, of ev'ry kind;
Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest,
And Heav'n beholds its image in his breast.
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Thus, the self-love that is fundamental in man can "be the
same" as "Social" (3.318), and man, in fact, finds "the
private in the public good" (3.282). In transforming self-
love into charity, man finds happiness, fulfilling the law of
Order, which is "the chain of Love":
Self-love thus push'd to social, to divine,
Gives thee to make thy neighbour's blessing thine.
Is this too little for the boundless heart?
Extend it, let thy enemies have part:
Grasp the whole worlds of Reason, Life, and Sense,
In one close system of Benevolence:
Happier as kinder, in whate'er degree,
And height of Bliss but height of Charity. [4.353-60]
A stunted self-love, one that has not expanded outward
but instead has constricted into a destructive concern for
the good of one (the part) manifests itself in the desire for
preferential treatment that has occasioned Pope's theo-
dicy. Mankind's task remains, however, clear, proper, and
manageable; it is to mirror in our relations with each other
God's relation with us.
Remember, Man, "the Universal Cause
''Acts not by partial, but by gen'rallaws;"
And makes what Happiness we justly call
Subsist not in the good of one, but all.
There's not a blessing Individuals find,
But some way leans and hearkens to the kind.
[4.35-40]
Appropriately Comforting
If human happiness is, contrary to our vain expectations,
dependent on God's impartiality, "Fix'd to no spot is Hap-
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piness sincere, / 'Tis no where to be found, or ev'ry
where" (4.15-16). Since "to all Men Happiness was
meant, / God in Externals could not place Content"
(4.65-66). Thus writes Pope, continuing the Aristotelian-
ism prominent as well in An Essay on Criticism, "Condi-
tion, circumstance is not the thing; / Bliss is the same in
subject or in king" (4.57-58). The entire fourth epistle of
An Essay on Man becomes an extended argument that
happiness is not tied to being in any particular condition,
state, or location or to having any possession.
Because, so the argument goes, "ORDER is Heav'n's first
law," "Some are, and must be, greater than the rest, /
More rich, more wise" (II. 49-51). But, Pope insists, "who
infers from hence / That such are happier, shocks all com-
mon sense" (II. 51-52). Though he allows an imagined
interlocutor to raise an objection, Pope advances the ideal-
ist argument that '''Virtue alone is Happiness below'" (I.
310). Pope's response to the caveat links up with his pri-
mary arguments in the poem, rebuking again the insa-
tiable human drive for more. In fact, Pope makes the ob-
jection to his own argument part of what becomes both a
selfish and a ridiculous set of expectations centering on
"Externals" at the expense of virtue, which is an "inter-
nal" matter. As part of his satirical technique here as well
as elsewhere, Pope "allows" his imagined respondent to
expose himself.
"But sometimes Virtue starves, while Vice is fed."
What then? Is the reward of Virtue bread?
That, Vice may merit; 'tis the price of toil;
The knave deserves it, when he tills the soil,
The knave deserves it when he tempts the main,
Where Folly fights for kings, or dives for gain.
The good man may be weak, be indolent,
Nor is his claim to plenty, but content.
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But grant him Riches, your demand is o'er?
"No-shall the good want Health, the good want
Pow'r?"
Add Health and Pow'r, and ev'ry earthly thing;
"Why bounded Pow'r? why private? why no king?"
Nay, why external for internal giv'n? [II. 149-61]
As he proceeds, Pope becomes more and more satirical,
lashing those who foolishly imagine the reward of virtue
to be one of several "Externals." He promotes the anti-
materialist contention that possession of such "Externals"
may actually be detrimental to virtue.
What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy,
The soul's calm sun-shine, and the heart-felt joy,
Is Virtue's prize: A better would you fix?
Then give Humility a coach and six,
Justice a Conq'ror's sword, or Truth a gown,
Or Public Spirit its great cure, a Crown.
Weak, foolish man! will Heav'n reward us there
With the same trash mad mortals wish for here?
The Boy and Man an individual makes,
Yet sigh'st thou now for apples and for cakes?
Go, like the Indian, in another life
Expect thy dog, thy bottle, and thy wife:
As well as dream such trifles are assign'd,
As toys and empires, for a god-like mind.
Rewards, that either would to Virtue bring
No joy, or be destructive of the thing:
How oft by these at sixty are undone
The virtues of a saint at twenty-one! [II. 167-84]
Pope goes on to detail each of several "Externals" in
which happiness is mistakenly thought to consist. These
include riches, honor ("Honour and shame from no Con-
dition rise; / Act well your part, there all the honour lies,"
11. 193-94), titles, "greatness," and fame. Yet, despite the
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mad pursuit of such "trash," virtue remains "The only
point where human bliss stands still" (1. 311). Because,
Pope repeats, God is impartial, happiness is equal and
available to all: "the sole bliss Heav'n could on all be-
stow; / Which who but feels can taste, but thinks can
know" (11. 327-28).
As he argues that no single state or condition assures
one of happiness, happiness being trans-situational, Pope
contends that no one form of government or of religion is
privileged. What matters here too is not the outward man-
ifestation or appearance (or the dress, the term most often
used in similar contexts in An Essay on Criticism) but the
"proper operation," the internal working, of the form or
mode. In lines that offered little comfort to (many of) his
fellow Catholics, Pope declares:
For Forms of Government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administer'd is best:
For Modes of Faith, let graceless zealots fight;
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right:
In Faith and Hope the world will disagree,
But all Mankind's concern is Charity:
All must be false that thwart this One great End,
And all of God, that bless Mankind or mend.
[3.30 3- 10]
As usual in Pope, the internal is privileged, the external
marginalized.
Confusing Things
This perhaps deliberately deconstructive but certainly dis-
illusioning attempt to expose the vanity and the futility of
the human wish for preferential and differentiating treat-
ment turns out to be a rather comforting poem-even if
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the verses just quoted disturbed at least some Catholics.
An Essay on Man not only links happiness with the very
impartiality that shatters man's expectation of special fa-
vors from God, but it also confidently tells us exactly how
we may assure ourselves of true happiness. "Our proper
bliss depends," Pope declares, "on what we blame"
(1.282). In our limitations lies our perfection.
Even, then, as it exposes one human construction and
vanity, An Essay on Man creates another. It substitutes, in
other words, one consolation for another, perpetuating
contentment (an ever-present danger) rather than instill-
ing the"sacred discontent" characteristic of both the Bible
and deconstruction. The end of Epistle II focuses on the
way we humans supplement, always searching, sometimes
desperately, for something to comfort, console, and sus-
tain us-and always finding a substitute for what we lack.
Such supplementarity, Pope makes clear, is as pervasive
as it is insistent. Whether or not reHgion is the opium of
the people, as Marx claimed, it becomes, at least with age,
a favored comfort, Pope maintains. I must quote the entire
concluding section of the epistle, which is devoted to this
important point concerning supplementarity:
See some strange comfort ev'ry state attend,
And Pride bestow'd on all, a common friend;
See some fit Passion ev'ry age supply,20
Hope travels thro', nor quits us when we die.
Behold the child, by Nature's kindly law,
Pleas'd with a rattle, tickled with a straw:
Some livelier play-thing gives his youth delight,
A little louder, but as empty quite:
Scarfs, garters, gold, amuse his riper stage;
And beads and pray'r-books are the toys of age:
Pleas'd with this bauble still, as that before;
'Till tir'd he sleeps, and Life's poor play is o'er!
Mean-while Opinion gilds with varying rays
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Those painted clouds that beautify our days;
Each want of happiness by Hope supply'd,
And each vacuity of sense by Pride:
These build as fast as knowledge can destroy;
In Folly's cup still laughs the bubble, joy;
One prospect lost, another still we gain;
And not a vanity is giv'n in vain;
Ev'n mean Self-love becomes, by force divine,
The scale to measure others wants by thine.
See! and confess, one comfort still must rise,
'Tis this, Tho' Man's a fool, yet GOD IS WISE.
[II. 2 7 1 - 94]
This remarkable, and ironic, passage is a devastating de-
construction of human constructions (including decon-
struction itself whenever it forgets its being as questioning
or criticism as such), which masquerade of course as fact
and truth. Not the least important of the ironies here, of
the deconstruction being performed, is that which cannot
be reasonably attributed to Pope's conscious intentions.
Though he declares the deconstructive point that human
activity consists of constant supplementing, his text sys-
tematically inscribes the description that his own (proper)
argument is unacknowledgeably what he ridicules, an-
other supplement, and "some strange comfort." He ad-
mits, after all, that "one comfort still must rise, / 'Tis this,
Tho' Man's a fool, yet GOD IS WISE." What Pope has of-
fered, then, in arguing for God's impartiality, on which,
he insists, human happiness depends, is no less a supple-
ment (or supply, the term he twice uses in the passage
quoted), a consolation, and a comfort than the "beads and
pray'r-books" he mentions here and the illusions that he
elsewhere deplores "if we preach or pray" (3.6).
The constructed nature of our most cherished truths,
and indeed the performative nature on which An Essay on
Man-like An Essay on Criticism-stands, however un-
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steadily, appears as well in that important passage (1.43-
50) I quoted earlier, in which Pope works out rationally a
justification for man's place in the scheme of things. These
verses make clear the suppositional nature of Pope's entire
argument, which hangs on a set of propositions beginning
with the hypothesis that "a God of infinite wisdom exists"
who "will necessarily have chosen to create, out of all pos-
sible systems, the best." These propositions continue, ac-
cording to Maynard Mack, whom I have been quoting,
with the further hypothesis that "the best will necessarily
have been that which actualizes the maximum number of
possible modes of being, and so is 'full' of existents-a
plenumformarum-'cohering' because actualization of all
the possibles leaves no gaps." The final proposition holds
that "the plenum's structure is hierarchical, a ladder of
beings of greater and greater complexity of faculties, ris-
ing by even steps (due degrees) from nothingness ... to
God."21 What seems so natural as we read is actually a
story, a construction of man.
Even if such accounts as Pope's are fictions, we are, he
declares unequivocally, dependent on them. But the very
notion of dependency, on which so much of An Essay on
Man depends, is itself highly problematical. The poem
maintains, as we saw, that each existent being is depen-
dent on others, "Heav'n forming each on other to de-
pend." If this is so, if indeed "nothing stands alone," then
nothing is either self-sufficient or complete. If it cannot
stand alone, it has a gap that needs supplementing, and
is, therefore, in need of help from outside itself. The inter-
nal requires the external. If it is, then, variously depen-
dent, it is not completely itself, or proper. It has, in fact,
no proper self. This is all suggested in the innocent-
looking line I quoted earlier, in which Pope both says that
and shows how the host feeds on the parasites feeding on
him: ''All feed on one vain Patron," the adjective establish-
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ing the interimplication that J. Hillis Miller has demon-
strated in the host/parasite relationship.
We should recall, moreover, that Pope has depicted
man's "in-between" or middle nature, his contingency, in
terms of the same root notion that functions in "depen-
dency." Man "hangs between," Pope writes, signifying that
man is neither angel nor beast but rather a little of both.
If he is both one thing and another, he lacks a proper
being. If this is so, Pope's entire chain of reasoning, start-
ing with a thing's "proper end and purpose of its being,"
begins to deconstruct.
As a matter of fact, the notion of the "proper," so impor-
tant to Pope's theodicy, is revealed as improper. Like the
idea of dependency, which assumes a relationship be-
tween distinct and separable entities, being quite a differ-
ent concept from interimplication, the "proper" depends
on the existence of clear lines that allow for absolute dif-
ferences, no matter the strength of the desire to collapse
them. Pope unequivocally establishes his position in the
first epistle of An Essay on Man when he declares: "What
thin partitions Sense from Thought divide: / And Middle
natures, how they long to join, / Yet never pass th' insu-
perable line!" (II. 226-28). The "insuperable line" always
already exists, according to Pope, making the "proper"
possible.
That line also makes possible God's touted impartiality,
but is it clear, distinct, and "insuperable," differentiating
impartiality absolutely from partiality-and Pope from
those he opposes? As we saw, Pope vigorously challenges
the anthropocentric desire for differentiating treatment
from God, insisting that He acts impartially, respecting no
difference or distinction between individuals, groups, or
species. In attitude, impartiality certainly suggests in-
difference, but it is in fact built on the notion of the
"proper," which in all its forms Derrida has decon-
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structed;22 that is, impartiality presupposes the possibility
of choosing, it assumes separateness, and it is impossible
unless a thing can be only its (proper) self and not also
something else. Pope's argument directed against anthro-
pocentric desires and expectations is thus interimplicated
with (and contaminated by) what it opposes. Both the de-
sire for differentiating treatment and the opposed argu-
ment for impartiality derive from a belief in clear, un-
equivocal distinction and difference. If in arguing against
partiality, Pope seemed to oppose difference, he in fact
links up with it. That result is not, finally, surprising, for
any oppositional structure ends in differance. In spite of
himself, therefore, Pope resembles those he opposes. Both
he and the reviled anthropocentrists share a commitment
to difference, the major difference between them perhaps
being that Pope's desire is subtler and operates at a deeper
enabling level.
There are, then, as John Dominic Crossan has written,
"not only different differences but also different under-
standings of difference itself." 23 An Essay on Man indi-
cates the difference between differance and both in-
difference and impartiality, which, though bearing some
resemblance to Derrida's deconstruction of difference, are
logocentrically based in adherence to unequivocation.
Differance "precedes" difference and indeed makes it pos-
sible, "appearing" within Pope's argument as the latter
both opposes anthropocentric differentialism and shares
its presuppositions. That which is differentiated is linked
by the disjunction just as what is linked is differentiated
by that linking. 24
An Essay on Man may most resemble An Essay on Crit-
icism in the way it differs from "itself."25 In Schneidau's
terms, it is alienated from "itself" and calls into question
the notion of the "proper," of identity, of absolute differ-
ence. The Moral Essays pursue such questions, focusing
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on the quest of truth, dependent-apparently-on dis-
tinct lines and clear differences, and both An Epistle to Dr.
Arbuthnot and the New Dunciad return to "th' insuperable
line" between self and other, focusing on the crossing that
An Essay on Man shows to occur between supposed op-
posites. Part of the truth sought may be, as To a Lady puts
it, that "one" is "whate'er she hates and ridicules" (1. 120).
c1\. Chapter Four
Shooting at Flying Game
Reading and the Qilest ofTruth
in the Moral Essays
I begin, no doubt unpromisingly, with my title. Whether it
refers, like the title of this book, to Pope's efforts in these
poems, to my own attempt to read them, or to both is a
question I will not (presume to) answer. My title here
comes from the Epistle to Cobham, specifically from a pas-
sage concerned with the difficulty we experience in reach-
ing decisions and making judgments. First Pope declares
that "God and Nature only are the same"; then he pro-
ceeds to grant the difference from such unity and identity
("I am who I am") that is man, in whom, contrariwise,
"the judgment shoots at flying game, / A bird of passage!
gone as soon as found, / Now in the Moon perhaps, now
under ground" (II. 154-57). It is precisely this difficulty in
deciding that I wish to focus on in considering the four
poems known as the "Ethic Epistles" and, in the Twick-
enham Edition, from which I quote, as the Epistles to Sev-
eral Persons. Because of both its specificity and its brevity
I prefer and will use the term Moral Essays.
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Especially in these poems, deciding is related to the
quest of truth, and that quest appears here most often as
an issue in reading. Cobham, in particular, declares that
man is not only different from God and Nature but that
that difference derives from his own difference within,
from his self-difference. Such difference produces the dif-
ficulty encountered in the attempt to read him and to ar-
rive at the truth concerning him, his actions, and his mo-
tives. The job of deciding, including about the Moral
Essays, is hard work, indeed. That in reading these poems
we must contend with both Pope's declarations and the
textual descriptions, with both construction and decon-
struction, the latter at more than one level, makes the job
all the more difficult. As in An Essay on Man, so here too
Pope sometimes assumes stances parallel to deconstruc-
tion.
And like An Essay on Criticism and An Essay on Man,
the Moral Essays pose the question of the relationship of
parts to parts and of parts to whole. They do so, though,
not so much through explicit thematization as through the
question they direct to their reader about his or her read-
ing a/them. That is, four different but linked poems con-
stitute the Moral Essays, which are in turn clearly related,
thematically and figurally, to An Essay on Man. All eight
poems, the late Miriam Leranbaum cogently argued, may
form an important part of an "Opus Magnum" that Pope
planned but never finished. 1 On this reading, the Moral
Essays are seen as posing questions of the relationship of
the four "parts" comprising this particular "whole" to
each other, of the relationship of the four of them-both
individually and collectively-to the four epistles of An
Essay on Man, and of the relationship, finally, of all eight
poems to the Horatian Imitations and even The Dunciad.
In the Preface to this book, I expressed my reservations
concerning any attempt to posit a totality or unified whole
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to which various poems somehow contribute. The effort to
attend to relationships among individual and different
poems is, as I have stated, quite another matter,2 and in
the pages that follow I shall attend to common concerns
among the Moral Essays, as well as to themes and notions
shared with previous and later poems, but I do not see
these poems relating to any whole other than the corpus
of texts we identify as Pope's. I shall first focus on the topic
of reading as it appears throughout these poems. Then I
shall attempt a full-scale reading of the Epistle to Bath-
urst, at least arguably the richest and most rewarding of
the Moral Essays.
Stalking the Unwobbling Pivot
In whatever order they were composed and printed3 and
however they are to be related, the Moral Essays treat, ac-
cording to the ''Argument'' Pope affixed to each poem,
"the Knowledge and Characters of Men" (Cobham), "the
Characters of Women" (To a Lady), and "the Use of
Riches" (both Bathurst and Burlington). In these poems,
Pope obviously continues the effort central to (if not begun
in) An Essay on Man to try to make sense of man, his
actions, and his "universe." As it is in so many texts, from
Oedipus to Hamlet and on to Great Expectations and be-
yond, reading is both an explicit theme and a central
metaphor for this important exploration.4
In "The Design" to An Essay on Man Pope remarks that
his theodicy "is only to be considered as a general Map of
MAN, marking out no more than the greater parts, their
extent, their limits, and their connection." He has, he
writes, left "the particular to be more fully delineated in
the charts which are to follow." An Essay on Man, Pope
continues, has merely "open[ed] the fountains, and
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clear[ed] the passage." What follows-that is, the "ethic
epistles"-will aim "To deduce the rivers, to follow them
in their course, and to observe their effects." Through the
characters of such men and women, fictional or otherwise,
as Wharton, Martha Blount, John Kyrle, Balaam, and Ti-
mon, Pope traces the particular rivers, charting their
course, attempting to locate their source, and exploring
their impact. The map imagery Pope employs in this ac-
count may, in the confidence it projects, belie the difficulty
of the job of reading entailed. Each of the epistles is con-
structed around "portraits" of individuals whose charac-
ters are particularly difficult to read, their actions appear-
ing so various and even contradictory. Pope suggests the
difficulty involved when he writes, in the "Argument" of
To a Lady, that the characters of women "are yet more
inconsistent and incomprehensible than those of Men."
Now printed as the first of the Moral Essays, An Epistle
to Cobham introduces the difficult attempt to read human
beings, their actions, and their motivations. The poem is,
in fact, an extended discussion of the (surprising) incon-
sistencies and the apparent incomprehensibility of the
characters of men. As he begins to consider the problem,
Pope warns us not to forget the observer in the observa-
tion; that is, he points to the complications caused by var-
iability and partiality in the observer. Pope sounds a mod-
ern theme in granting that reading consists of much more
than an objective processing, or decoding, of a passive
text. The observer-or reader-of human beings and
their actions is himself or herself a human being, sharing
the passions, opinions, and whims of those he studies;
there is simply no way for the reader to get outside, to a
neutral, objective position:
Men may be read, as well as Books too much.
To Observations which ourselves we make,
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We grow more partial for th' observer's sake;
To written Wisdom, as another's, less:
Maxims are drawn from Notions, these from Guess.
[II. 10- 1 4]
The reader's opinions and desires, Pope continues, inevi-
tably color the text. Because reading involves both a text
and a reader, and is a matter of interpretation rather than
of identification and repetition, there is no "fit" between
the reading and the text read:
Yet more; the diff'rence is as great between
The optics seeing, as the objects seen.
All Manners take a tincture from our own,
Or come discolour'd thro' our Passions shown.
Or Fancy's beam enlarges, multiplies,
Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand dyes.
[II. 23-28]
What occurs in the reader, destroying the possibility of
objectivity and the simple presentation of "truth," also oc-
curs in the text studied. It is, in a word, difference, and it
constitutes the major problem in the determined drive to
read the characters of men (and of women, for that mat-
ter). If Pope sounds modern in advising us to grasp the
reader's implication in the reading, he appears decon-
structive in declaring that, no matter how careful and so-
phisticated our observations and interpretations are,
something will not quite fit, will stubbornly remain on the
"outside," refusing to be drawn neatly into the "whole" we
strive vainly to make. It may be a gap, a hole, or perhaps
some excess that destroys any sense of putative harmony
and totality.
There's some Peculiar in each leaf and grain,
Some unmark'd fibre, or some varying vein:
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Shall only Man be taken in the gross?
Grant but as many sorts of Mind as Moss.
Lest any doubt remain that Pope means to indicate, not
just the difference among men, but also the difference
within each man, note the following verses, in which Pope
anticipates Barbara Johnson's use, cited earlier, of this
very notion in characterizing the work of deconstruction:
That each from other differs, first confess;
Next, that he varies from himself no less:
Add Nature's, Custom's, Reason's, Passion's strife,
And all Opinion's colours cast on life. [II. 19-22]
Thus Atossa is "Scarce once herself, by turns all Woman-
kind!" (To a Lady, 1. 116).
From this account of the general difficulties difference
and self-difference pose for the quest of truth about men,
Pope turns to certain specific, and more technical, prob-
lems in reading. These include the impossibility of impos-
ing a pattern on the process and flux of life. Experience,
Pope suggests, does not easily-if at all-lend itself to the
human compulsion to order and comprehend:5
Our depths who fathoms, or our shallows finds,
Quick whirls, and shifting eddies, of our minds?
Life's stream for Observation will not stay,
It hurries all too fast to mark their way.
In vain sedate reflections we would make,
When half our knowledge we must snatch, not take.
[II. 29-34]
We normally expect, Pope continues, that the key to the
truth about a man's character lies in his action. If we can
but locate and isolate his "Principle of action," we should
be able to read him correctly. An Essay on Criticism, we
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recall, stressed that proper attention to the purposive
movement of literary texts will reveal the "Spirit [with
which the] Author writ." But in Cobham no such faith ap-
pears. On the contrary, Pope seeks to disabuse his readers
of the notion that the "Principle of action" is the vade
mecum that makes clear men's complex characters. Just as
reason is not adequate to experience, principles, Pope ar-
gues, do not explain actions. In fact, reason appears pow-
erless to read passionate human character correctly-for
the same reason it cannot fully comprehend experience:
On human actions reason tho' you can,
It may be reason, but it is not man:
His Principle of action once explore,
That instant 'tis his Principle no more.
Like following life thro' creatures you dissect,
You lose it in the moment you detect. [II. 35-40]
That we ourselves often do not know what motivates us is
further indication of the helplessness of a "Principle of
action" to explain our behavior, which, Pope suggests,
may be caused by deep and dark forces unknown to the
consciousness:
Oft in the Passions' wild rotation tost,
Our spring of action to ourselves is lost:
Tir'd, not determin'd, to the last we yield,
And what comes then is master of the field.
As the last image of that troubled heap,
When Sense subsides, and Fancy sports in sleep,
(Tho' past the recollection of the thought)
Becomes the stuff of which our dream is wrought:
Something as dim to our internal view,
Is thus, perhaps, the cause of most we do. [11. 41-50]
For a number of reasons, then, it is foolhardy to expect
to read the "why" in the "what." Pope's argument thus be-
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comes a brief against intentionality. Our passionate, vari-
0us' and mystifying behavior is, he insists, no reliable
guide to intention.
In vain the Sage, with retrospective eye,
Would from th' apparent What conclude the Why,
Infer the Motive from the Deed, and show,
That what we chanc'd was what we meant to do.
[11. 51-54]
So many factors, conscious and unconscious, beyond our
control as well as within it, enter into, influence, and even
determine our actions that we cannot but conclude that
they do not always "show the man" (1. 61). Indeed, writes
Pope,
we find
Who does a kindness, is not therefore kind;
Perhaps Prosperity becalm'd his breast,
Perhaps the Wind just shifted from the east:
Not therefore humble he who seeks retreat,
Pride guides his steps, and bids him shun the great:
Who combats bravely is not therefore brave,
He dreads a death-bed like the meanest slave:
Who reasons wisely is not therefore wise,
His pride in Reas'ning, not in Acting lies. [11. 61-70]
The following verse paragraphs detail more specifics
that influence our actions and frustrate our desire to find
the key that unties the knot and "unravels all the rest" (1.
178). Though Pope is willing to grant that '~ctions best
discover man" (1. 71), he asks, "What will you do with
such as disagree?" (1. 75). As he suggests elsewhere, con-
trary to our idealistic expectations, an important decision
and subsequent action may hinge on arbitrary or quite
mundane considerations: '~las! in truth the man but
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chang'd his mind, / Perhaps was sick, in love, or had not
din'd" (II. 79-80). In such acknowledgments, Pope shat-
ters a number of "realistic" notions concerning human
action and character, apparently continuing the work of
de-mythologization we noted in An Essay on Man.
And though he grants that we sometimes find "plain
Characters" (I. 122), both those who "are open, and to all
men known" and those who are "so very close, they're hid
from none" (II. 110-11), he concludes on the note he
struck at the beginning of the poem: "Manners with For-
tunes, Humours turn with Climes, / Tenets with Books,
and Principles with Times" (II. 166-67). Summing up his
argument that change and difference are the principal
characteristics of human conduct, Pope asks how, then,
are we to read man, how to decide what is the truth
about him:
Judge we by Nature? Habit can efface,
Int'rest o'ercome, or Policy take place:
By Actions? those Uncertainty divides:
By Passions? these Dissimulation hides:
Opinions? they still take a wider range.
Perhaps recalling (aspects of) An Essay on Man, Pope's
advice at this point seems not very reassuring: "Find, if
you can, in what you cannot change" (I. 173).
"The only certain way to
avoid Misconstruction"
Despite the obstacles and all the objections that we have
noted, the unchangeable and unchanging is finally found
(or, rather, posited). The unwobbling pivot, the clue that
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unties the knot and "unravels all," allowing-so Pope
claims-for an accurate reading of human character, is
the "ruling passion," an idea that Pope introduced in the
second epistle of An Essay on Man. Whatever its limita-
tions and deficiencies, the ruling passion has the advan-
tage not available to those theories of reading dependent
on conscious motivation and the de-mythologized notion
of purposive action.
The ruling passion focuses Pope's reading of the enig-
matic characters drawn after line 1 78 in the Epistle to
Cobham and throughout the remaining Moral Essays. In
it "alone," Pope declares in Cobham, "The Wild are con-
stant, and the Cunning known; / The Fool consistent, and
the False sincere; / Priests, Princes, Women, no dissem-
blers here" (II. 174-77). The ruling passion is-to adopt
Pope's phrasing from his address to Richard Boyle, Earl of
Burlington, affixed to the fourth epistle-"the only certain
way to avoid Misconstruction. "
Pope tests the capacity of the ruling passion to reveal
the truth about human behavior, making our conduct, in
spite of its complexity and inconsistency, legible and clear.
This he does in the second epistle by applying it to the
"characters" of women, who are said to be even more var-
ious, inconsistent, and apparently incomprehensible than
men. Indeed, opening To a Lady, Pope expresses agree-
ment with Martha Blount that "'Most Women have no
Characters at all'" (I. 2), being so changeable. Pope im-
plies that if the ruling passion can provide a satisfactory
reading of women, revealing order in the bewildering
chaos that characterizes their actions, then it is a powerful
and compelling theory, indeed. As it turns out, women
prove easier to read than men, for whereas
In Men, we various Ruling Passions find,
In Women, two almost divide the kind;
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Those, only fix'd, they first or last obey,
The Love of Pleasure, and the Love of Sway.
[II. 207- 10]
In both men and women, the ruling passion functions like
a controlling theme in a well-wrought literary text, toward
which all the subordinate elements gravitate.
Differences, which (we thought) threaten to divide us
irreparably, splitting us at least in two and making it per-
haps impossible to think of a human being as a distinct
entity with its own (proper) identity, are thus subsumed,
in a sort of pre-Hegelian Aufhebung. Those differences are
sublated in a transcendent unity capable of bestowing a
recognizable and definite identity on individual men and
women, after all. Pope offers not a little comfort in assur-
ing us that we have "proper" characters, legible and dis-
tinct, and that this identity remains with us, until death:
Time, that on all things lays his lenient hand,
Yet tames not this; it sticks to our last sand.
Consistent in our follies and our sins,
Here honest Nature ends as she begins.
[Cobham, II. 224-27]
The pattern is the familiar one in Pope (as well as in the
work of Pope scholars): after all is said and done and all
the difficulties acknowledged, differences are reconciled,
and harmony prevails where only discord had been appar-
ent. Real identity triumphs over apparent difference, order
prevailing in the world as well as in men and women, ''All
Chance [being in fact], Direction," and ''All Discord, Har-
mony" (An Essay on Man, 1.290-91). All is well because
all is being directed by "Th' Eternal Art educing good
from ill" (ibid., 2.175). This "mightier Pow'r [than we] the
strong direction sends, / And sev'ral Men impels to sev'ral
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ends" (ibid., 2.165-66). As the Epistle to Bathurst puts it,
declaring that it is the truth about human character so
earnestly sought though so often mistaken:
Hear then the truth: "'Tis Heav'n each Passion
sends,
'~nd diff'rent men directs to diff'rent ends.
"Extremes in Nature equal good produce,
"Extremes in Man concur to gen'ral use."
Ask we what makes one keep, and one bestow?
That POW'R who bids the Ocean ebb and flow,
Bids seed-time, harvest, equal course maintain,
Thro' reconcil'd extremes of drought and rain,
Builds Life on Death, on Change Duration founds,
And gives th' eternal wheels to know their rounds.
[II. 1 61 - 70]
"A S d· S "tan lng ermon
Even aside from psychological and philosophical difficul-
ties entailed in Pope's notion of the ruling passion,6 the
solution offered to the problem of reading human char-
acter in the Moral Essays appears unsatisfactory. As a
theory of reading, it fails because it ignores the reader.
That it ignores the reader is surprising since, early on in
the Epistle to Cobham, as we saw, Pope urges us precisely
not to forget the reader and the ways in which the reader
inevitably affects what is read. Yet, in treating the ruling
passion, Pope apparently forgets his own point, ignoring
the reader's role in interpreting actions and in deciding
which ruling passion is operative in a given individual.
The ruling passion no more escapes the effects of the
reader's imposition of his or her own opinions and pas-
sions than does the deflated notion of the "Principle of
action." Pope's solution, then, is a solution only if we for-
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get or ignore the earlier argument. It depends on an exclu-
sion or, perhaps, on a hole.
What does this discovered lacuna in :rope's argument
tell us? Is it an embarrassing story, revealing the poet's
own inconsistency, contradictoriness, and even incompe-
tence, and providing an odd parallel to the account given
of human action? Is human action (like) a literary text,
the self-difference (differance) they share indicating that
both are writing? Might the revealed hole be filled by the
(signifying) phallus that is the "whole"? That the hole ex-
posed in Pope's argument, however, is more than a local
instance of compositional error is indicated by the occur-
rence in Pope's text of what Barbara Johnson calls "a sys-
tematic 'other message' behind or through what is being
said."
The Moral Essays offer declarations concerning this
matter of unintentional stories being told through texts. In
fact, they thematize the point. Such thematization occurs
when, for example, in the Epistle to Burlington Pope writes
that one "Prodigal" created through his extravagance his
own "standing sermon." The passage ostensibly concerns
the construction of a lavish and contemptible mansion,
but it is also an allegory of reading:
See! sportive fate, to punish aukward pride,
Bids Bubo build, and sends him such a Guide:
A standing sermon, at each year's expense,
That never Coxcomb reach'd Magnificence!
[II. 19-22]
Designed as a thing of grandeur, the constructed edifice
becomes a "standing sermon" because it is something
other than, indeed contra~y to, what was intended. Such
recognition comes through reading against the grain.
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Read in that manner, as Pope does, the prodigious struc-
ture functions as a sermon directed against prodigality.
What occurs in this passage is structurally identical to
what appears in the de-mythologizing of a "Principle of
action" as a reliable index to the characters of men and
women. It is also like the way in which God is said to turn
our activity to good, in spite of us and our intentions. Like
Pope, God is apparently something of a deconstructionist.
Just as Bubo's mansion becomes, in spite of his intentions,
"a standing sermon" on lavish and impractical expense,
and just as human conduct stems from motivation of
which we may not be conscious and occurs (sometimes)
as actions we never intended, so God goes against the
grain, subverting our intentions. ''A standing sermon" is,
therefore, another name for that "systematic 'other mes-
sage'" appearing through the declaration.
In some other ways, too, Pope seems to anticipate Der-
rida, sounding deconstructive themes and assuming
deconstructive positions, for example depicting women
somewhat as the French philosopher does in Spurs and
even acknowledging that "by Man's oppression curst,"
women seek "the Love of Sway" so as not to lose "The
Love of Pleasure" (To a Lady, 11. 210-14).7 But if this is so,
Pope certainly diverges at other points from anything ap-
proaching deconstruction. In addition to the implicitly
metaphysical and logocentric points we treated earlier (for
example, concerning reading), Pope explicitly supports
phallogocentrism and the primacy of the male, a position
we might not expect given his statement above that
women are oppressed by men; nevertheless, he writes to-
ward the end of To a Lady: "Heav'n, when it strives to
polish all it can / Its last best work, but forms a softer
Man" (II. 271-72).
Moreover, though Pope insists on reading other-wise,8
contrary to apparent intentions and declarations, he
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comes to rest as deconstruction never does. He stops, that
is, with his inversion of the hierarchy that, for example,
privileges Bubo's mansion as "Magnificence." Reversing
the hierarchy, Pope himself insists that that structure is not
at all "Magnificence" but simply a "standing sermon"
against "Magnificence." He thus privileges the textual de-
scription at the expense of its explicit declarations.
Though often considered merely destructive, deconstruc-
tion involves, as we have noted, a double gesture that does
not rest content with hierarchical inversion, important as
that "phase" is. Derrida goes to considerable lengths to
make his "double science" clear, writing, for instance, in
Positions: "To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to
overturn the hierarchy at a given moment.... That being
said-and on the other hand-to remain in this phase is
still to operate on the terrain of and from within the de-
constructed system. By means of this double, and pre-
cisely stratified, dislodged and dislodging, writing, we
must also mark the interval between inversion, which
brings low what was high, and the irruptive emergence of
a new 'concept,' a concept that can no longer be, and never
could be, included in the previous regime."9 Deconstruc-
tion, that is, first intervenes in a violently maintained hi-
erarchy, such as the man/woman "opposition," and pro-
ceeds to bring the superior "party" down, "momentarily"
installing the "inferior" in its place. But far from ending
with this inversion, it continues to operate, reinscribing in
an interminable process of "reading" the newly elevated
"term," subjecting it to the same deconstruction and ulti-
mately producing a "new 'concept.'" Like the Bible, we
might say, deconstruction refuses to let us rest comforta-
bly in any place or position reached. Its target is the notion
of hierarchization-its goal, the emergence of a new
woman. 10
Even if Pope is able to decide, to determine that the
truth concerning, for example, Bubo's mansion is the
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simple contrary of that intended, his readers cannot easily
do so. As readers, however, we do enjoy considerable
power, as Pope has hinted (though he does not acknowl-
edge that the recognition of a "standing sermon" is no less
dependent on the reader than a straightforward, unsuspi-
cious reading). But if the reader has power, he or she is
not therefore in an enviable position. The reader of the
Moral Essays is faced with two stories, intertwined, each
with a "message" (part of which is that there is "a system-
atic 'other message' behind or through" what is being de-
clared). Who shall decide between the two competing sto-
ries? We often cannot say that the poems, like Bubo's
mansion, simply have "two meanings that exist side by
side." The situation is far more problematical, as Paul de
Man has written in another context: "The two readings
have to engage each other in direct confrontation, for the
one reading is precisely the error denounced by the other
and has to be undone by it. Nor can we in any way make
a valid decision as to which of the readings can be given
priority over the other." 11
And the point with which we began this section, con-
cerning a satisfactory theory of reading? What we are left
with is simply a story of reading. As unsatisfactory as it
may appear to those who prefer to have matters neatly and
clearly resolved, there are always texts and readers, read-
ing being a dialogical activity characterized by-among
other things-constant tension and a struggle of compet-
ing wills, as the reader's aforementioned drive toward uni-
vocity encounters the text's equally strong resistance. 12
"Who Shall Decide?" The Economy of Truth ~n
An Epistle to Bathurst
Of all Pope's poems, An Epistle to Bathurst may be said to
offer the fullest treatment of the problem of deciding and
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the quest of truth that we have been considering. Complex
and demanding, Bathurst explores the nature and econ-
0my of truth and the truth about some of our-and
Pope's-most cherished truths. Though the poem has jus-
tifiably received considerable critical attention, the pro-
found philosophical questions it raises and the perspec-
tives it offers have not, I think, been adequately focused. 13
In Bathurst, the longest of the Moral Essays, the econ-
omy of truth is inseparable from the truth of economy-
or at least of money. Like the Epistle to Burlington, this
poem focuses on "the use of riches." Pope's subject is gold
and money, their usefulness, and human attitudes con-
cerning them. Not so obvious perhaps but nonetheless
crucial to the text's performance is the relation between
money and truth. Exactly what that relation is, I want to
explore, with considerable help from Marc Shell's recent
studies The Economy ofLiterature and Money, Language,
and Thought. 14
Pope admits, somewhat grudgingly, that gold, consid-
ered as a medium of exchange, "serves what life requires"
(I. 29). But because it panders to and indeed increases
some of the baser human desires, gold has a negative as
well as a positive aspect: "What Nature wants, commodi-
ous Gold bestows" (I. 21). Pope quickly adds, for a reason
that I shall suggest below, that "What Nature wants" is "a
phrase I much distrust" (I. 25). In Pope's view, in any case,
a fundamental inequality and an unfairness reside in the
exchange that gold makes possible: "'Tis thus we eat the
bread another sows: / But how unequal it bestows, ob-
serve, /. 'Tis thus we riot, while who sow it, starve" (II. 22-
24). Gold's influence, power, and capacity for significant
abuse are simply "dreadful" to contemplate, for gold
the dark Assassin hires:
Trade it may help, Society extend;
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But lures the Pyrate, and corrupts the Friend:
It raises Armies in a Nation's aid,
But bribes a Senate, and the Land's betray'd.
[II. 30-34]
The coin has two sides, and Pope stresses the dark, nega-
tive side.
The major problem with gold, according to Pope, is pre-
cisely its capacity for advancing and spreading corruption;
indeed, it facilitates both avarice and prodigality, and it
creates falsehood and error. Better, then, Pope declares, if
gold did not exist as a medium of exchange, for one can
literally buy anything (material and otherwise) with it and
sell anything for it. Better, in fact, if there were only the
commodities themselves, as in former, less corrupt times,
and perhaps an inconvenient but effective barter system
for securing needed goods and services. Pope's account
contains strong nostalgia for the simplicity and supposed
virtue of a more pastoral existence that lacked the encour-
agement to vice gold offers: 15
Oh! that such bulky Bribes as all might see,
Still, as of old, incumber'd Villainy!
In vain may Heroes fight, and Patriots rave;
If secret Gold saps on from knave to knave.
Could France or Rome divert our brave designs,
With all their brandies or with all their wines?
Poor Avarice one torment more would find;
Nor could Profusion squander all in kind.
Astride his cheese Sir Morgan might we meet,
And Worldly crying coals from street to street,
(Whom with a wig so wild, and mien so maz'd,
Pity mistakes for some poor tradesman craz'd).
Had Colepepper's whole wealth been hops and hogs,
Could he himself have sent it to the dogs?
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His Grace will game: to White's a Bull be led,
With spurning heels and with a butting head.
To White's be carried, as to ancient games,
Fair Coursers, Vases, and alluring Dames.
Shall then Uxorio, if the stakes he s\veep,
Bear home six Whores, and make his Lady weep?
Or soft Adonis, so perfum'd and fine,
Drive to St. James's a whole herd of swine?
[11. 35-40, 47-62]
With the "progress" from gold coins to paper money,
problems increase. Pope begins his diatribe with an echo
of Proverbs 23:5, which condemns material wealth
("When your eyes light upon it, it is gone; for suddenly it
takes to itself wings, flying like an eagle toward heaven").
Pope's account may remind us not only of the Paper
Money Scene in Faust but also of the fierce debate con-
cerning coined and paper money that dominated the
American political scene for fifty years in the middle of
the nineteenth century. 16
Blest paper-credit! last and best supply!
That lends Corruption lighter wings to fly!
Gold imp'd by thee, can compass hardest things,
Can pocket States, can fetch or carry Kings;
A single leaf shall waft an Army o'er,
Or ship off Senates to a distant Shore;
A leaf, like Sibyl's, scatter to and fro
Our fates and fortunes, as the winds shall blow:
Pregnant with thousands flits the Scrap unseen,
And silent sells a King, or buys a Queen. [II. 69-78]
Paper money, even more than gold, facilitates secrecy,
allowing error, vice, and sin to thrive. Throughout, Pope
stresses the importance of this matter of visibility. As Marc
Shell puts it, "In a monetary economy, invisible exchanges
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... are easily effected. Not the presence of money but
rather the absence of witness ... makes such transactions
'invisible.'" 17 For Pope, gold is the virtual opposite of the
sun, source of light and bearer of truth; it was (appro-
priately) buried and hidden "under ground" until brought
out "by Man's audacious labour" (11. 10-11). If gold is so
bad, what can paper money, which is worse, signify?
According to Pope, paper money not only advances cor-
ruption and falsehood, but it is also itself false. Though
gold is both commodity and coin, thing and symbol, paper
money is simply a medium of exchange. Far from being
"the thing itself," paper money is a representation of what
is already a representation. Actually, Pope insists, gold is
itself more-and worse-than a "mere" representation,
for it comes to rival its sire, which Pope believed to be the
sun's rays:
Nature, as in duty bound,
Deep hid the shining mischief under ground:
But when by Man's audacious labour won,
Flam'd forth this rival to, its Sire, the Sun. [lI. 9-12]
In the family romance Pope tells, the son thus struggles
with, and desires to usurp the place of, the father, the
sun. In opposition stand the One (the sun) and the Money
(the son).18
While lambasting gold and paper money as represen-
tations and therefore lies, Pope insists that truth is the
thing itself: always visible, shining, and immediately
available to everyone. 19 Anything hidden or not so acces-
sible is false, as Pope establishes when, for example, he
lashes those who "Some War, some Plague, or Famine ...
foresee, / Some Revelation hid from you and me" (11. 115-
16). A metaphysical stillness, truth is, in fact, like the sun,
source of light: open, clear, and single. A thing is thus it-
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self, proper, possessing uniqueness and identity; unequiv-
ocal, it is not also something else, a point Pope repeatedly
makes.
It may prove helpful to consider Pope's position in rela-
tion to what Shell writes about Plato's conception of truth:
for the philosopher, "the upward way ... does not depend
finally on its opposite, the downward way. Plato pretends
that the etymology of aletheia (truth) is not 'the uncon-
cealed' but rather the unidirectional 'way of the god,'
which does not imply any negation." 20 Pope's declared po-
sition is obvious enough, but is he right? Or is truth per-
haps, like money, the unconcealed, as philosophers such
as Heraclitus and Heidegger believed, opposing the Pla-
tonic notion of the "unidirectional"? Pope believes, of
course, that what is unconcealed and brought from
"under ground" to light is not truth (aletheia) but its op-
posite. Must we choose between these two opposed posi-
tions, the sense of truth as approximation and that of un-
concealment? Might "truth" be inseparable from "not
truth"? Might it, in fact, be at the same time "not truth"?
If so, would "truth" be dialectical, in the way Shell sug-
gests?
"Who shall decide?" Pope asks in opening Bathurst.
Who, that is, will resolve, settle, answer clearly and deci-
sively, do the necessary cutting that the etymology of the
verb indicates that deciding involves and requires? Pope's
question is rhetorical, and according to Paul de Man's im-
portant analysis in "Semiology and Rhetoric," every rhe-
torical question cuts two ways and at once: whereas its
literal meaning insists on a specific response, its figurative
meaning implies the impossibility of deciding and con-
notes, indeed, some degree of resignation concerning this
fact. 21 Two equally possible but entirely incompatible ways
of reading Pope's opening question reside (uneasily) in the
question, which is itself addressed to a situation involving
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two different, conflicting, and indeed incompatible re-
sponses. Pope's initial question opens out onto a difference
of opinion in the poem's two participants, Pope and his
addressee-interlocutor, the rakish Allen Lord Bathurst:
Who shall decide, when Doctors disagree,
And soundest Casuists doubt, like you and me?
You hold the word, from Jove to Momus giv'n,
That Man was made the standing jest of Heav'n;
And Gold but sent to keep the fools in play,
For some to heap, and some to throwaway. [11. 1-6]
More optimistic than his friend (at least in this fiction),
Pope, who thinks "more highly of our kind, / (And surely,
Heav'n and I are of a mind)" (11. 7-8), believes that Nature,
"as in duty bound," hid "the shining mischief" deep
"under ground." When man audaciously began to mine
gold and it came to rival its "sire," "careful Heav'n sup-
ply'd two sorts of Men, / To squander these, and those to
hide agen" (11. 13-14). Each of the two accounts given,
that of Bathurst and that of Pope, is structured as a rec-
ognition of difference, indeed of polar opposition. But
since both participants in the discussion agree that some
heap gold while others squander it, what initially appears
a significant difference dissolves, prompting Pope to de-
clare, "Like Doctors thus, when much dispute has past, /
We find our tenets just the same at last" (11. 15-16). No
decision is, then, necessary: what seemed to be difference
turns out to be actual identity. Such a resolution may sat-
isfy the literal meaning of the opening question, but what
about the figurative meaning, which implies the impossi-
bility of deciding?
And what of the structural pattern of which that impos-
ing initial question forms a part? Like An Epistle to Dr.
Arbuthnot, for example, Bathurst consists of a series of
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differences, extremes, and polarities. Are they similarly
dissolved? A recurring pattern in Pope involves the can-
cellation and ultimate transcendence of difference in an
unexpected synthesis or unity. Elsewhere in Bathurst, cer-
tainly, difference dissolves. For example, picking up on the
earlier point regarding the similarity of those who hide
and those who squander gold, Pope asserts:
Yet, to be just to these poor men of pelf,
Each does but hate his Neighbour as himself:
Damn'd to the Mines, an equal fate betides
The Slave that digs it, and the Slave that hides.
[11. 1 09- 1 2 ]
In a similar vein Pope later writes of the great and final
destroyer of difference:
Who builds a Church to God, and not to Fame,
Will never mark the marble with his Name:
Go, search it there, where to be born and die,
Of rich and poor makes all the history. [11. 285-88]
These passages, like several others we remarked earlier,
indicate that for Pope, no matter how complex truth is, it
is finally one, difference being transcended and in fact
transformed into an identity. Other passages in Bathurst
appear, however, to drive a wedge into this univocal and
monolithic understanding of truth. One of these is Pope's
presentation of the fortuitously named Sir John Blunt, di-
rector of the infamous South Sea Company, in whose
stock Pope unwisely invested. With apparent fidelity to the
man, Pope first depicts Blunt as unscrupulous and hard-
hearted, the virtual opposite of the Man of Ross extolled
later as the imitatio Christi: "'God cannot love (says Blunt,
with tearless eyes) / 'The wretch he starves'-and piously
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denies" the poor (11. 105-6). Pope's later, extended treat-
ment of Blunt, however, is complex and, I think, equivocal:
Much injur'd Blunt! why bears he Britain's hate?
A wizard told him in these words our fate:
''At length Corruption, like a gen'ral flood,
"(So long by watchful Ministers withstood)
"Shall deluge all; and Av'rice creeping on,
"Spread like a low-born mist, and blot the Sun;
"Statesman and Patriot ply alike the stocks,
"Peeress and Butler share alike the Box,
''And Judges job, and Bishops bite the town,
''And mighty Dukes pack cards for half a crown.
"See Britain sunk in lucre's sordid charms,
''And France reveng'd of ANNE'S and EDWARD'S arms!"
No mean Court-badge, great Scriv'ner! £ir'd thy brain,
Nor lordly Luxury, nor City Gain:
No, 'twas thy righteous end, asham'd to see
Senates degen'rate, Patriots disagree,
And nobly wishing Party-rage to cease,
To buy both sides, and give thy Country peace.
[11. 135-52]
Among others, Earl Wasserman has ably discussed this
passage, observing how Pope's satire cuts two ways at
once: "The wizard's picture of corruption is valid, and
Pope can use the vision to lash at the current vice of riches.
But the corrupt Blunt ... is not the man to inveigh against
them; a swindling Dissenter, he represents corruption
crying out against corruption with false piety and false
benevolence."22 As I read it, no clear line exists in Bath-
urst's treatment of Blunt to separate good absolutely from
bad. In terms of effects, there is a mixture of good and bad,
in Blunt perhaps a blunting of the truth.
Increasing the complexity of truth, and unsettling
Pope's sense of its economy, is supplementarity, which we
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briefly discussed in connection with An Essay on Man.
Bathurst thematizes supplementarity, just as it does differ-
ence. The poem is, in fact, full of supplements, of one
kind or another. If Pope sometimes presents them nega-
tively' as a fall from "the thing itself" (e.g., II. 27-28 and
81-92, as well as a couplet I quoted earlier: "Blest paper-
credit! last and best supply! / That lends Corruption
lighter wings to fly!"), at other times supplements are de-
picted as necessary and even good. This last point is per-
haps clearest in relation to man's stewardship of riches (a
steward is an oikonomos).23 Whereas the wise and good
steward will "ease, or emulate, the care of Heav'n" (I.
230), supplementing that work, others, including Blunt,
as well as some clergymen, stubbornly and selfishly refuse
to supplement:
"God cannot love (says Blunt, with tearless eyes)
"The wretch he starves"-and piously denies:
But the good Bishop, with a meeker air,
Admits, and leaves them, Providence's care.
The fullest and most important account of supplemen-
tarity occurs in the depiction of the admirable John Kyrle,
"The MAN of Ross" (I. 250), "who with a small Estate
actually performed all these good works" that Pope pro-
ceeds to detaiI.24 Kyrle's outstanding characteristic is his
acceptance of the relatedness that is our entry into
humanity25 and so of social responsibility, coupled with
his work as steward of man's estate and supplement of
"the care of Heav'n." In the opening verses of Pope's por-
trait, Kyrle appears God-like:
Who hung with woods yon mountain's sultry brow?
From the dry rock who bade the waters flow?
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Not to the skies in useless columns tost,
Or in proud falls magnificently lost,
But clear and artless, pouring thro' the plain
Health to the sick, and solace to the swain.
Whose Cause-way parts the vale with shady rows?
Whose Seats the weary Traveller repose?
Who taught that heav'n-directed spire to rise?
[II. 253-61]
The answer, the truth, is "The MAN of Ross, each lisping
babe replies" (1. 262). In the following verses, Kyrle be-
comes unmistakably both an imitatio Christi and a se-
quentia Christi:
Behold the Market-place with poor o'erspread!
The MAN of Ross divides the weekly bread:
Behold yon Alms-house, neat, but void of state,
Where Age and Want sit smiling at the gate:
Him portion'd maids, apprentic'd orphans blest,
The young who labour, and the old who rest.
Is any sick? the MAN of Ross relieves,
Prescribes, attends, the med'cine makes, and gives.
[H. 263-70]
The portrait concludes with verses depicting Kyrle as rec-
onciler, peacemaker, and judge of differences, deciding
disputes:
Is there a variance? enter but his door,
Balk'd are the Courts, and contest is no more.
Despairing Quacks with curses fled the place,
And vile Attornies, now an useless race. [II. 271-74]
In several ways, the Man of Ross thus emulates, repre-
sents, and supplements the work of Providence.
In presenting John Kyrle as a supplement of "the care
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of Heav'n," Pope shows how this Christ-like figure adds to
that effort. But as we have seen, a strange logic operates
in supplementarity, and so far we have considered only a
part of its work. Another part is more "dangerous," func-
tioning as a substitution and not just an addition. Both
these senses of the supplement appear in Bathurst: if
"what Nature wants" (a phrase Pope admits that he much
distrusts, 1. 25) refers to what is lacking rather than what
is desired, then gold as a supplement-or "supply," to use
Pope's own repeated term-adds to, augments. But riches
also function as a substitute-albeit a poor one-for what
is truly needed:
What Riches give us let us then enquire:
Meat, Fire, and Cloatlls. What more? Meat, Cloaths,
and Fire.
What can they give? to dying Hopkins Heirs;
To Chartres, Vigour; Japhet, Nose and Ears?
Can they, in gems bid pallid Hippia glow,
In Fulvia's buckle ease the throbs below,
Or heal, old Narses, thy obscener ail,
With all th' embroid'ry plaister'd at thy tail?
[ll. 81-82, 87-92]
Though Pope wants to keep these different, indeed con-
flicting senses of supplementarity distinct, "the shadow
presence of the other meaning is always there to under-
mine the distinction."26 Pope's third Moral Essay thus car-
ries a double message: both a declaration, for example
depicting Kyrle as simply an addition to the work of Prov-
idence, and a conflicting descriptiol1 that involves an am-
bivalent and equivocal presentation of the Man of Ross,
much more complex than the structurally similar depic-
tion of Sir John Blunt that we read earlier. Bodying forth
the strange logic of supplementarity, John Kyrle not only
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emulates and eases the work of Providence, but he may
also-in spite of "himself"-rival it and even take its
place. Indeed, by means of that logic according to which,
by Pope's own reckoning in Bathurst and elsewhere, good
is educed from ill, Kyrle may undermine his own work
and what he represents. Since, according to what I have
described as God's deconstructive efforts, Providence uses
individual and collective differences, directing them in
ways we fallible and limited human beings cannot possi-
bly know, in fact turning our actions in ways contrary to
our willful intentions, then may not attempts to ease or
emulate its work actually countermine that which they
were intended to bring about? Perhaps, though, Provi-
dence is judiciously selective in its deconstruction, inter-
vening in our bad actions so as to produce good in spite of
ourselves, but gratefully accepting our good. In any case,
something positive should be expected to come from
those, like Blunt and "the good Bishop," who leave the
poor completely to the care of Providence.
Whether or not Providence deconstructs our good ac-
tions as it does our evil, it apparently requires the labors of
such direct supplementers as Kyrle. If it does, then it is
hardly perfect. But as Pope presents Kyrle, he seems com-
plete-and perfect-in himself. After all, he does every-
thing himself, for example prescribing, making, and dis-
pensing medicine. Kyrle appears, in short, to take the
place of Providence, doing its work. Kyrle's own work, es-
pecially in its effectiveness, implies in Providence what
Derrida calls "the anterior default of a presence." Needing
the "supply" provided by people like the Man of Ross,
Providence lacks, a void becoming apparent, another hole
exposed. Because Providence requires human help just as
humans ostensibly need its care and assistance, it evi-
dently has to be supplemented.
In such a manner, Bathurst calls into question the no-
94~ Quests ofDifference
tion of truth as univocal. Indeed, it systematically reveals
the complex economy of truth, specifically its dialogical
nature. This we begin to grasp via the oft-cited portrait of
Balaam, with which Pope ends the poem. Balaam appears,
even more than Blunt, as Kyrle's polar opposite; he is as
Satanic as the Man of Ross is Christ-lil(e. Whereas Kyrle
accepted and enacted the responsibilities entailed in hu-
man relatedness, Balaam proudly and avariciously refuses
to care, to help, to supplement. In fact, he effectively dis-
lodges Providence as a force in his life, claiming self-
sufficiency. Thus he ''Ascribes his gettings to his parts and
merit, / What late he call'd a Blessing, now was Wit, / And
God's good Providence, a lucky Hit" (II. 376-78). At the
end, penniless, impeached, destitute, and alone, "sad Sir
Balaam curses God and dies" (I. 402), shifting responsi-
bility for his own manifold failures onto God, making
Him a supplement of those failures.
Together, the Man of Ross, the imitatio and sequentia
Christi, and Sir Balaam, who refuses to imitate the work
of Providence, represent the two different and conflicting
senses that Derrida has shown to co-exist in supplemen-
tarity. The two portraits constitute, in fact, an allegory of
supplementarity. As we have seen, Bathurst declares that
Kyrle adds to and therefore eases "the care of Heav'n" and
that Balaam acts as a substitute, proudly refusing to ac-
knowledge any power or force outside himself as respon-
sible for his good fortune. But as the textual descriptions
indicate, the logic of the supplement operates within this
allegory of supplementarity, rending each of the two
"poles," dividing each within. As a result, Kyrle, in Ba-
laam-like self-sufficiency, becomes a rival of and substi-
tute for Providence, much as gold comes to rival its sire
the sun. Likewise, Balaam may be said to add to or ad-
vance the grand design of Heaven if, as Pope repeatedly
assures us, the ill particular individuals do is ultimately
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directed, deconstructed, and transformed by a benevolent
"Pow'r" into good for the whole.
Moreover, since Kyrle and Balaam each add to the text's
force and direction while rivaling each other, they func-
tion-beyond the thematic level at what might be called
the material or textual level-as both additions to and
substitutions for one another. The Man of Ross serves, of
course, as the poem's ethical norm, a representation of its
deeply Christian values, and ostensibly overshadows the
evil Balaam represents, but the latter is powerfully pre-
sented, certainly memorable, and-whether or not more
realistic-significantly accorded the final section. Kyrle
and Balaam are described as exchanging places with one
another, each being the battlefield between the warring
forces that they (declaratively) represent as apparent op-
posites.
Other instances of the problematization of identity, and
so of univocal truth, occur in Bathurst. There is, for ex-
ample, the double meaning of the words 1 have quoted on
more than one occasion: "What Nature wants." The verb
means both to desire and to lack, the phrase being one
(therefore?) that, Pope confesses, "I much distrust." Did
Pope distrust the verb because it is untrustworthy, im-
proper, equivocal? In any case, consider Pope's claim, also
noted earlier, that the sun sired gold (1. 12), which is,
therefore, the sun's son. We cannot but hear in this verse,
as we did in An Essay on Criticism, both "sun" and "son,"
which illustrates the difference between phonemes and
graphemes: as with the Derridean neologism differance,
which is indistinguishable audibly from difference, so with
"sun" and "son." About this situation Derrida writes:
The difference between two phonemes, which enables them to
exist and to operate, is inaudible. The inaudible opens the two
present phonemes to hearing, as they present themselves....
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The difference that brings out phonemes and lets them be heard
and understood ... itself remains inaudible....
[Since] the difference between the e and the a marked in "dif-
ferance" eludes ... hearing, this happily suggests that we must
here let ourselves be referred to an order that no longer refers
to sensibility. But we are not referred to intelligibility either....
We must be referred to an order, then, that resists philosophy's
founding opposition between the sensible and the intelligible.
The order that resists this opposition, that resists it because it
sustains it, is designated in a movement of differance (with an
a) between two differences or between two letters. This differ-
ance belongs neither to the voice nor to writing in the ordinary
sense, and it takes place . . . between speech and writing and
beyond the tranquil familiarity that binds us to one and to the
other, reassuring us sometimes in the illusion that they are two
separate things.27
On this reading, which I have quoted at such length be-
cause of the way it brings together a number of points
crucial to our exploration, the a of differance "remains si-
lent, secret, and discreet, like a tomb"; it is a tomb, Der-
rida adds, that "is not far from signaling the death of the
king."28 The king is the sign, supposedly single, proper,
and truth-ful. In Bathurst, to return at last to Pope, "sun"
and "son" are brought together as their differance, and so
we hear that the sun/son sired the son, which is then said
to rival the sun. Does the son thus supplement the father,
or does it supplement "itself," dividing "itself" within?
"Who shall decide?"
The exchange (paying what sort of dividends, repaying
how much interest?) between "sun" and "son" is paral-
leled by the blunt-ing of differences, and exchange, that
occurs when, after the sun has been posited as (source of)
truth, the figures traditionally associated with it are ap-
plied to a representation. Though early in Bathurst repre-
sentation is treated, we recall, as falsehood, truth and rep-
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resentation are not opposed to each other in the following
passage; on the contrary, copying is now roundly praised:
Who copies Your's, or OXFORD'S better part,
To ease th' oppress'd, and raise the sinking heart?
Where-e'er he shines, oh Fortune, gild the scene,
And Angels guard him in the golden Mean!
[11. 243-46]
An Epistle to Bathurst thus describes, in a systematic
manner, not only the collapse of absolute difference but
also the impossibility of distinct identity and univocal
truth. In this poem, Pope shows, descriptively, that a thing
is and is not "itself." The point applies equally to the text
that reveals this "truth." In its exploration of truth, An
Epistle to Bathurst loses its own "identity."29 As an alle-
gory, it tells the story of the struggle between textual dec-
laration and textual description. It also tells the story of
two competing ideas of truth. One of these, deriving from
Plato, holds that truth is, in Marc Shell's account, the
"unidirectional 'way of the god,'" and the other posits
truth as equivocal, indeed as dialogical, being inseparable
from not-truth. This second notion of truth is related to,
though it should be distinguished from, the Heraclitean
and Heideggerian conception that Shell has presented.
This latter conception is a dialectical one that regards
truth as aletheia, the unconcealed.
We are dealing here, obviously, with both "truth" in
general and the "truth" about Pope's poem. And though
we should be sure not to confuse and identify the two pur-
suits, we must wonder about the relationship of these
quests. Apparently in accord with the idea of truth as ale-
theia, the "truth" concerning Bathurst had to be "by Man's
audacious labour won"; like gold, it had to be sought be-
low the surface, where it lay hidden, and then brought to
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light, coming finally into unconcealedness. If I may pur-
sue the analogy with gold, then the "truth" about Bathurst
is both fathered by and will come to rival and eventually
to replace that other (Platonic) conception of truth, asso-
ciated with the sun (the father) and believed to be readily
available. How can we be sure, in any case, that what we
brought from concealedness to light, via reading, is the
truth, any more than the traditional univocal reading? In
short, is the deconstructive analysis of Bathurst "truer"
than the other one? Actually, what the deconstruction
makes clear, dependent on Bathurst's complex explora-
tions' is the connection, rivalry, and exchange that pre-
vents us from resting with any possibility as the "truth,"
including any "truth" brought into unconcealedness. Our
reading, deriving from the text's difficult lesson that truth
is always on the move, reveals that truth is divided, dia-
logical, rather than unequivocal and univocal. Is that
"truth" about "truth" "truer" than the deconstructed one?
If truth is always on the move, and if reading seems to
disillusion us, as the Bible does, concerning the possibility
of a simple truth, exposing the untruthfulness of "truth,"
then the "truth" established by reading, even if posited as
divided and dialogical, is no less logocentric and in need
of further deconstruction. Oil reste . . . ? Perhaps what
matters is the use we make of what is taken as "truth."
The use of riches.
~ Chapter Five
Becoming Woman
Writing, Self, and the Q:test ofDifference
in the Imitations of Horace
Besides An Essay on Man and the Moral Essays, Pope's
major poems of the 1730S are those we know by the rubric
Imitations ofHorace. This title is convenient but mislead-
ing-if not perverse-for only eleven of the seventeen
poems included are more or less directly imitative of the
Roman poet; the remaining poems include the two "imi-
tations" of Donne, An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, the two
dialogues of the Epilogue to the Satires, and the fragment
known as One Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty. If
reading is the major concern in the Moral Essays, writing
is the central thematic focus in these poems, which, de-
spite some reservations, I follow the Twickenham Edition
in calling Imitations ofHorace. Several of these poems, in
fact, deal centrally with the life of writing, though they do
not exclude issues in reading; from Arbuthnot, often con-
sidered the prologue to this series of poems, to the Epi-
logue to the Satires, the Imitations focus on the social, po-
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litical, and cultural state of writing, its value, and Pope's
own praxis.
As these poems focus on the problem(atic)s of writing
and its significance, they require considerable effort from
the reader. By this I mean more than the recognition, no
less accurate for being familiar, that Pope demands of his
reader wide knowledge, close attention, and considerable
skill in identifying and understanding the many allusions.
That the reader of the Imitations becomes, in fact, a pro-
ducer and not merely a consumer perhaps carries little
surprise. After all, most of these poems are in some sense
"about" their individual similarities to and differences
from the Latin and English poems that they "imitate" and
that Pope printed alongside his own texts. The reader of
these poems is thus asked to relate and distinguish, part
of his or her pleasure surely deriving from the ability to
note both resemblance and difference. But that work, im-
portant as it is, is not all that Pope demands.
As the presence of the "imitated" poems alongside the
"imitations" suggests, the work that Pope demands re-
volves around questions of difference. Especially since a
number of critics have carefully and ably explicated the
relation of Pope's to Horace's poems,1 I shall concentrate
on the ways in which difference functions as theme, goal,
and strategy within the Imitations, without, I trust, ne-
glecting the similarities to and differences from poems
"imitated" wherever these bear on meaning. As Shake-
speare does in Ulysses' famous speech on Order in the
third act of Troilus and Cressida, Pope insists that distinc-
tion is the key to social and cultural survival, let alone
excellence; without difference, as Pope goes on·to claim in
The Dunciad, light will be eliminated, "dread" chaos re-
stored, and the "great Anarch" enthroned as ruler of all
that is. As he lambastes Augustan society throughout the
satires and epistles for its increasing failure to distinguish,
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Pope tries, in and through his writing, to make a differ-
ence. This he does in part by requiring his reader to make
certain necessary distinctions.
In various ways, the Imitations require that the reader
exercise his or her ability to discriminate. Sober Advice
from Horace, "Imitated in the Manner of Mr. Pope," for
example, that apparent "jeu d'esprit" frequently called ob-
scene and pornographic,2 has to do. with the reader's re-
sponse to the value systems displayed in the verse by the
libertine "speaker" and in the mock notes by "Richard
Bentley," who thus reveal how they have responded to both
Horace and Pope. In An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, the read-
er's responsibilities are different, extending beyond ques-
tions of Pope's intentions. What to make of this important
text, arguably the greatest of the Imitations, in which, im-
mediately after the devastating attack on Sporus, Pope
switches, without warning or apparent justification, to the
third person in referring to himself? Might this abrupt
change signal in him a recognition of the otherness within
"himself" and so perhaps the same self-difference he has
satirized in Sporus, "one vile Antithesis. / Amphibious
Thing!" (11. 32S-26)? Though the poem was evidently
constructed to persuade us that his own are "manly ways"
(1. 337), unlike Sporus's, Pope appears just as equivocal,
becoming clearly womanly by poem's end.
Whatever we make of the perplexing problems the Im-
itations present us with, questions of difference cannot be
avoided. Important among these questions is sexual dif-
ference. Obviously Sober Advice treats sex, but so does Ar-
buthnot, for example, even if this has rarely been recog-
nized. The latter poem especially makes clear the
inseparability of sex and writing. Given Pope's privileging
of man in To a Lady (woman comes after, being but "a
softer Man," 1. 272), it is probably not surprising that he
considers writing a masculine activity. This is so at least
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at the "level" of the declarations, his desire both to make
a difference and to be different from the "plague" of po-
etasters exemplifying phallogocentrism. Textual descrip-
tion is, however, as always a different matter. The ways in
which the male/female "opposition" structures Pope's ex-
ploration of writing, difference, and the self is one of my
concerns in the pages that follow.
"Equivocation Will Undo Us"
'54dieu Distinction, Satire, Warmth, and Truth.'''
No one has better discussed Pope's poetry in the 1730S
than Maynard Mack, in The Garden and the City: Retire-
ment and Politics in the Later Poetry of Pope, 1731-43.3
Among Mack's contributions to our understanding of
Pope, his poetry, and his milieu is his demonstration that
the satirist used his "retirement" from the city as both op-
portunity and justification for the attacks he launched
against King George II, the administration of Robert Wal-
pole, and the art and morality they encouraged. Though
Mack does not himself emphasize the term, we might say
that Pope wants to make a difference, and his way ofmak-
ing a difference entails being different.
The first dialogue of the Epilogue to the Satires, pub-
lished in 1 738, summarizes what Pope found wrong in
England in the 1730S: a pervasive eclipse of what An Es-
say on Man calls virtue. Pope's attack becomes as precise
as it is emotionally heightened:
See thronging Millions to the Pagod run,
And offer Country, Parent, Wife, or Son!
Hear [the] black Trumpet thro' the Land proclaim,
That "Not to be corrupted is the Shame."
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In Soldier, Churchman, Patriot, Man in Pow'r,
'Tis Av'rice all, Ambition is no more!
See, all our Nobles begging to be Slaves!
See, all our Fools aspiring to be Knaves!
The Wit of Cheats, the Courage of a Whore,
Are what ten thousand envy and adore.
All, all look up, with reverential Awe,
On Crimes that scape, or triumph o'er the Law:
While Truth, Worth, Wisdom, daily they decry-
"Nothing is Sacred now but Villany." [II. 157-70]
The themes sounded throughout the satires of the 1730S
appear here, including the inversion of values, "the Ava-
rice of Pow'r" (Epistle II.ii.307), the mad lust for gold, the
corruption of youth and the perversion of the nobility, and
the pervasiveness of slavery. All now being scorned "but
gold" (the second Satire of Donne, 1. 24), charity and the
poor being neglected ("Oh Impudence of wealth! with all
thy store, / How dar'st thou let one worthy man be poor?"
[Satire ll.ii.117-18]), the present age has simply bid
''Adieu [to] Distinction, Satire, Warmth, and Truth!" (first
dialogue of the Epilogue to the Satires, 1. 64).
Preeminently among the poems of the 1730s, Epistle
II.i. (To Augustus) makes this loss of the ability to distin-
guish its central concern. Maintaining that this condition
characterizes the nobility no less than the "Mobs," Pope
argues that indiscrimination in literary taste and loss of
critical judgment presage collapse of social distinction.
What dear delight to Britons Farce affords!
Farce once the taste of Mobs, but now of Lords;
(For Taste, eternal wanderer, now flies
From heads to ears, and now from ears to eyes.)
The Play stands still; damn action and discourse,
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Back fly the scenes, and enter foot and horse;
Pageants on pageants, in long order drawn,
Peers, Heralds, Bishops, Ermin, Gold, and Lawn;
The Champion too! and, to complete the jest,
Old Edward's Armour beams on Cibber's breast!
With laughter sure Democritus had dy'd,
Had he beheld an Audience gape so wide.
Let Bear or Elephant be e'er so white,
The people, sure, the people are the sight!
Ah luckless Poet! stretch thy lungs and roar,
That Bear or Elephant shall heed thee more;
While all its throats the Gallery extends,
And all the Thunder of the Pit ascends!
Loud as the Wolves on Orcas' stormy steep,
Howl to the roarings of the Northern deep.
Such is the shout, the long-applauding note,
At Quin's high plume, or Oldfield's petticoat,
Or when from Court a birth-day suit bestow'd
Sinks the lost Actor in the tawdry load.
Booth enters-hark! the Universal Peal!
"But has he spoken?" Not a syllable.
"What shook the stage, and made the people stare?"
Cato's long Wig, flowr'd gown, and lacquer'd chair.
[H. 310-37]
In this situation, attention is misdirected, values all askew,
the outside being privileged: of interest is the spectacle
alone, the outward trappings, what the eye can see, what
does not require interpretive or critical effort.
At least partly responsible for this situation, according
to Pope, is bad writing, and one reason why writing is now
bad is that everyone, talented or not, seems driven to
write: "those who cannot write, and those who can, / All
ryme, and scrawl, and scribble, to a man" (Augustus, II.
187-88). Like Arbuthnot (e.g., "All Bedlam, or Pamassus,
is let out: / Fire in each eye, and Papers in each hand, /
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They rave, recite, and madden round the land," 11. 4-6),
Augustus claims that
one Poetick Itch
Has seiz'd the Court and City, Poor and Rich:
Sons, Sires, and Grandsires, all will wear the Bays,
Our Wives read Milton, and our Daughters Plays,
To Theatres, and to Rehearsals throng,
And all our Grace at Table is a Song.
When, sick of Muse, our follies we deplore,
And promise our best Friends to ryme no more;
We wake next morning in a raging Fit,
And call for Pen and Ink to show our Wit.
[11. 169-74, 177-80]
Given the lust for gold and "the Avarice of Pow'r," of
which writers are by no means innocent, Englishmen
have, says Pope in various poems, given themselves to flat-
tery, in an effort to enlist the rich and powerful in advanc-
ing their own selfish causes: "The Poets learn'd to please,
and not to wound: / Most warp'd to Flatt'ry's side" (Au-
gustus, 11. 258-59). As a result, "Satire is no more-I feel
it die" (Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue 1.83). What satire
does exist, Pope claims, is mere libel. Much-if not
most-of the blame for this deplorable situation rests, ac-
cording to Pope, with the King, the Court, and the Wal-
pole administration, for whom the current "Poetick Itch"
is propitious: allow the crazed scribbler "but his Play-
thing of a Pen, / He ne'er rebels, or plots, like other men"
(Augustus, 11. 193-94). Moreover, neither the King nor his
Court can distinguish sufficiently to support the worthy
and deserving. Because George Augustus cannot distin-
guish, Pope asserts in Epistle II.i., flatterers are promoted.
And because the King cannot make the necessary distinc-
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tions, Pope can write this particular poem, ostensibly
praising him but actually satirizing him. Pope gambles
that the king will not be able to negotiate the double
meanings of his verse nor discern the uncompromising
satire. As he slyly writes, "Kings in Wit may want discern-
ing spirit" (1. 385). To Augustus thus becomes a particular
kind of satirical performance, demonstrating George the
reader's inability to distinguish.
A somewhat similar situation (as well as strategy) ob-
tains in Sober Advice from Horace, also addressed to the
loss of critical judgment. I have argued elsewhere that,
just as Pope impersonates Bentley in the pedantic notes to
the English poem, so he creates a completely fictional
"speaker," specifically a Restoration rake, who offers an
imitation of Pope imitating Horace.4 At least part of the
point, with both "Bentley" and the rakish persona, is the
nature of their (undiscriminating) response to both poets.
Though superficially quite different, their responses are
actually similar. Whereas the literal-minded "Bentley" is
obsessed with technical accuracy in rendering the words
of Horace and oblivious to meanings and effects,5 the
poem's "speaker," interested only in "God's good Thing"
(1. 103), undermines poetic and moral values in giving
free rein to man's baser, animalistic instincts and indeed
in using poetry to glorify them. Such an effort dissipates
the satirical force of the Horatian sermo as the satirized
persona either misunderstands the texts on which he
draws or else willfully transforms them for his own libidi-
nous purposes. How the reader responds to this sermon
promoting fornication, as well as to the mock notes, mat-
ters greatly. We might say, in fact, that the poem reads the
reader. Pope clearly expects his reader to make distinc-
tions that neither "Bentley" nor the rakish persona, like
George Augustus, is able to make. In dramatizing such
inability to distinguish, Pope works to make a difference.
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Pursuing Difference
Pope's (vain but no doubt sincere) commitment is to some-
thing like the green world dreamed of in Shakespearean
romance.6 Even if such cannot be realized in Augustan
England, he tries to effect some difference in the way
things are. For him to do so, he believes, he must be and
appear different. In a number of respects, of course, in-
cluding physical, religious, and intellectual, he was differ-
ent. The epistles and satires we are now treating he con-
structs as complex and carefully orchestrated attempts to
establish definitively his difference from the corruption of
City and Court, from the pervasive literary and cultural
indiscrimination, and from the "plague" of poetasters
hounding him wherever he goes.
The strategy involves, first of all, physical separation
and geographical distance. The Fourth Satire of Dr. John
Donne, Dean of St. Paul's, Versify'd dramatizes Pope's
imagined experiences at Court, depicting both the villainy
he hates and the distance from it he desires:
Bear me, some God! oh quickly bear me hence
To wholesome Solitude, the Nurse of Sense:
Where Contemplation prunes her ruffled Wings,
And the free Soul looks down to pity Kings.
If he is to write, Pope claims, he must get away from
London, for "Who there his Muse, or Self, or Soul at-
tends? / In Crouds and Courts, Law, Business, Feasts and
Friends?" (Epistle II.ii.go-gl). The apparent answer to this
desire of physical distance is, of course, Pope's cherished
"retreat" at Twickenham, where he can be properly con-
templative and attend to the stirrings of his heart. His op-
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position of city and country parallels that familiar In
Fielding's novels as well as elsewhere in the period.
Soon as I enter at my Country door,
My Mind resumes the thread it dropt before;
Thoughts, which at Hyde-Park-Corner I forgot,
Meet and rejoin me, in the pensive Grott.
There all alone, and Compliments apart,
I ask these sober questions of my Heart.
[Epistle II.ii.206-1 1]
Unfortunately for Pope, even Twickenham does not pro-
vide the difference sought, as An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot
makes abundantly clear. The "undistinguish'd race" (1.
237) of "Witlings" invade even this sacred "retreat": ''All
fly to Twit'nam, and in humble strain / Apply to me, to
keep them mad or vain" (11. 21-22). As the poem opens,
Pope cries to his servant, "Shut, shut the door, good John!
fatigu'd I said, / Tye up the knocker, say I'm sick, I'm
dead." Sequestering and protecting himself from the
"Plague" (1. 29) raging outside, Pope thus dramatizes the
desire for literary and moral difference that lies at the
heart of this poem. Widely used as a symbol for loss of
distinction, the metaphor of plague functions, according
to Rene Girard, as a "generic label for a variety of ills that
... threaten or seem to threaten the very existence of so-
ciallife." 7 Faced with such threats, Pope preserves his dif-
ference not only by escaping from the poetasters but also
by carefully establishing his difference from those who
lack discrimination and sufficient difference.
"Let Us befix'd, and our own Masters still"
What distinguishes Pope from "the Race that write," the
ubiquitous and avaricious flatterers, and the literary and
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political sycophants is in part his independence. "Thanks
to Homer," he proudly declares, referring, of course, to the
money he earned on the translation, he is "Indebted to no
Prince or Peer alive" (Epistle II.ii.6g-70). His financial se-
curity allows for intellectual, moral, and literary indepen-
dence: "No Pimp of Pleasure, and no Spy of State" (Satire
II.i. 134), "Sworn to no Master, of no Sect am I" (Epistle
I.i.24). As a result, Pope claims to be objective, interested
only in virtue, no matter where it is found:
I follow Virtue, where she shines, I praise,
Point she to Priest or Elder, Whig or Tory,
Or round a Quaker's Beaver cast a Glory.
To find an honest man, I beat about,
And love him, court him, praise him, in or out.
[Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue 11.95-97, 102-3]
He is thus different from those driven by desire for fame,
praise, and glory, who are subject to continuous buffeting:
o you! whom Vanity's light bark conveys
On Fame's mad voyage by the wind of Praise;
With what a shifting gale your course you ply;
For ever sunk too low, or born too high!
Who pants for glory finds but short repose,
A breath revives him, or a breath o'erthrows!
[Augustus, II. 296-301]
Closely related to Pope's proud and fierce independence
is his constancy and singleness of purpose, unlike the wild
changeableness of the flatterers and sycophants. Their
lust and avarice produces, as Dante understood, constant
movement, the opposite of the contemplativeness Twick-
enham symbolizes: "If Wealth alone then make and keep
us blest, / Still, still be getting, never, never rest" (Epistle
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I.vi.gS-g6). As Pope suggests (see, for example, Epistle
I.i·41 and Epistle II.ii.73), such inconstancy at least threat-
ens loss of self. Certainly it produces equivocalness: in
their quest of gold, power, and place, their success being
dependent on others, the greedy have to become what is
expected of them and to be what those holding the keys to
"success" want them to be. Unlike the (supposedly) uni-
vocal Pope, dependent on no one, the avaricious become
all things to all men, losing any sense of distinct identity.
For himself and those he cares about, Pope's wish is ap-
propriately simple: "Let Lands and Houses have what
Lords they will, / Let Us be fix'd, and our own Masters
still" (Satire II.ii.179-80). "Equivocation will undo us."
Exposing Himself in the "impartial Glms"
Such is the context of the life of writing that Pope de-
scribes as his calling in the Imitations of Horace. Though
many of these poems treat in a significant way the subject
of writing, Satire II.i. (To Fortescue) will serve to introduce
and focus the issues with which we need to be concerned.
Later in this chapter I shall devote individual sections to
Augustus, Sober Advice, and Arbuthnot.
In Fortescue, reiterating his independence and objectiv-
ity ("Un-plac'd, un-pension'd, no Man's Heir, or Slave," 1.
116), Pope avers that "To VIRTUE ONLY and HER FRIENDS" is
he (as well as his writing) "A FRIEND" (1. 121). He further
declares himself an instrument of truth, asserting that he
will conceal or hold back nothing but instead will tell the
truth, even if it is unflattering to himself and his friends.
Like them, he will appear naked, exposed in the truly re-
flecting mirror of his satire. An expression of Pope's con-
tinuing privileging of the inside, his claim recalls An Essay
on Criticism.
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I love to pour out all myself, as plain
As downright Shippen, or as old Montagne.
In them, as certain to be lov'd as seen,
The Soul stood forth, nor kept a Thought within;
In me what Spots (for Spots I have) appear,
Will prove at least the Medium must be clear.
In this impartial Glass, my Muse intends
Fair to expose myself, my Foes, my Friends;
Publish the present Age, but where my Text
Is Vice too high, reserve it for the next:
My Foes shall wish my Life a longer date,
And ev'ry Friend the less lament my Fate. [II. 5 1-62]8
For Pope's reader this conception of the particular na-
ture of virtue and truth may well create certain difficulties.
Pope's intention is to be strictly impartial: he holds that
truth lies on and with no side or "part." Believing in what
he terms "moderation," Pope may be misunderstood,
however, as favoring one side or another or both, indis-
criminately, even equivocally.
My Head and Heart thus flowing thro' my Quill,
Verse-man or Prose-man, term me which you will,
Papist or Protestant, or both between,
Like good Erasmus in an honest Mean,
In Moderation placing all my Glory,
While Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory.
[II. 63-68]
Both the need for and the difficulty of distinction is ap-
parent when we juxtapose this passage and the following
lines from To Augustus, which lash inconstancy:
Britain, changeful as a Child at play,
Now calls in Princes, and now turns away.
Now Whig, now Tory, what we lov'd we hate;
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Now all for Pleasure, now for Church and State;
Now for Prerogative, and now for Laws;
Effects unhappy! from a Noble Cause. [ll. 155-60]
The truth, though, is by now familiar: rather than equiv-
ocate, or oscillate from side to side, Pope actually rises
above and transcends individual differences (so the story
goes), residing in the "truth" that is one even if never seen
whole by the various partisans. Pope's claim is thus to the
same holistic vision he prizes in An Essay on Criticism and
in An Essay on Man. The point is amplified in Epistle l.i.:
Sworn to no Master, of no Sect am I:
As drives the storm, at any door I knock,
And house with Montagne now, or now with Lock.
Sometimes a Patriot, active in debate,
Mix with the World, and battle for the State,
Free as young Lyttelton, her cause pursue,
Still true to Virtue, and as warm as true:
Sometimes, with Aristippus, or St. Paul,
Indulge my Candor, and grow all to all;
Back to my native Moderation slide,
And win my way by yielding to the tyde. [II. 24-34]
Pope's freedom and candor must, then, be distinguished
from the changeableness and equivocation that he de-
plores. Such discrimination proves hard work for the
reader, particularly as Pope's stance involves ironies,
tones, and strategies sometimes easily misunderstood.
The most important consequence of the difficulty in read-
ing Pope is the burden placed on the reader, whose own
ability to distinguish is actively called into play and fre-
quently tested rather severely.
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Double Reading To Augustus
Framing the King
Earlier I commented on some of the ways in which Au-
gustus focuses on the widespread inability to distinguish,
for example satirizing the king for his lack of the "discern-
ing spirit" needed to read that poem correctly. Complicat-
ing the problem, if not creating it, for both George Augus-
tus and Pope's other readers past and present, is the
presence of irony, particularly in the political "frame" sur-
rounding the discussion of the condition and value of po-
etry. Irony always entails, of course, questions of intention
and necessitates a double reading since what is being
overtly declared is not what is meant. Though there is ob-
viously some resemblance, this situation is by no means
identical to the declaration/description that characterizes
the double movement of deconstruction. In irony, both
overt and "real" (i.e., satirical) meanings derive from au-
thorial intention; in deconstruction, on the other hand,
what I have been calling description derives from the tex-
tual play of language. To those being satirized via irony,
only overt meanings should appear. In the case of Augus-
tus, this is the fulsome praise of the king, "flattered" by
the poem's "speaker" as profusely as by those Pope else-
where satirizes. To those of us blessed, as the king was not,
with some "discerning spirit," the meaning appears
double, as Pope evidently intended it. The overt meaning
(the praise) is, however, strictly a function of, indeed is
subordinate to and undercut by, the satire.
From the opening lines we are invited to read ironically
the ostensible praise of George II. This we can, and will,
do if we possess certain minimal information and are at-
tuned to the doubleness of Pope's procedure. If he or she
is to read these verses ironically, the reader may need to
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know, for example, that English ships were routinely
being harassed at sea and that George Augustus spent
much of his time in the arms of his German mistress. If
the reader happens to share Pope's interpretation that the
king could not be credited with advancing the cause of the
arts, morality, or good government, all the better. Such
shared knowledge, or interpretation, certainly assists the
reader, and it may even be necessary for an ironical read-
ing. But the possibility of doubleness inherent in the
words themselves should not be neglected.9 I think Irvin
Ehrenpreis correct in writing that these lines "may be read
as either eulogy or vituperation." 10
While You, great Patron11 of Mankind, sustain
The balanc'd World, and open all the Main;
Your Country, chief, in Arms abroad defend,
At home, with Morals, Arts, and Laws amend;
How shall the Muse, from such a Monarch, steal
An hour, and not defraud the Publick Weal? [II. 1 -6]
Even if we are entitled to say-thanks to historical and
biographical information as well as to the entire tradition
of reading the poem-that Pope's intentions are (appar-
ently) clear, we must grant that Augustus "works" only if
such lines as I have quoted may also be read as straight-
forward praise, however saccharine.
By the end of the poem, when Pope returns to the king,
completing the "frame," the irony appears somewhat
more complicated yet also more obvious. Pope works to
ensure that his reader read double. As a matter of fact, he
has already stated unequivocally (albeit ironically) that he
lies: "I, who so oft renounce the Muses, lye, / Not--'s
self e'er tells more Fibs than I" (II. 175-76). At the close,
he even suggests, in acknowledging that what he "aims"
Imitations ofHorace c1!\. 1 15
as praise actually satirizes, that his efforts undercut-de-
construct-themselves.
Not with such Majesty, such bold relief,
The Forms august of King, or conqu'ring Chief,
E'er swell'd on Marble; as in Verse have shin'd
(In polish'd Verse) the Manners and the Mind.
Oh! could I mount on the Mreonian wing,
Your Arms, your Actions, your Repose to sing!
What seas you travers'd! and what fields you fought!
Your Country's Peace, how oft, how dearly bought!
How barb'rous rage subsided at your word,
And Nations wonder'd while they dropp'd the sword!
How, when you nodded, o'er the land and deep,
Peace stole her wing, and wrapt the world in sleep;
Till Earth's extremes your mediation own,
And Asia's Tyrants tremble at your Throne-
But Verse alas! your Majesty disdains;
And I'm not us'd to Panegyric strains:
The Zeal of Fools offends at any time,
But most of all, the Zeal of Fools in ryme.
Besides, a fate attends on all I write,
That when I aim at praise, they say I bite.
A vile Encomium doubly ridicules;
There's nothing blackens like the ink of fools;
If true, a wofullikeness, and if lyes,
"Praise undeserv'd is scandal in disguise:"
Well may he blush, who gives it, or receives;
And when I flatter, let my dirty leaves
(Like Journals, Odes, and such forgotten things
As Eusden, Philips, Settle, writ of Kings)
Cloath spice, line trunks, or flutt'ring in a row,
Befringe the rails of Bedlam and Sohoe. [11. 390-419]
Within the rather obvious irony is a tantalizing inconsist-
ency in the "I." If the "I" of line 415 is straightforwardly
Pope, that at lines 408-9, as at lines 175-76, is ironic.
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"Discerning spirit" may be necessary to detect the differ-
ence, but the difference helps lead the reader to Pope's
declared intentions.
'1Cnow[ing] the Poetfrom the Man ofRymes"
If the opening and closing verses "frame" George Augus-
tus, ostensibly lavishing him with the praise he wants to
hear but actually satirizing him for his lack of "discerning
spirit," indeed convicting him for that failure, the "inside"
centers on the value of writing, whose complexity the
frame well establishes. (That the relationship of frame to
thing framed is not unproblematical is just the point, pol-
itics and writing being obviously interimplicated.) In both
situations, the focus is on the ability to distinguish. The
frame centers on the king's lack of critical judgment, pre-
cisely what it requires of the reader, and the rest of the
poem, like An Essay on Criticism, offers its own exact dis-
criminations and critical assessments, in the process es-
tablishing the grounds for true distinction.
Part of the problem Pope treats, and must cope with
strategically, is that George II is popular: he frequently re-
ceived such praise as Pope only ironically gives. That sit-
uation opens Pope's argument for the need of discrimina-
tion. Immediately after asserting that "Suns of Glory
please not till they set" (I. 22-still another play on "sun"
and "son"), Pope turns to George Augustus and declares,
without pointing to the difference, that he already pleases:
"To Thee, the World its present homage pays, / The Har-
vest early, but mature the Praise" (II. 23-24). Pope adds a
few lines later that his subjects are "partial" to George:
"Foes to all living worth except your own" (II. 32-33). Pope
thus draws a significant difference that the reader must
recognize, a difference "the people" do not make.
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They simply cannot distinguish good from bad, true
from false, whether the subject be the king or authors an-
cient and modern:
Authors, like Coins, grow dear as they grow old;
It is the rust we value, not the gold.
Chaucer's worst ribaldry is learn'd by rote,
And beastly Skelton Heads of Houses quote.
In authors, what matters to the public is "staying power,"
or reputation over a period of time; the irrational claim, in
fact, is that" 'Who lasts a Century can have no flaw'" (I.
55). Partial to older writers, as they are to the king, Pope's
contemporaries, so he claims, censure works "not as bad,
but new; / While if our Elders break all Reason's laws, /
These fools demand not Pardon, but Applause" (II. 116-
18). If one dare ask whether Shakespeare has any flaws,
or criticize the actors Betterton and Booth, "How will our
Fathers rise up in a rage, / And swear, all shame is lost in
George's Age" (II. 125-26). Pope's double-edged point
here is, of course, that, though the age does lack shame, it
is not for the reasons adduced by such critics.
As he had defined "the true critic" in An Essay on Crit-
icism, so in Augustus Pope proceeds to offer a description
of the true poet. This description immediately follows the
long passage I quoted earlier (II. 310-37) concerning the
translatia of indiscrimination from City to Court, from
"Mobs" to "Lords." Different from those who are, in every
sense, undistinguished, undistinguishing, and indeed un-
distinguishable, the true poet, declares Pope, is he who
can affect and move the reader or spectator, appealing to
his or her innermost being:
Let me for once presume t'instruct the times,
To know the Poet from the Man of Rymes:
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'Tis He, who gives my breast a thousand pains,
Can make me feel each Passion that he feigns,
Inrage, compose, with more than magic Art,
With Pity, and with Terror, tear my heart;
And snatch me, o'er the earth, or thro' the air,
To Thebes, to Athens, when he 'will, and where.
[II. 340-47]
That Pope's primary concern, like that of classical and
Renaissance criticism, lies in a text's effects and impact on
an audience is apparent in a number of ways. It appears,
for example, in his interest in George Augustus as reader,
including as reader of the poem Pope is writing. In To Au-
gustus, moreover, as in Sober Advicefrom Horace, Pope ex-
hibits the effects on himself of his reading of Horace's
"original" poem, of which the English version constitutes
a response and an interpretation. As he indicates in the
''Advertisement'' to Augustus, Pope is especially interested
in the application of Horace to the situation in Augustan
England; that is, he uses the Horatian poem to interpret
the present: "The Reflections of Horace, and the Judg-
ments past in his Epistle to Augustus, seem'd so season-
able to the present Times, that I could not help applying
them to the use of my own Country" (I reverse italics and
roman). For Pope, imitation presupposes application and
use, the aim being elucidation of the present (rather than
antiquarianism or historicism, satirized, in fact, in the
reader responses dramatized in Sober Advice). As Joel
Weinsheimer has written in an insightful essay on imita-
tion and the question of application in hermeneutics, "the
end of interpretation, if it includes application, is self-
knowledge. What true literature is foremost true of, is
the interpreter." 12
What Pope has done with Horace he expects his reader
to repeat with him-not necessarily to write an imitation
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interpreting his poem but at least to respond to it, to open
himself or herself to it so as to be involved in it in impor-
tant ways and affected by it. Especially because the pas-
sage eliciting my comments treats the drama, I am re-
minded of Stephen Booth's recent-and apposite-
discussion of "indefinition" in Shakespearean tragedy.
Discussing the way we work to make tragedy (which is by
definition the undefinable) bearable, Booth claims that "it
is in the interest of human comfort to insist that dramatic
tragedy happens on the stage and not in the audience,
where the only real action of a play must necessarily oc-
cur." 13 Pope agrees, and he extends the principle to his
own efforts in To Augustus, the important action of that
poem occurring in the reader. Pope is, in the terms he
uses, therefore a "Poet."
''Rely[ing] / More on a Reatkr~ sense, than Gazer~ Eye"
From the verses quoted above (11. 340-47), Pope proceeds
to urge the king to "Think of those Authors ... who would
rely / More on a Reader's sense, than Gazer's eye" (II. 350-
51). His point is directed against the current privileging of
the trappings, the outside, what an actor wears at the ex-
pense of the part acted and of the lines spoken. Lines 310-
37, quoted earlier, roundly criticize this situation: "(For
Taste, eternal wanderer, now flies / From heads to ears,
and now from ears to eyes)" (11. 312-13). As manifested in
the distinction drawn between "the Poet" and "the Man
of Rymes," Pope's interest, characteristically, is with what
happens inside, to the reader or spectator.
In order to establish its central point concerning the
need to distinguish, To Augustus enacts what Pope talks
about in lines 350-51: in a number of specific ways, the
poem "rel[ies] / ... on [the] Reader's Sense." Unless, in
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fact, the reader is able to distinguish as neither George
Augustus nor "the Publick" can, the poem makes little
sense, several important passages appearing an indiscrim-
inate mess of often-conflicting opinions and contradictory
judgments-in short, striking instances of the very equiv-
ocation Pope elsewhere repudiates. To a far greater extent
than any other poem we have so far considered, To Augus-
tus makes the reader a producer of its meaning, actively
involving him or her in the construction of its meaning,
finally depending on him for its most important effects.
Though it is sometimes confused with "affective aesthet-
ics," such a strategy as Pope's in Augustus is principally
concerned with the "Reader's sense"; it is, therefore, more
cognitive than affective, though affectivity is certainly in-
volved. Whatever the degree of cognition and affectivity,
the focus is on what happens inside the reader.
As I claimed earlier, To Augustus is constructed around
the notion (and recognition) of difference. We have, in
fact, already remarked some instances of this construc-
tion: the double meanings at work in the praise of George
II, the difference between the king's popularity and the
"Suns of Glory" who "please not till they set," and the
necessity of valuing writers for "the gold" rather than "the
rust." Especially when he praises the present and criticizes
the so-called "classick," Pope may seem differentiating in
the sense of partial. If he is, then he obviously flouts his
assertions elsewhere concerning objectivity and impar-
tiality. Yet he also praises the past, invoking it as the stan-
dard by which the present is assessed and, in so many
ways, found lacking. Pope thus seems, as he declares, to
"grow all to all," Moderns calling him Ancient, Ancients
calling him Modern. Is he, therefore, equivocal, no matter
what he claims?
Actually, Pope only seems to "grow all to all." The reason
for the possible misreading is that his (declared) judgment
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is frequently double (though not equivocal or contradic-
tory), as in the following passage, which requires that the
reader do the work of making the assessments for which
the passage merely presents the opportunity:
Tho' justly Greece her eldest sons admires,
Why should not we be wiser than our Sires?
In ev'ry publick Virtue we excell,
We build, we paint, we sing, we dance as well,
And learned Athens to our Art must stoop,
Could she behold us tumbling thro' a hoop.
These verses suggest a notable range of attitudes: the first
couplet is a rhetorical question the answer to which is both
obvious and reasonable; the second begins to modulate
away from celebration of present achievements toward the
bathetic judgment of the final line. Rather than consistent
irony, this short passage exemplifies the both/and stance
Ehrenpreis locates in the poem's panegyric and vitupera-
tive frame. There is, in short, both straightforward and le-
gitimate praise and biting satire, and the reader's job con-
sists of recognizing the justness of both. In a certain sense,
such a passage reads the reader, implicating him in the
satire lashing the inability to distinguish if he takes either
a partial or an equivocal position, either monolithically
condemning the past or present or failing to note the dif-
ferent values implied.
As he proceeds, Pope dramatizes the inability to distin-
guish that he finds to be a characteristic of his age. Such
lines as I just quoted suggest that he does not share that
inability, though they depend on the reader for that per-
ception. But whereas Pope shows "discerning spirit," for
example praising Shakespeare while granting that "the
divine, the matchless" poet "For gain, not glory, wing'd
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his roving flight, / And grew Immortal in his own de-
spight" (II. 70-72), an undiscriminating contemporary as-
serts, monolithically:
"Yet surely, surely, these were famous men!
"What Boy but hears the sayings of old Ben?
"In all debates where Criticks bear a part,
"Not one but nods, and talks of Johnson's Art,
"Of Shakespear's Nature, and of Cowley's Wit;
"How Beaumont's Judgment check'd what Fletcher
writ;
"How Shadwell hasty, Wycherly was slow;
"But, for the Passions, Southern sure and Rowe.
"These, only these, support the crouded stage,
"From eldest Heywood down to Cibber's age.
[11. 79-88]
The wildly wrong judgment of Shadwell and Wycherley
prompts a note from Pope, clarifying and correcting this
assessment: "Nothing was less true than this particular:
But the whole Paragraph has a mixture of Irony, and must
not altogether be taken for Horace's own Judgment, only
the common Chatt of the pretenders to Criticism; in some
things right, in others wrong." Succeeding lines in the
poem stress the point and dramatize the proper attitude,
focused impartially on value:
.... the People's Voice is odd,
It is, and it is not, the voice of God.
To Gammer Gurton if it give the bays,
And yet deny the Careless Husband praise,
Or say our fathers never broke a rule;
Why then I say, the Publick is a fool.
But let them own, that greater faults than we
They had, and greater Virtues, I'll agree. [11. 89-96]
In going on to cite the case of Milton, Pope further exem-
plifies the proper complexity of judgment, which grants to
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the writer of Paradise Lost and Areopagitica both sublimity
and bathos, recognizing, therefore, that he is not "of a
piece": Pope ·distinguishes this double-edged judgment
from Bentley's monolithic and undiscriminating criticism,
rebuked in Sober Advice and The Dunciad as well:
Milton's strong pinion now not Heav'n can bound,
Now serpent-like, in prose he sweeps the ground,
In Quibbles, Angel and Archangel join,
And God the Father turns a School-Divine.
Not that I'd lop the Beauties from his book,
Like slashing Bentley with his desp'rate Hook;
Or damn all Shakespear, like th' affected fool
At Court, who hates whate'er he read at School.
[11. 99-106]
Though a number of other passages as well invoke the
reader's "discerning spirit," requiring judgment that the
verses themselves do not explicitly make (e.g., 11. 282ff.),
the reader's most extensive labor probably comes in work-
ing through the long passage in which Pope attempts to
persuade George Augustus that "a Poet's of some weight, /
And (tho' no Soldier) useful to the State" (11. 203-4). This
important verse paragraph, which is a melange of wildly
divergent values and judgments, opens with Pope's asser-
tion, cited earlier, that writing serves as a useful diversion-
ary strategy for corrupt courts and governments, becom-
ing a "Play-thing" that keeps men's attention away from
public and political matters. Pope then describes the func-
tion of poetry in mundane terms as-if not a trifle-cer-
tainly an instrument of relatively mean value:
What will a Child learn sooner than a song?
What better teach a Foreigner the tongue?
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What's long or short, each accent where to place,
And speak in publick with some sort of grace.
[II. 205-8]
Mter declaring that "In all Charles's days" not even Dry-
den could boast "unspotted Bays" (11. 213-14), Pope turns
to the current scene of writing, offering first a panegyric
on Addison, whom he attacks as Atticus in An Epistle to
Dr. Arbuthnot:
And in our own (excuse some Courtly stains)
No whiter page than Addison remains.
He, from the taste obscene reclaims our Youth,
And sets the Passions on the side of Truth;
Forms the soft bosom with the gentlest art,
And pours each human Virtue in the heart.
Following this account of poetry's moral function and civ-
ilizing capacity comes a ringing tribute to Pope's friend
Swift, which asserts writing's political opportunities, re-
sponsibilities, and achievements-in short, its way of
making a difference. Pope's modulating description of
writing's power and function climaxes here:
Let Ir~land tell, how Wit upheld her cause,
Her Trade supported, and supply'd her Laws;
And leave on SWIFT this grateful verse ingrav'd,
The Rights a Court attack'd, a Poet sav'd.
Behold the hand that wrought a Nation's cure,
Stretch'd to relieve the Idiot and the Poor,
Proud Vice to brand, or injur'd Worth adorn,
And stretch the Ray to Ages yet unborn. [II. 221-28]
I shall pause over this heroic passage long enough to
note the "presence" of "the strange logic of the supple-
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ment"-tracing of which entails considerable work for the
reader. By means of the verb "supply'd," cognate to "sup-
plemented," the passage, which recalls that on the Man of
Ross in An Epistle to Bathurst, states both that Swift's writ-
ing added to or assisted Ireland's laws and that it came to
substitute for them. Forcefully asserting writing's grave re-
sponsibilities, these lines claim that "The Rights a Court
attack'd, a Poet sav'd." To preserve these rights, writing
had to "supply" the country's laws, making up "for [their]
deficiencies," to use the Twickenham Edition gloss on that
verb. The two different meanings of "supply'd" engage
each other in endless conflict, and the reader is unable to
choose decisively between them; the meaning of the verb
as a substitute deconstructs its meaning as an addition
and vice versa, in ceaseless oscillation.
Immediately following the dramatic lines on Swift come
verses offering a strikingly different account of poetry and
its value, an account that harks back to the mundane de-
scription at the beginning of the paragraph. The lines in
question begin with praise of Sternhold and Hopkins,
translators of the Psalms and frequent butts of satire for
their (at best) bad rhymes. What is striking is not only that
they are treated in the same breath as Swift but also that
no distinction is suggested regarding their very different
value. The effect is to place them on the same level with
Swift. But again, I suggest, with these verses as well as
those that follow, Pope's reader must supply the necessary
distinctions:
Not but there are, who merit other palms;
Hopkins and Sternhold glad the heart with Psalms;
The Boys and Girls whom Charity maintains,
Implore your help in these pathetic [!] strains:
How could Devotion touch the country pews,
Unless the Gods bestow'd a proper Muse?
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Verse chears their leisure, Verse assists their work,
Verse prays for Peace, or sings down [Alexander?] Pope
and Turk.
The silenc'd Preacher yields to potent strain,
And feels that grace his pray'r besought in vain,
The blessing thrills thro' all the lab'ring throng,
And Heav'n is won by violence of Song. [II. 229-40]
Ending with such dOllble meanings as I have marked with
brackets, this entire verse paragraph is, whether or not
read as reflecting the judgment of a single and consistent
persona, ironic or straight, a definitely mixed bag. But we
fail to do justice to Pope's strategy if we focus on the
"speaker's" opinions, which in fact are so mixed that we
cannot find any consistency in that "speaking voice."
What Pope is really interested in is the reader's efforts to
sort through and differentiate the varying implied judg-
ments, "in some things right, in others wrong." The para-
graph precisely calls the reader to supplement those judg-
ments: that is, both to add to them and to substitute for
them when they appear wrong. In Augustus to a far greater
extent than in the other poems we have considered by
Pope, the reader is invoked as a supplement of the text's
(apparent) declarations. Here, in other words, Pope in-
tends that the reader do at least part of what we ventured
to do elsewhere without his sanction and blessing.
Sober Advicefrom Horace
Screwing Around
In such cases as To Augustus and Sober Advice from Hor-
ace, despite our stubborn humanistic mystifications, it
may be irony that creates the illusion of a "speaking voice"
belonging to an existent "speaker" who stands behind his
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statements as creator and guarantor of their meaning; we
persist in believing, however, that a "speaker" is respon-
sible for irony, endowing the human agent with the power
properly belonging to this trope. Of course, as J. Hillis
Miller has recently written concerning the novel, whether
or not the text is an ironic one there is "the illusion of the
character of the narrator. The narrator seems to be a man
(or woman) speaking to men (or women)"; there is, more-
over, Miller adds, "an almost irresistible temptation to
think of the narrative voice as that of the author him-
self." 14 But irony is a special instance ,of the situation
Miller describes, one closer, in fact, to Roland Barthes's
famous remarks on "the death of the author": "Linguis-
tically, the author is never more than the instance writing,
just as I is nothing other than the instance saying I: lan-
guage knows a 'subject', not a 'person', and this subject,
empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it,
suffices to make language 'hold together.'" 15
In To Augustus, the play of irony creates the illusion that
a "speaker" (i.e., Pope) "speaks" straightforwardly in de-
claring "when I flatter, let my dirty leaves / ... / Cloath
spice, line trunks, or flutt'ring in a row, / Befringe the rails
of Bedlam and Sohoe" but that that "speaker" does not
mean what he "says" when he asserts, "I, who so oft re-
nounce the Muses, lye, / Not--'s self e'er tells more Fibs
than I." In Pope's version of Horace's early Satire I.ii., on
the other hand, the irony is not local but ubiquitous. At a
more comprehensive level than To Augustus, Sober Advice
invokes the reader's labor, turning him or her into an ac-
tive producer of the poem's meaning by asking him to sup-
plement all the "speaker's" declarations.
As I mentioned earlier, I have argued elsewhere that the
fictional "speaker" of Sober Advice is identifiable as-in-
deed possesses the identity, the oneness, of-a Restora-
tion rake "living" in Augustan England. I shall not re-
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hearse my various arguments in support of this claim. I
shall simply point out that the "speaker" everywhere al-
ludes to personalities and events of the Restoration, ex-
hibits the interests and values we associate with that pe-
riod (from the drama to smut), and praises other rakes as
he flouts morality, in the process transforming Horace's
satire into praise and advocacy of fornication.
Thus with a playfully perverse echo of the Bible as well
as a striking misappropriation of Pope's own themes and
attitudes, the "speaker" asks:
Hath not indulgent Nature spread a Feast,
And giv'n enough for Man, enough for Beast?
But Man corrupt, perverse in all his ways,
In search of Vanities from Nature strays:
Yea, tho' the Blessing's more than he can use,
Shun the permitted, the forbid pursues!
Weigh well the Cause from whence these Evils spring,
'Tis in thyself, and not in God's good Thing:
Then, lest Repentence punish such a Life,
Never, ah, never! kiss thy Neighbour's Wife.
[11. 96-105]
Rather than risk all the trouble and dangers that adultery
may produce (the last several verse paragraphs graphically
describe some of these), one should accept the feast kindly
spread by Nature and in fact blessed by "My Lord of
L--n," who
chancing to remark
A noted Dean much busy'd in the Park,
"Proceed (he cry'd) proceed, my Reverend Brother,
" 'Tis Fomicatio simplex, and no other:
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"Better than lust for Boys, with Pope [Alexander?] and
Turk,
"Or others Spouses, like my Lord of-- [11. 39-44]
Sober Advice is constructed as "a sermon against adul-
tery" (the title of the poem's 1738 reissue) and as a pane-
gyric on "indulgent Nature" and the "Feast" she kindly
spreads (for men). It is directed against the obstinate and
"unnatural" insistence that only "a Dame of Quality" (1.
70) will satisfy. In a witty variation (and perversion) of the
Pauline theme that, though "containment" is preferable
to marriage, "it is better to marry than to be aflame with
passion" (1 Cor. 7:9), the "speaker" asks:
Has Nature set no bounds to wild Desire?
No Sense to guide, no Reason to enquire,
What solid Happiness, what empty Pride?
And what is best indulg'd, or best deny'd?
If neither Gems adorn, nor Silver tip
The flowing Bowl, will you not wet your Lip?
When sharp with Hunger, scorn you to be fed,
Except on Pea-Chicks, at the Bedford-head?
Or, when a tight, neat Girl, will serve the Turn,
In errant Pride continue stiff, and burn?
I'm a plain Man, whose Maxim is profest,
"The Thing at hand is of all Things the best.
[11. 143-54]
What the "speaker" reveals throughout this poem con-
structed of such double entendres is a libertine and amoral
response to both Horace and Pope, whose imitation of the
former the rake himself "imitates." The poem's Ineaning
thus centers in the "speaker's" imitation of these poets-
and in our interpretation of his response. Our job, in fact,
is to recognize "his" failures and perversions for what they
are and to judge them accordingly. We must, then, supple-
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ment "his" declarations. But whether we do or not, Sober
Advice from Horace reads us.
Getting into "the Thing," or the Part and the Hole
If, from the opening discussion of misers and spendthrifts
to the focus several lines later on "the hackneyed theme
of the grave and quite unnecessary risks involved in adul-
tery with women of society," 16 Horace proceeds in a casual
manner befitting the conversational pattern of urbane
men speaking to one another, the situation is different in
Sober Advice. It opens with the subject that almost obses-
sively occupies its attention throughout: women and sex.
Instead of a beginning contrast between miserliness and
prodigality, the extremes in Sober Advice are female gen-
erosity with "God's good Thing" (1. 103) and feminine
avarice resulting in the use and abuse of sex. Having
stated his "Theme" ("'Women and Fools are always in Ex-
treme," II. 27-28), Pope's "speaker" proceeds with a
graphic description of women that in coarseness goes well
beyond Horace:
Rufa's at either end a Common-Shoar,
Sweet Moll and Jack are Civet-Cat and Boar:
Nothing in Nature is so lewd as Peg,
Yet, for the World, she would not shew her Leg!
While bashful Jenny, ev'n at Morning-Prayer,
Spreads her Fore-Buttocks to the Navel bare.
But difI'rent Taste in difI'rent Men prevails,
And one is fired by Heads, and one by Tails;
Some feel no Flames but at the Court or Ball,
And others hunt white Aprons in the Mall. [11. 29-38]
Whereas Horace frequently seems interested in shocking,
the rakish "speaker" of Sober Advice is more involved, in-
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sinuating, and arousing. Indeed, he expands on possibili-
ties mainly latent in the Latin poem, turning the occa-
sional bluntness into extended metaphors less like the
double entendres of Restoration comedy than the "pornog-
raphy" of Rochester's "obscene" verses:
Suppose that honest Part that rules us all,
Should rise, and say-"Sir Robert! or Sir Paul!
"Did I demand, in my most vig'rous hour,
"A Thing descended from the Conqueror?
"Or when my pulse beat highest, ask for any
"Such Nicety, as Lady or Lord Fanny?-
What would you answer? Could you have the Face, I
When the poor Suff'rer humbly mourn'd his Case,
To cry "You weep the Favours of her GRACE?
Despite the strikingly different contexts, this passage re-
calls Pope's persistent concern with the parts-whole prob-
lem. The significance of the relationship these lines hint
at becomes clearer when we link parts-whole with the in-
side/outside opposition that also figures prominently in
Pope's poetry from An Essay on Criticism on. In Sober Ad-
vice, of course, like everything else inside/outside is
fraught with heavily sexual overtones. As a matter of fact,
just preceding the lines I quoted is a blunt passage treat-
ing "Ellis" and his desire "to be where CHARLES had been
before" (11. 81-82). After declaring that "his Pride" led to
punishment by "The fatal Steel" (11. 83-84), Pope's
"speaker" concludes: "Too hard a Penance [!] for defeated
Sin, / Himself shut out, and Jacob Hall let in" (11. 85-86).
"That honest Part" being the phallus, the whole to which
that part seeks to relate is here the female hole. Is the
parts-whole issue, like the outside/inside opposition,
therefore a sexual allegory?
For Pope, as we have seen, the inside is frequently priv-
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ileged, and in Sober Advice from Horace the goal of all
(masculine) activity is the "Thing" (1. go), indeed "God's
good Thing," the "speaker's" "private" view being that
"'The Thing at hand is of all Things the best" (1. 153).
Pope too has not only consistently privileged the inside,
but he has also sought to reach-in whatever sense-"the
thing itself." Is "the thing itself" therefore "God's good
Thing"? Is the whole to which Pope has always tried to
relate the hole to which he wants entrance? Provocative
possibilities.
TextlUll Play and Sexual Difference
Certainly, Sober Advicefrom Horace is sexist, raucously so,
in fact. Even if the poem was designed by the poet as I
have argued, with a consistently fictional-and thor-
oughly satirized-persona distinct from Pope and created
via irony, and if, therefore, Pope maintains (and wishes his
readers to take) a critical attitude towards this dirty "ser-
mon," its wit, humor, and fun cannot be denied, at least
not by males. I suspect that Pope, who prided himself on
his "manly ways" (Arbuthnot, 1. 337), delighted in the
scurrilous wit even as he transformed it into a moralistic
"statement" dependent on the reader's judgment. I expect
that female readers are considerably less titillated: if not
by the sly dirty jokes themselves, they are probably of-
fended by the marginalization that the poem imposes
upon women, relegated to sexual "objects" and de-
humanized. Perhaps in terms of our gender as well as our
attitudes, Sober Advice reads us. In any case, the serious-
ness that I have argued for cannot be separated from the
dirty fun that is not cancelled out by the overarching
moral intentions. The situation is reminiscent of that in
An Essay on Criticism.
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Whether or not my speculations concerning a relation-
ship between matters sexual and Pope's perennial interest
in parts-whole and inside/outside have any validity, the
quest for "the thing itself," as Derrida suggests in Spurs, is
clearly a masculine drive. There is no doubt that Sober
Advice, understood as the "speaker's" poem, is phallogo-
centric, literalizing masculine desire for conquest and
mastery and subjugating the female. But if the drive is
masculine, the "object" sought, "the Thing," the truth
quested for, the inside that the outside always wants, is
feminine. Perhaps nowhere in the poem do these points
converge as they do in the following verses, describing the
quest of "God's good Thing," depicted as surrounded and
protected by numerous obstacles trying to keep the inside
safe and intact from the threatened invasion outside. The
quest for the naked truth is determined, however.
A Lady's Face is all you see undress'd;
(For none but Lady M-- shows the Rest)
But if to Charms more latent you pretend,
What Lines encompass, and what Works defend!
Dangers on Dangers! obstacles by dozens!
Spies, Guardians, Guests, old Women, Aunts, and
Cozens!
Could you directly to her Person go, I
Stays will obstruct above, and Hoops below,
And if the Dame says yes, the Dress says no.
Not thus at N-dh-m's; your judicious Eye
May measure there the Breast, the Hip, the Thigh!
[II. 123-34]
What would this truth unveiled as woman (naked) look
like? If it is feminine, as Pope suggests perhaps in spite of
himself, exactly how is it feminine? Is it intact and inviol-
ate, or might it be always already not-inviolate? Like the
"easy" women at "N-dh-m's"? Scandalous possibility,
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truly, one that suggests an added dimension to the quest
of truth in An Epistle to Bathurst.
What, in any case, about writing? Have I not lost sight
of it amid all the talk of wit and sexuality and Pope? Per-
haps writing is like truth. Perhaps, as I suggested earlier,
there is more to writing than our narrow sense suggests.
This other, larger sense of writing is that revealed to us by
Jacques Derrida as the structure of difference marked by
the trace. On this understanding, writing is inclusive, with
apparently nothing escaping textuality.
An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot
Feminizing Pope
Earlier in this chapter, I contended that the subject of An
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot is Pope's desire for literary and
moral difference from the "plague" of poetasters who ac-
cost him whenever he ventures from Twickenham. That
they even invade his "retreat" there prompts his opening
exclamation to his servant, "Shut, shut the door, good
John! fatigu'd I said, / Tye up the knocker, say I'm sick,
I'm dead" (11. 1-2). Dramatically presented here, Pope's
desire for separation, distance, and difference is mascu-
line. That this is so appears not only in the phallic sym-
bolism of the second line but also in Pope's quest, detailed
in the poem, as well as elsewhere, for absolute distinctions
and definite truth, simple, clear, and univocal. That quest
is inseparable from the desire of mastery (which the sati-
rized "speaker" of Sober Advice from Horace shares) as
well as the desire to be distinct and to possess a clear iden-
tity. From the outset, Pope wants to establish what he
terms his "manly ways" (1. 337), absolutely different from
the inadequately masculine Atticus, the feminized Bufo,
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and the indeterminate, undecidable Sporus, the latter
"one vile Antithesis. / Amphibious Thing!" (IL 325-26).
Often regarded as Pope's apologia pro satura sua, An
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot depicts writing, in unmistakably
sexual terms, as distinctly masculine, thus matching
Pope's own desires. Indeed, Pope describes his own writ-
ing in explicitly sexual terms as offering the satisfaction a
partner wants and expects: "The Muse but serv'd to ease
some Friend, not Wife" (L 131). The sexuality of writing
appears, too, when Pope notes that "ev'ry Coxcomb knows
me by my Style" (1. 282), "Style" suggesting not only the
Stylus but also (therefore) the penis. The references to
Gildon's "venal quill" (1. 151), to Bufo "puff'd by ev'ry
quill" (1. 232), and to "each gray goose quill" that a patron
may "bless" (1. 249), as well as to "slashing Bentley" (1.
164), further link pen to penis. According to Freud, we
might recall, writing (in the narrow sense, pre-typewriter
and -word processor) consists of "making a liquid flow out
of a tube onto a piece of white paper," thereby assuming
"the significance of copulation." 17 With his pen(is), the
writer seeks pen-etration. Arbuthnot is a remarkable alle-
gory of writing as copulation.
As Pope develops his defense of himself and his writing,
it is "the Race that write" (1. 219) that emerges as the mas-
culine force, one that sexually threatens him, in fact.
Seeking to escape from them, Pope appears, contrary to
his desire, as feminine (I adopt provisio~ally, putting it
under erasure, Pope's own stereotypical and oppositional
view of sexual difference). Indeed, he is feminized, or at
the very least threatened with feminization, by the aspir-
ing writers. If the poem's opening couplet is phallic, suc-
ceeding verses, with even clearer sexual symbolism, pre-
sent Pope in the role of woman: for example, "What Walls
can guard me, or what Shades can hide? / They pierce my
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Thickets, thro' my Grot they glide" (II. 7-8). To return for
a moment to the concerns that marked the close of our
consideration of Sober Advice from Horace, writing is,
then, more than simple graphic inscription; it is, accord-
ing to Arbuthnot's declarations, penetration of and copu-
1ation with a woman. IfArbuthnot is, as I suggested above,
an allegory of writing as copulation, is Sober Advice an
allegory of copulation as writing?
In any case, in Arbuthnot, courted by the "Witlings,"
Pope is the sexual object whom these writers pursue. This
structure establishes not only the masculine nature of
writing as Pope declares it but also the feminine nature of
the response sought by writers, who want a patron. That a
patron, such as the poetasters hope to find in Pope, is fem-
inized appears most clearly in the famous portrait of Bufo.
In this portrait, arguably the most important difference
Pope tries to make in Arbuthnot, Pope aims to distinguish
himself from the false friend (and ultimately foe) that the
patron is. Bufo's importance in the poem, however, derives
as well from his similarity to Pope, particularly in being
courted by the flattering poetasters.
Proud, as Apollo on his forked hill,
Sate full-blown Bufo, puff'd by ev'ry quill;
Fed with soft Dedication all day long,
Horace and he went hand in hand in song.
His Library, (where Busts of Poets dead
And a true Pindar stood without a head)
Receiv'd of Wits an undistinguish'd race,
Who first his Judgment ask'd, and then a Place:
Much they extolI'd his Pictures, much his Seat,
And flatter'd ev'ry day, and some days eat:
Till grown more frugal in his riper days,
He pay'd some Bards with Port, and some with Praise,
To some a dry Rehearsal was assign'd,
And others (harder still) he pay'd in kind.
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Dryden alone (what wonder?) came not nigh,
Dryden alone escap'd this judging eye:
But still the Great have kindness in reserve,
He help'd to bury whom he help'd to starve.
[II. 231-48]
According to this portrait, what Pope feared does happen
to a patron: "puff'd by ev'ry quill," Bufo has imposed upon
him the role of woman in "hosting" the would-be poets.
This is precisely what Pope rejects: he refuses to grant the
poetasters satisfaction, declining to "copulate" with them,
to be either their reader or their sponsor, refusing the role
of woman they would impose upon him-and succeed in
imposing upon Bufo.
But this is only part of the story, which, like all stories,
has a perhaps surprising turn. For Bufo (at least) has his
revenge on the emasculating writers: he becomes the cas-
trated yet castrating woman. In his library (or womb) lie
"dead" poets. Are these poets merely "spent," having been
satisfied, or is it that, feminized, Bufo feminizes the fem-
inizers, turning (masculine) writers into females if they
are given their way?
Here it may help to consider the portrait's thematic fo-
cus on parasite-host relations, an analogue of flatterer-
flattered. Clearly, the "plague" of poetasters surrounding
Bufo, like "the Race that write" courting Pope, are para-
sites. By means of this structure, the portrait dramatizes
the turning of one thing into another that I have already
mentioned. This transformation destabilizes differences
arrested as oppositions. In a well-known essay that I have
cited before, J. Hillis Miller has traced the etymology of
the terms "host" and "parasite" and has shown how, far
from being the opposites that we commonly suppose, they
are interimplicated, each always already containing a
"trace" of "the other" within "itself." 18 This of course fur-
138 c1!\. Quests ofDifference
ther problematizes the distinction between inside and
outside. In Arbuthnot, the patron-flattered-host Bufo, like
the "vain Patron" mentioned in An Essay on Man, func-
tions as flattered-parasite vis-a.-vis those who initially ap-
pear as parasite-poetasters, for if as host Bufo feeds the
"undistinguish'd race" of "Wits," he feeds in turn on the
very parasites he feeds, changing places with them, in fact
turning into one of them, in a wild and dizzying "see-saw
between that and this" (1. 323). As a result, he is just as
"undistinguish'd" as they are and indeed identifiable as
neither simply parasite nor host, flatterer nor flattered,
man nor woman but, in all cases, as both.
Becoming what ''she hates and ridicules"
Somewhat like Bufo, Pope combines in himself masculine
and feminine traits (at least as Pope presents these, they
are stereotypical and opposed), in spite of his desire for
"manly ways." This feminization occurs, as we have seen,
in the act of withdrawing himself from the "Witlings"
(that that act is also one of separation and differentiation
and therefore "masculine" is a complication I shall con-
sider below). By poem's end, many more feminine quali-
ties appear in Pope. In addition to two changes I have al-
ready remarked (the notable change of tone as well as the
abrupt shift to third person in referring to himself, begin-
ning at line 334), there is an important difference in atti-
tude. What emerges is nothing less than a split in both
poem and poet, and that split is, in the final analysis, pre-
cisely what constitutes woman. I follow Derrida, who
writes in Spurs that "the 'woman' is not a determinable
identity. Perhaps," he continues, "woman-a non-
identity, a non-figure, a simulacrum-is distance's very
chasm, the out-distancing of distance, the interval's ca-
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dence, distance itself, if we could still say such a thing,
distance itself."· In short, "There is no such thing as the
essence of wom"an because woman averts, she is averted of
herself.... There is no such thing as the truth of woman,
but it is because of that abyssal divergence of the truth,
because that untruth is 'truth.'" Thus: "Woman is but one
name for that untruth of truth." 19 Writing becomes
woman, as does truth.
The difference in An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot and in
Pope emerges most clearly as Pope praises his deceased
father and his infirm mother for their tolerance and for-
bearance.2o As the son develops the brief but effective ac-
count of his parents, the reader cannot but notice, it seems
to me, the strong difference implied. Whereas the poet
rather easily condemned others and launched often scath-
ing attacks, his "Father held it for a rule / It was a Sin to
call our Neighbour Fool, / That harmless Mother thought
no Wife a Whore" (11. 382-84). To be sure, such passages
are designed to show the injustice, as well as the gross
insensitivity, of the attacks on the poet's family, but the
effects can by no means be limited to such intentions. In
fact, the following portrait of the elder Pope develops the
implied differences between father and son, becoming a
clear criticism of the poet as he has appeared in such pas-
sages as the verses on Atticus, Bufo, and Sporus (more on
this last directly). Presented as something of a hero, the
elder Pope even receives the epithet the poet had hoped
for and sought: "The good Man." Unlike the son, more-
over, the father never let himself become involved in civil
or religious controversy, never offered a "Bill of Com-
plaint," the phrase Pope uses in the ''Advertisement'' to de-
scribe his own efforts in Arbuthnot, and never tried a
"Suit," as Pope does in a number of the Imitations. In
phrases that inevitably recall his earlier descriptions of
"this long Disease, my Life" (1. 132), Pope contrasts his
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own physical deformity and proneness to illness with his
father's lifelong good health:
Born to no Pride, inheriting no Strife,
Nor marrying Discord in a Noble Wife,
Stranger to Civil and Religious Rage,
The good Man walk'd innoxious thro' his Age.
No Courts he saw, no Suits would ever try,
Nor dar'd an Oath, nor hazarded a Lye:
Un-learn'd, he knew no Schoolman's subtle Art,
No Language, but the Language of the Heart.
By Nature honest, by Experience wise,
Healthy by Temp'rance and by Exercise:
His Life, tho' long, to sickness past unknown,
His Death was instant, and without a groan.
[II. 392-403]
In continuing, Pope expresses a desire for just such sim-
plicity, naturalness, and innocence of discord and strife.
As indicated by the absence of the sexual language char-
acteristic of earlier sections of the poem, Pope also seems
desirous of abandoning the burden and the stress of writ-
ing. "Sick of Fops, and Poetry, and Prate, / To Bufo [he]
left the whole Castalian State" (II. 229-30). When he
turns, finally, to his mother, Pope in effect changes places
with her, becoming her nurse and mother:
Me, let the tender Office long engage
To rock the Cradle of reposing Age,
With lenient Arts extend a Mother's breath,
Make Languor smile, and smooth the Bed of Death,
Explore the Thought, explain the asking Eye,
And keep a while one Parent from the Sky!
By the end of Arbuthnot, certainly, Pope appears differ-
ent (from "himself"), adopting his father as model and
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ideal, thus implicitly criticizing his own earlier stance and
attitude, and apparently hoping to repeat somehow the in-
nocence the elder Pope represents. But even as he adopts
his father as model, Pope-in a different sense-adopts
his mother, changing places with her. He thus appears
stereotypically "manly" in at best problematical ways.21 In
other words, Pope now deconstructs the earlier account of
his manliness, becoming equivocal and womanly. In fact,
however, Pope is no different from the way he has always
been; he simply makes explicit what was earlier implicit.
All along, he has been divided, equivocal. All along, that
is, despite his desire to project "manly ways," Pope has not
only had feminine ways imposed on him, but he has him-
self exhibited such ways. For example, in defending his
hard-hitting truth-telling ("The truth once told, (and
wherefore shou'd we lie?)," 1. 81), Pope occasionally re-
sembles a coquette, asking coyly, "You think this cruel?"
(1. 83) and "Whom have I hurt?" (1. 95). When he con-
fesses later on, "If wrong, I smil'd; if right, I kiss'd the rod"
(1. 158), the double entendre indicates the feminine nature
of his position. In treating him as a woman, therefore, "the
Race that write" were not feminizing Pope. On the con-
trary, in being split, divided, equivocal, indeterminate,
and undecidable, he was already woman.
The term "see-saw" or "oscillation" or perhaps "equiv-
ocation" may best describe the relation of male and fe-
male in Pope as he appears in An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot.
For there is certainly neither a distinct turn or difference
nor a change from one stable and distinct identity into
another. Even when supposedly feminine qualities appear
most prominently in Pope, at poem's end, they exist along-
side-and in oscillation with-"masculine" ones. Thus,
even in adopting his peaceable and uncontentious father
as model and ideal, Pope continues the (masculine) desire
for clear, straight lines and unequivocal truth, the elder
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Pope being represented as an absolute. Even if the mani-
festation changes, the "core" remains, and it is an abso-
lute, unequivocal, and therefore masculine one. That is,
the belief in and desire for such definition persists, and of
course one desires what one lacks.
The fact is, there are no absolute differences. In spite of
what we may think and desire, male and female qualities
are coterminous (Chinese philosophy depicts this situa-
tion in the yin and the yang, and Galatians 3:28 empha-
sizes Christ's acceptance and embodiment of this fact: "in
Christ there is neither male nor female"). As it happens
(and it is finally not surprising), precisely this equivoca-
tion, indeterminacy, and undecidability lie at the heart of
Pope's most savage satire in An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot,
the scathing portrait of Sporus, traditionally assumed to
represent John Lord Hervey, well known for effeminacy of
both appearance and manner. But the dramatic and sa-
tirical force of the portrait lies not in Sporus's effeminacy
but in his combining and embodying "opposite" qualities.
According to one of the most illuminating studies of the
poem, Sporus is "the very antithesis of the divine recon-
ciliation of opposites."22 If Atticus is neither quite one
thing nor distinctly another, Sporus is, more pointedly and
dramatically than Bufo, both one thing and another, both
male and female: he "Now trips a Lady, and now struts a
Lord." "One vile Antithesis. / Amphibious Thing!", Spo-
rus is "all see-saw between that and this." In Sporus, dif-
ferences go unreconciled. Whereas in Pope's other treat-
ments differences are finally resolved, synthesized, or
somehow transcended, here they stubbornly remain dif-
ferences, apparently producing emptiness and impotence.
let me flap this Bug with gilded wings,
This painted Child of Dirt that stinks and stings;
Whose Buzz the Witty and the Fair annoys,
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Yet Wit ne'er tastes, and Beauty ne'er enjoys,
So well-bred Spaniels civilly delight
In mumbling of the Game they dare not bite.
Eternal Smiles his Emptiness betray,
As shallow streams run dimpling all the way.
Whether in florid Impotence he speaks,
And, as the Prompter breathes, the Puppet squeaks;
Or at the Ear of Eve, familiar Toad,
Half Froth, half Venom, spits himself abroad,
In Puns, or Politicks, or Tales, or Lyes,
Or Spite, or Smut, or Rymes, or Blasphemies.
His Wit all see-saw between that and this,
Now high, now low, now Master up, now Miss,
And he himself one vile Antithesis.
Amphibious Thing! that acting either Part,
The trifling Head, or the corrupted Heart!
Fop at the Toilet, Flatt'rer at the Board,
Now trips a Lady, and now struts a Lord.
Eve's Tempter thus the Rabbins have exprest,
A Cherub's face, a Reptile all the rest;
Beauty that shocks you, Parts that none will trust,
Wit that can creep, and Pride that licks the dust.
[Il. 309-33]
As Aubrey Williams points out, the name "Sporus" de-
rives, at least in part, from the youth that the emperor
Nero had castrated and then, treating him as a woman,
eventually married.23 Accordingly, Sporus appears in Ar-
buthnot as self-divided and different from "himself," ex-
actly like woman as Derrida describes her. Moreover, also
as Derrida suggests, the negative side of the coin that is
Sporus, which represents Pope's declaration of his equiv-
ocation as impotence, is only half the story. For the name
"Sporus" also suggests "spore," which comes from the
Greek word meanjng both seed and the act of sowing.
Whereas, then, Sporus as a historical reference suggests
the undecidability and emptiness Pope emphasizes in the
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portrait, the etymology of the word denotes-differ-
ently-fertility and productivity. Alongside the first, this
second, positive meaning is always "present" in the word
as a shimmering, or "trace," that prevents the meaning,
like the character, from lying still or being unequivocal.
This other side of the coin suggests that an internal split,
an equivocation, such as Pope (and before him, Hamlet)
feared, has positive potential and may be productive.
In any case, the textual situation of indeterminacy be-
tween Sporus as potential and as impotent functions as an
analogue, as does the "trace" structure of the word "Spo-
rus," of the both/and nature Pope (satirically) ascribes to
this figure. The self-division satirized in Sporus is also an
analogue of the internal difference within Pope's poem be-
tween the various declarations and the descriptions that
emerged via our reading. The fissure in Arbuthnot marks,
of course, the self-difference in Pope, both he and his
poem being divided, oscillating, like Sporus, "all see-saw
between that and this." Appearing in each of these situa-
tions is a both/and structure, a dividing that is at the same
time a joining. If, as a result, identities are nullified, so are
absolute differences. Made possible by self-division, in-
deed impossible without it, is relationality, a point that
The Dunciad returns to. The structure thus revealed,
writes J. Hillis Miller in another but related context, "al-
lows an osmotic mixing, making the stranger friend, the
distant near, the Unheimlich heimlich ... without, for all
its closeness and similarity, ceasing to be strange, distant,
and dissimilar."24 Self-difference, and equivocation, may
not be so bad after all.
If, as Miller claims, an "uncanny antithetical relation-
ship," resulting from inevitable self-difference, "reforms
itself in each polar opposite when that opposite is sepa-
rated out," subverting or nullifying "the apparently un-
equivocal relation of polarity,"25 there is, among other
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things, an obvious and significant effect on Pope's rela-
tionship to those he hates and ridicules. Unwilling (lover
and) patron, Pope is nevertheless host to the parasite-
poetasters in the sense that they "live" inside his poem,
taking life from it and being preserved in it. As Pope de-
clares, "Ev'n such small Critics some regard may claim, /
Preserv'd in Milton's or in Shakespear's name" (11. 167-
68).26 At the same time, like Bufo fed by his parasite-
hosts, Pope is a parasite as well as a host: he needs the
dunces no less than they need him, for without them he
would have no poem.
Despite, then, Pope's strong desire for, and determined
efforts to achieve, absolute difference, he is only always
already related to those that he hates and from whom he
would distinguish himself. Rather than absolutely differ-
ent from such satirized objects as Bufo and Sporus, he is
like them, a point long suspected concerning satirists,
who, it is often said, fiercely attack in others what they
subconsciously realize about themselves. An Epistle to Dr.
Arbuthnot shows how Pope, in becoming woman, makes
clear his own equivocation and indeterminacy, even as he
attacks these qualities in those he hates. Thus what he
writes in To a Lady concerning the contradictory and con-
trary Atossa both echoes Paul's lament in Romans ("what
I hate, that do I," 7:15) and describes "himself":
Scarce once herself, by turns all Womankind!
Who, with herself, or others, from her birth
Finds all her life one warfare upon earth:
Shines, in exposing Knaves, and painting Fools,
Yet is, whate'er she hates and ridicules. [11. 116-20]
Writing is the name of such differance, a point that Pope
dramatizes in Arbuthnot and acknowledges in Epistle l.i.
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when he declares that he "grow[s] all to all" (1. 32), being
"Careless how ill I with myself agree" (1. 175). That differ-
ance becomes woman. Writing and woman and Pope:
wherein lies the difference./?
c1\. Chapter Six
"All Relation Scorn"
Duncery, Deconstruction,
and The Dunciad
The Dunciad is clearly Pope's most complex poem, in part
because it is more than poem, consisting of poetic text,
elaborate notes, and seemingly endless prefatory and
other matter. But as Wallace Jackson has recently
claimed, "The New Dunciad incorporates little that has
not been in Pope's texts from the beginning." 1 Focusing on
such issues as parts-whole and inside/outside, The Dun-
ciad returns us to the concerns with which we began this
study. As it reminds us of An Essay on Criticism as well as
An Essay on Man, Pope's last and perhaps greatest poem
also extends strategies developed in Sober Advice from
Horace and covers again some territory explored in An
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, posing anew questions concern-
ing male and female and self and other. The relation of
The Dunciad to Arbuthnot is, I think, particularly interest-
ing and important, for both poems raise in insistent ways
the issue of relationship, most notably via the question of
Pope's relations to those he hates and ridicules. Without, I
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hope, repeating too much of our preceding discussions, I
focus here on the relation of Pope, those he attacks, and
deconstruction, which seems importantly to resemble
duncery as Pope presents it.
AWar with Words
In his classic Pope's "Dunciad": A Study of Its Meaning,
Aubrey Williams argues eloquently that Pope's "war" with
duncery is, in the final analysis, "a battle over words-
over a destructive use of the 'word,' as the poet saw it, by
the dunces in the most important areas of human experi-
ence: literature, education, politics, religion."2 Williams
links up The Dunciad with the persistent Battle of the An-
cients and Moderns:
The War of the Dunces (and that of the Ancients and Moderns)
is best described, perhaps, as one waged between eighteenth-
century versions of humanist and schoolman. To describe the
fray in these terms is to see the parties involved as standing on
either side of a cleavage in thought and attitude which extends
through the whole of Western civilization: the labels applied to
the opposing parties change, but the parties contend about the
same issues.3
''At the heart of the struggle," in Williams's view, lies "the
concern with the means, use, ends, limits of human
knowledge," humanists being especially concerned about
rhetorical "degeneration into mere words, empty and
meaningless verbalism." Their opponents, on the other
hand, are of two kinds, but their similarities are stronger
than their (superficial) differences: one group reveals log-
ical, dialectical, and scientific preoccupation with things,
and the other is concerned with words as outer, material
shells at the expense of the informing sense.4
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Even if the humanists and their opponents do not al-
ways contend about exactly the same issues Williams well
describes, we may forever be refighting the Battle of the
Ancients and Moderns. In our own day, as Geoffrey Hart-
man has claimed,5 that battle is waged between tradi-
tional' humanistic critics and "hermeneutical" ones, most
notably perhaps deconstructionists. The Dunciad may
precisely interest many readers today as a prescient treat-
ment of just the issue that Hartman describes. Even if
Pope sometimes practices deconstruction, might his ha-
tred and ridicule of Dulness and the dunces be read, then,
as another Ancient, humanist attack on the latest version
of "Modern madness"?
Duncery and Absence
I am not the first to treat difference (and relation) in The
Dunciad. Fredric V. Bogel has argued that Pope's last great
work "is a poem about relations, especially those relations
whose relationship to each other ... makes meaning pos-
sible at all: the relations of sameness and difference."6 A
humanist, Bogel contends that the poet creates such rela-
tionships' in fact making a difference that did not previ-
ously exist. But as I have argued elsewhere,7 and as Bogel's
own text evinces, sameness is not, and cannot be, origi-
nary and grounding. If-to take one of Bogel's major
points-Dulness is "unrestrained combinatory energy,"
which unifies "discrete items," difference obviously pre-
cedes her efforts to combine.8 Difference, in fact, already
appears (as it must) in the chaos Dulness contemplates at
1.55-78, a passage in which Bogellocates primal undiffer-
entiation: that here "Tragedy and Comedy embrace" (1.
69) and "Farce and Epic get a jumbled race" (1. 70) makes
clear that mingling follows difference. Ultimately, then,
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despite its suggestiveness and insight, Bogel's account
fails to do justice to the poem because it seems unaware
of the work of differance.
At issue between us, it might be said, is the difference
between e and a, a difference apparent only in writing. If
this is so, if the quarrel concerns words (actually, letters),
then ·we (I!) who engage in the squabble are no different
from the dunces, who are satirized for exploiting the very
difference I have noted. As one of the more illustrious of
them boasts,
'Tis true, on Words is still our whole debate,
Disputes of Me or Te, of aut or at,
To sound or sink in cano, 0 or A,
Or give up Cicero to C or K. [4.219-22J
Are we, then, in quarreling with Bogel (and others) impli-
cating ourselves in Pope's capacious satire, The Dunciad
reading and satirizing us, just as I suggested other Pope
poems may do? Does the declaration "Out of thine own
Mouth will I judge thee, wicked Scribler!" refer as much to
us as to the (earlier) dunces? 9 Is deconstruction (merely)
a war with words? Such questions bear on the poem's re-
markable capacity for drawing seemingly everything into
its own vortex, not unlike Dulness herself sucking all in.
Let us continue for a while to look at the dunces' war
with words. What "Bentley," the "verbal Critick," favors in
the passage above (as well as in the notes to Sober Advice)
is also what the Goddess promotes. Nothing would ad-
vance her cause more, the poem maintains, than general
verbal warfare; she wants human concern narrowed to a
"war with Words alone" (4.178). That is precisely what is
being taught in the schools, already victims of her sway.
That duncery permeates the educational establishment is
not surprising, Pope declares, since Dulness is "often rec-
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onciled in some degree with Learning" (4.21-22n.). Ex-
emplifying the current teaching, Dr. Busby, the famous
headmaster of Westminster, asserts:
"Since Man from beast by Words is known,
Words are Man's province, Words we teach alone.
When Reason doubtful, like the Samian letter,
Points him two ways, the narrower is the better.
Plac'd at the door of Learning, youth to guide,
We never suffer it to stand too wide.
To ask, to guess, to know, as they commence,
As Fancy opens the quick springs of Sense,
We ply the Memory, we load the brain,
Bind rebel Wit, and double chain on chain,
Confine the thought, to exercise the breath;
And keep them in the pale of Words till death.
[4. 1 49-60]
What Pope specifically opposes in Dulness's call to "war
with Words alone," in Busby's proclamation that "words"
the schools "teach alone," and in Bentley's boast that "on
Words is still our whole debate" is what he evidently
feared in An Essay on Criticism and attacked in both the
verse and the notes of Sober Advice from Horace: a privi-
leging of the shell at the expense of the heart and soul of
the matter. For Pope, "sense informs words," 10 just as "In
some fair Body ... th' informing Soul/With Spirits feeds,
with Vigour fills the whole, / ... / It self unseen, but in th'
Effects, remains" (An Essay on Criticism, II. 76-79); for the
dunces, however, words are merely material things. The
notes to The Dunciad, often parodying Richard Bentley
and exposing his pedantry as well as that of Scriblerus and
others, dramatize the dunces' abusive neglect of inform-
Ing sense.
Pope's treatment, in the verse, of the antiquarian coin
collectors Annius and Mummius (4.347-94) and of the
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gardener and the naturalist (4.397-436) plays a variation
on the same theme. The antiquarians are concerned with
coins as material things, Annius ironically dramatizing
the primacy (for Pope) of the informing sense when he
ingests the coins he has stolen. Meddling "only in [his
own] sphere" (1. 432), the naturalist destroys-it seems-
anything that gets in the way of his "insect lust" (1. 415):
as he insensitively replies to the gardener's anguished cry,
wherever the prized butterfly "fix'd, the beauteous bird I
seiz'd: / Rose or Carnation was below my care" (11. 430-
31). Of course, the distraught gardener is no less a (nar-
row) specialist and no less willing, in Aubrey Williams's
apt phrasing, to "focus extravagantly upon nature itself
and grant to the thing the devotion properly given to
God." 11 For their contributions, in helping "T'invert the
world, and counter-work its Cause" (An Essay on Man
3.244) and thus to "MAKE ONE MIGHTY DUNCIAD OF THE
LAND" (4.6°4), the antiquarians, the gardener, and the
scientist receive Dulness's commendation. They have
helped to narrow men's outlook and to make them forget
about God:
"O! would the Sons of Men once think their Eyes
And Reason giv'n them but to study Flies!
See Nature in some partial narrow shape,
And let the Author of the Whole escape:
Learn but to trifle; or, who most observe,
To wonder at their Maker, not to serve." [11. 453-58]
According to Pope, those who valorize natural and mate-
rial objects produce the same effects as those who restrict
their concern to words alone.
Scientist and scholar alike, Pope maintains, neglect
what is central to any intellectual effort, and that is use, a
point that recalls Pope's focus on "the use of riches" in the
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Moral Essays. As Bentley puts it, echoing Dulness's prayer
just quoted:
The critic Eye, that microscope of Wit,
Sees hairs and pores, examines bit by bit:
How parts relate to parts, or they to whole,
The body's harmony, the beaming soul,
Are things which Kuster, Burman, Wasse shall see,
When Man's whole frame is obvious to a Flea.
[11. 233-38]
This "verbal Critick" adds, "we dim the eyes, and stuff the
head / With all such reading as was never read" (II. 249-
50), helping to produce pedants like himself rather than
citizen-humanists, the ideal of the tradition out of which
Pope writes. Bentley's conclusion is, "We only furnish
what [You] cannot use" (I. 261). For Pope, on the other
hand, what mattered was wisdom, and wisdom derives, as
Williams puts it, from "the whole man as a single moral,
religious, and sentient being"; it also involves "the use of
learning for the benefit of others." 12
Pope's particular depiction of duncery as neglectful of
informing sense carries still further implications, as Wil-
liams has shown. It is, he writes, "impossible to separate
the war 'over words' which gave the poem its impetus, and
the theological metaphor which gives it its profoundest
significance." 13 Though Williams's interpretation has re-
cently been challenged, the theological implications of
Pope's efforts seem to me obvious. 14 To begin with, The
Dunciad clearly inverts An Essay on Man, its plea for char-
ity and relationality, and its call to move outward, from
the self, toward others, in love. Instead of expanding love,
movingly described at the end of An Essay on Man, The
Dunciad offers Dulness's inwardly spiraling vortex, ever-
narrowing concern (the goal is ''A trifling head, and a con-
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tracted heart," 4.504), a god "Wrapt up in Self" (4.485),
and the injunction to "all Relation scorn, / See all in Self,
and but for self be born" (4.479-80).
Inversion thus plays a major role in the later poem. Ac-
cording to Williams, "as Pope employs this principle of
inversion in the Dunciad it is more than a matter of tech-
nique: it is also a realization of the nature of evil, of its
negative and destructive qualities." In Christian thought,
as Williams says, evil is "neither 'an essence nor a nature
nor a form' but an absence, a privation, a non-being." 15
Such emptiness and absence characterize the dunces'
understanding of the "word," as well as the soulless meta-
physics of Dulness. According to Bentley, emphasizing
duncery's devotion to surfaces and exteriors:
Like buoys, that never sink into the flood,
On Learning's surface we but lie and nod.
Thine is the genuine head of many a house,
And much Divinity without a NofJ~. [4.241-44]
As Pope carefully explains in a note to this last line, NoiJ~
is a "word much affected by the learned Aristarchus in
common conversation, to signify Genius or natural acu-
men. But this passage has a farther view," he continues,
for "NofJ~ was the Platonic term for Mind, or the first
Cause, and that system of Divinity is here hinted at which
terminates in blind Nature without a NofJ~." Content to
"See Nature in some partial narrow shape, / And let the
Author of the Whole escape" (4.455-56), that way of
thinking comes to rest in secondariness, with things, not
being "to Nature's Cause thro' Nature led" (4.468). Such
"free-thinkers," as Pope calls them in the note to line 50 I,
Make Nature still incroach upon [God's] plan;
And shove him off as far as e'er we can:
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Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his place;
Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space.
Or, at one bound o'er-leaping all his laws,
Make God Man's Image, Man the final Cause.
[4.473-78]
Words and world alike are emptied of meaning, leaving a
shell, and the absence, the non-being, made "present" in
The Dunciad is figured by Pope as evil.
Duncery and Deconstruction
What we have seen about Dulness and duncery suggests
a link with deconstruction. A (castrated and castrating)
woman, opposing the male Logos and menacing the reg-
nant logo- and phallogocentrism; an inversion of human-
istic understanding and values; a representation of ab-
sence; an advocate of the study of words alone, their
sounds, and their materiality; a champion of exteriors and
surfaces; a skeptic concerning a ''final Cause" and a pro-
moter of secondariness-are not these and other charac-
teristics of Dulness shared by deconstruction? Is decon-
struction, which becomes woman, one of Pope's satirical
objects in The Dunciad? To raise such a question seems to
participate in duncery's work of inversion.
Of course, it is not just in the characterization of Dul-
ness that The Dunciad parallels (aspects of) deconstruc-
tion, its teaching, and its effects. Considered as poem and
commentary, The Dunciad, with its voluminous notes and
elaborate editorial apparatus, is part of an entire tradition,
in which deconstruction participates and which is con-
cerned to explore such questions as the relation between
"text" and commentary. One thinks immediately ofA Tale
of a Tub, Sartor Resartus, and Pale Fire as well as of such
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decentering efforts by Derrida as Glas and "Living On:
Border Lines." By means of typographical strategies, Der-
rida succeeds in problematizing our usual notions con-
cerning margins, borders, and the "proper," "Living On"
consisting of an essay placed as a footnote that contends
for priority with the essay "proper." In The Dunciad, the
notes, and less frequently the prefatory and other matter,
serve a number of purposes. The notes are of several
kinds, some continuing and extending the satire at work
in the verse, others exposing the wrongheadedness of
Scriblerus, Bentley, Gibber, Theobald, et al. The effect of
many of these notes is simply to present the work of "ver-
bal Griticks." This work the Goddess describes as follows:
"... murder first, and mince them all to bits;
As erst Medea (cruel, so to save!)
A new Edition of old £son gave,
Let standard-Authors, thus, like trophies born,
Appear more glorious as more hack'd and torn,
And you, my Critics! in the chequer'd shade,
Admire new light thro' holes yourselves have made.
"Leave not a foot of verse, a foot of stone,
A Page, a Grave, that they can call their own;
But spread, my sons, your glory thin or thick,
On passive paper, or on solid brick. [4.120-30]
Though most of the notes serve some satirical purpose,
still others provide helpful-and in some cases, essen-
tial-information and clarification. Regardless of their
nature, the overall effect of the panoply of notes is, as Wil-
liam Kinsley has written, to "crowd the poem off the
page," much as the "prefaces and appendices reproduce
their kind to the seventh generation." 16 Like Swift in A
Tale of a Tub, which ironically mingles "text" and com-
mentary' Pope wants things straight, center and· margins
clearly distinct, and so the extensive editorial apparatus is
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designed to satirize the indulgent dunces, who-we might
say-have become de-centered (though not morally). On
this matter of textual boundaries, Kinsley further writes
that "one of the most important benefits of printing for
[Pope] was its rigid spatial separation of text and com-
mentary.... [M]arginal glosses, the manuscript equiva-
lent of footnotes, always had a fateful tendency to creep
into the text and lodge there. Once the spatial separation
is firmly established, Pope is free to set up many kinds of
ironical relationships between text and commentary." 17
Actually, the relationship between "text" and commen-
tary is no more stable in The Dunciad than in the manu-
scripts that Kinsley mentions: the "rigid spatial separa-
tion" does not tell the whole story. I have already
suggested the point in claiming that some of the notes
continue and expand the satire and that still others pro-
vide needed information. Aubrey Williams made this last
point some time ago, though without drawing the signifi-
cance that I am interested in. He wrote, in discussing how
many of the notes serve as justification for Pope's attacks
in the verse, that "the notes ... are an implicit admission
of a kind of failure, but they are also an attempt to remedy
the situation, particularly with regard to the ethical vision
of the poet. Because the notes are not the poem, however,
even the remedy is not ultimately a thoroughly satisfac-
tory solution to the problem: the damage is in some ways
skilfully repaired, but one can still see the patches." 18 The
Dunciad qua poem is not, then, a whole-only holey. The
notes supplement, trying to plug some of these holes. As
they supplement the flawed "text," the notes break do",~n
any "rigid" separation between "text" and notes. What is
ostensibly a satirical technique turns out to be more:
Pope's own text displays the same de-centering for which
he satirizes the dunces.
A final point or two concerning the notes, which in var-
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ious ways call in question the notion of the "proper": They
not only supplement the verse, but they also act to open
up the text, destabilizing it and exposing it as something
other than-because more than-a fixed and complete
object, a well-wrought urn. In short, the notes establish
the text's need for help, from readers. As Williams writes,
the notes impose "upon editors and critics a never-ending
(though in part fruitless) job of clarification, a laborious
correction of Pope's careful misstatements of fact." 19 Sev-
eral of the (in more than one sense, modern) notes in the
Twickenham Edition mirror the dunces' editorial lahors,
annotating their commentary, trying to set matters
straight, providing factual information, and explaining
certain apparently obscure allusions.20 If, as Kinsley
claims, "Pope implies that the Dunciad ... can assimilate
all future commentary into itself,"21 it also makes clear its
receptivity to such commentary, extending an invitation to
annotate and supplement. To whom, then, does the text
"properly" belong?
Of course, The Dunciad opens up in another way, a way
to which the notes themselves do not contribute signifi-
cantly. The poem is not complete "in itself" because it is
involved with, parallels, and extends such other poems as
An Essay on Man. More so than any other of Pope's major
poems, The Dunciad reveals the ways in which texts inter-
penetrate each other. As I suggested earlier, it is impor-
tantly related, not only to An Essay on Man, but also to An
Essay on Criticism, Sober Advice from Horace, and An
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, as well as (obviously) to the three-
book Dunciad of the late 1720S. In being involved with
such texts, The Dunciad spills over, exceeding "itself" as a
self-contained entity.
I want to mention one other way in which the poem
prevents us from rounding it off. To indicate how it opens
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"itself" up still further, I turn to the recent argument by
Donald T Siebert, Jr., that critics such as Aubrey Williams
have painted too pessimistic a picture of what The Dun-
ciad is. It may be, as Siebert claims, that "the School of
Deep Intent" slights and on occasion ignores the wit and
humor that permeate the poem, though I do not see how
one can discount the philosophical and theological mean-
ings that Williams describes. The situation, I think, re-
sembles that in Sober Advice from Horace: Pope is serious,
deeply so, about the threat posed by the dunces. At the
same time, there is the smut and the fun especially of the
first three books, and we enjoy and delight in it, as Pope
must have. Surely part-and not a negligible part, at
that-of the meaning and significance of The Dunciad
lies in the game and the play, including the often brilliant
fiction of the seemingly endless commentary.22 And as
Geoffrey Hartman has observed, there are carnivalesque
qualities aplenty in Pope and an "older, hieratic speech,
biblical, mystical, or popular-sermonic, [that] pierces with
'Asiatic' force through 'Attic' veils."23 Perhaps contrary to
the implications of "the School of Deep Intent," the
smutty fun is not transcended (or not fully so, anyway),
and, perhaps contrary to Siebert's argument, that fun does
not obscure the seriousness. I am not suggesting that in
The Dunciad the fun and the "deep Intent" (4.4) always
work together or co-exist harmoniously. On the contrary,
they seem to reside together in uneasy tension that is
never quite resolved-a situation paralleled, as we shall
see, by other features. Thanks to the dialogical nature of
satire, Pope can put the earthy counterheroic rhetoric in
the mouths of the dunces, thereby indulging in it while
condemning it. But the play, like other features, spills over,
affecting the "deep Intent," helping to make the poem ex-
ceed "itself," just as An Essay on Criticism exceeds "itself."
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The Dunciad contains, then, features and effects that can-
not always (to echo Barbara Johnson) be reasonably at-
tributed to Pope's conscious intentions.
Defeating One's Own Design
In The Dunciad, Pope's basic technique consists of letting
the "wicked scriblers" condemn themselves out of their
own mouths, turning their own words against them. As a
result, "In broad Effulgence all below [is] reveal'd" (4.18).
As he does elsewhere, then, Pope here reads against the
grain, the dunces exposing themselves in spite of them-
selves.
Despite obvious differences, accentuated by Pope's de-
sire to appear and be different from the dunces, he is in
some ways like them, his actions on occasion mirroring
theirs. Consider, for example, what Aubrey Williams calls
Pope's "careful misstatements of fact" in the notes, where
he plays fast and loose with the texts of duncery so as to
implicate and convict the votaries of Dulness. Not content
to let the dunces be judged by their own words, even if one
reads those words counter to their authors' intentions,
Pope sometimes puts into their mouths something other
than what they actually wrote or were known to have said.
Such fabrications are not so different from the counter-
feiting done, for example, by the London booksellers
whom Pope castigates. Such counterfeiting Dulness ap-
plauds, as she makes clear in speaking to Curll, an expert
at this work:
"Son! thy grief lay down,
And turn this whole illusion on the town:
As the sage dame, experienc'd in her trade,
By names of Toasts retails each batter'd jade;
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(Whence hapless Monsieur much complains at Paris
Of wrongs from Duchesses and Lady Maries;)
Be thine, my stationer! this magic gift;
Cook shall be Prior, and Concanen, Swift:
So shall each hostile name become our own,
And we too boast our Garth and Addison."
[2.13 1 -40 ]
I do not deny the differences, including those in the eyes
of the law, between the fraudulent bookseller and the sa-
tirical poet. I do, though, insist on the structural similarity
in their actions, both counterfeiting: albeit in different
ways, Curll and Pope make "each hostile name ... [their]
own." 24
That Pope resembles such dunces as his archenemy Ed-
mund Curll more closely than he would care to admit,
appears too in the manner in which he depicts himself in
the final book. As the opening verses suggest ("Yet, yet a
moment, one dim Ray of Light / Indulge, dread Chaos,
and eternal Night!"), Pope sets out to dramatize the power
and effects of Dulness, evincing that even he, poet of light
and Being and defender of distinction and difference,
must succumb as "the all-composing Hour / Resistless
falls" (II. 627-28); the schools, the church, the arts, and
government have already enlisted in her efforts to extin-
guish all light. Though he by no means becomes a votary
of the Goddess, Pope feels her "resistless" sway to such a
degree that Scriblerus mistakes him for one of her party,
referring to him not only as "a dull Poet" (I. 4n.) but also
as her "genuine Son" (I. In.). Any other strategy would
have endangered Pope's efforts: had such a person as Pope
remained untouched by Dulness's effects, readers would
not have been so disturbed by the dire prospects. But Pope
obviously wanted his readers to appreciate the gravity of
the threat as he perceived it-and as he powerfully de-
scribes it toward the close of the poem.
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In a note at the end of Book III "signed" by Scriblerus,
Pope warns his readers not to mistake the power and in-
fluence of Dulness but to recognize them as the threat
they are. This note immediately precedes, and prepares
the way for, the dramatized effects of Dulness's sway on
the poet in the final book. "It may perhaps seem incred-
ible' that so great a Revolution in Learning as is here
prophesied, should be brought about by such weak Instru-
ments as have been described in our poem: But do not
thou, gentle reader, rest too secure in thy contempt of
these Instruments" (1. 333n.).
In Book IV: Pope contradicts this statement, reassuring
us that, no matter how threatening duncery may appear,
it will subvert its own efforts, and so there is nothing to
worry about: "... if it be well consider'd, ... whatever in-
clination they might have to do mischief, her sons are gen-
erally render'd harmless by their Inability; and ... it is the
common effect of Dulness (even in her greatest efforts) to
defeat her own design" (4.S84n.). Pope's contradiction
might be dismissed as an unimportant slip, to which we
are all prone, were it not that this particular contradiction
mirrors exactly the subversion said to be characteristic of
Dulness and the dunces. In undermining in the fourth
book of The Dunciad the claim made in the third, Pope
reveals another similarity to Dulness: like her, he defeats
his own design.
Accepting Relation
The question of Pope's relation to those he hates and rid-
icules opens out onto the larger matter of relation in gen-
eral' a topic that The Dunciad thematizes. An issue im-
portant in Pope's poetry since An Essay on Criticism, it
appears most prominently here in the speech of the
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"gloomy Clerk." Having boasted that, a "Sworn foe to
Myst'ry" (4.460), he like the other dunces will not be "to
Nature's Cause thro' Nature led" (1. 468), the clergyman
declares:
All-seeing in thy mists, we want no guide,
Mother of Arrogance, and Source of Pride!
We nobly take the high Priori Road,
And reason downward, till we doubt of God:
Make Nature still incroach upon his plan;
And shove him off as far as e'er we can:
Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his place;
Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space.
Or, at one bound o'er-leaping all his laws,
Make God Man's Image, Man the final Cause,
Find Virtue local, all Relation scorn,
See all in Self, and but for self be born:
Of nought so certain as our Reason still,
Of nought so doubtful as of Soul and Will.
Oh hide the God still more! and make us see
Such as Lucretius drew, a God like Thee:
Wrapt up in Self, a God without a Thought,
Regardless of our merit or default. [II. 469-86]
No more devastating self-exposure occurs in The Dunciad
as inversions of traditional understanding abound: taking
the place of the grand conception of Nature, extolled in
An Essay on Criticism and An Essay on Man, which bodies
forth God's design, is a mechanical, soulless, and materi-
alistic notion, and man has usurped the power and place
of God, accomplishing what Pope's theodicy satirized him
for daring. If God ex;ists at all, the Clerk shamelessly
maintains, He is "without a Thought," "a Divinity without
a NofJq."
The inversions in this and other passages, it is impor-
tant to understand, are part of Pope's "thoroughgoing
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technique." 25 Accustomed as many (most?) are to think of
literary texts as simply mimetic, we may find it hard to
grasp that inversion in The Dunciad is not primarily what
duncery effects but, rather, a device that Pope employs to
represent the activity of Dulness and her followers. I want
to consider some of the implications of using inversion to
represent threats to one's cherished beliefs.
To begin with, if everything is inverted, man, for ex-
ample, becoming the Final Cause, hierarchization is (ob-
viously) preserved, an either/or situation prevailing: either
God or man assumes priority. In light of Pope's defense of
the Logos, such a situation is hardly surprising. Hierar-
chies are, of course, maintained by violence, and inverting
is oppositional (and therefore violent) as well as hierarchi-
cal. But if inversion is oppositional, it contradicts Pope's
call to relation. As he did in An Essay on Man, Pope de-
nies, in 4.469-86, that virtue is "local," pertaining only to
an isolated "part" or "parts" unconcerned with how such
a "part" relates to another. But the dunces, Pope claims,
"all Relation scorn"; for them what matters is the opera-
tion of the individual "part," in isolation. Such a belief
ultimately ends, Pope maintains, with each "center[ing]
every thing in himself' (1. 478n.). But isn't the belief that
Pope ascribes to the dunces, denying that virtue is rela-
tional, the logical conclusion of the logocentrism that
Pope defends? Rigid separation, absolute difference, dis-
tinct identity-these preclude relation.
The relationship that Pope seeks thus does not reside
comfortably with the logocentrism that characterizes his
efforts to achieve it. Indeed, those procedures ensure that
relationality will not result. Committed equally to oppos-
ing, Pope can only invert, making what he hates and fears
the opposite of what he cherishes, as he did in An Epistle
to Dr. Arbuthnot. Caught in the trap of binary oppositions,
fundamental to logocentrism, Pope denies himself what
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he seeks. Inverting, Pope understands Dulness and the
dunces as merely destructive, indeed as (maternal) ab-
sence and non-being, and so he opposes to them (pater-
nal) presence and Being. Another procedure, eschewing
oppositionalism and inversion, would lead to a sense of
relatedness to those from whom Pope wants to difference
himself absolutely. But as we saw in Arbuthnot, as well as
in The Dunciad, such relations always already exist; in a
number of ways, Pope is like those he hates and ridicules,
resembling his "opponents" in spite of himself.
Preceding man, relation is not dependent on him for its
"existence" and effects. It plays and does its work in spite
of him, undermining his oppositional ways. The key to
relationality appears to lie in the fact of self-difference,
which itself derives from what Derrida terms (in a passage
I quoted in the first chapter) the "trace retaining the other
as other in the same." Considering differences between di-
vinity and humanity in light of the "trace," John Dominic
Crossan has made precisely this point. We may substitute
any other "opposition," for example self and other, for
those Crossan deconstructs: "If humanity and divinity
must be separated, they are combined by that very dis-
junction itself; and if humanity and divinity are to be
joined, they are separated as well by that necessity.
Whether a hybrid is to be censored or celebrated, the dif-
ference that establishes it, be it for separation or for com-
bination' rules alike over both those options and is much
more fundamental than either of them. The difference is
itself a relationship that binds more firmly than any other
could."26 As Crossan stipulates, "it makes a difference"
whether you privilege divinity or humanity, just as it does
whether you are (or embrace) Pope or the dunces. Still, as
Derrida insists, differance is "the movement that struc-
tures every dissociation."27
I perhaps cannot stress enough that difference operates
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within entities as well as between them, and it is their self-
difference, differance, the retention of a "trace" of the
"other" as other in the "same," that produces relation. For
Herbert N. Schneidau, whom I mentioned earlier in this
book, that self-difference is a mode of alienation, and
achieving some alienation from ourselves, he maintains,
is very good news indeed.28 Crucial, it seems, is somehow
coming to realize our internal division, accepting it, and
regarding it as a way of getting outside the self considered
as a fragile, precious, univocal bearer of meaning and sig-
nificance. To transcend the self and its proud, vain desires
and imposed meanings, reaching a point where we can be
critical of them, requires recognizing and admitting the
presence of an other, the "trace" in us of an other, which
is always already a part of us.
In The Dunciad, Pope declares the need for just such an
other:
Kind Self-conceit to some her glass applies,
Which no one looks in with another's eyes:
But as the Flatt'rer or Dependant paint,
Beholds himself a Patriot, Chief, or Saint. [4.533-36]
One is, then, not enough. Pope "himself," as we have seen,
contains the needed other within himself, a point that Bo-
gel approaches in treating, in a footnote, Pope's "closing
appeal to the Muse": "0 sing, and hush the Nations with
thy Song!" (4.626). According to Bogel, the line shows the
speaker turning "rather dramatically into his opposite,"
the word "hush"-"a lapsus linguae"-marking "an in-
vasion of the self by the other or a recognition that what
had been conceived of as other is actually present in the
self." 29 But the situation is not quite as Bogel describes it.
The latter half of the coordinate construction in the im-
mediately preceding quotation accurately describes the
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relation of self and other, though Bogel presents it as
equivalent to the very different position indicated in the
former half. Clearly, the other does not invade the self
from outside. Rather, it is always already in the self, self
and other being related, neither being conceivable or hav-
ing any meaning apart from the other.
"Always a case of both/and,
never a simple either/or"
If-to :return to my earlier contention-Dulness parallels
deconstruction in inverting traditional, humanistic under-
standing, that resemblance ends ifher work stops with in-
version. Pope sees and depicts her work as simply that, just
as he sees the oscillating, self-divided Sporus as merely
negative. Thus duncery relates to deconstruction as a
caricature of it, not a faithful representation (deconstruc-
tion is not, for example, in any simple sense a war with
words alone). In opposing and inverting, Pope ensures
that he not be able to recognize that the "other" is a part
of him as he is a part of the "other." The implications of
such a relationship of "self" and "other" are far-
reaching-and obviously bear on religion as well as eth-
ics.30 Has this study turned out, after all, to be about hu-
manity and divinity and so to be-in some ways-the
study of Pope and religion that I had long planned? A
trace remains . . .
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21. Ibid., p. xiii.
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24. Roland Barthes, S/ Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 4.
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"In the Wake of the Anarch," in Gnomon: Essays on Contem-
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may now be among the least ambitious of all the humanistic
disciplines, yet it parades and flaunts its own indifference. No
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Criticism," the first volume of the Twickenham Edition of the
Poems (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 212, 209.
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lipsis," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
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ciad?'
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so-called Providentialist School, including Williams's An Ap-
proach to Congreve (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1979).
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differentiation in Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Greg-
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of California Press, 1965), p. Ill.
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Manipulation of Ideas in '~n Essay on Man" (Chicago: Univ. of
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desire of presence, of being in place, of having a single, definite,
and distinct identity. But, writes Derrida in Of Grammatology,
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33·
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Order and Energy from Dryden to Blake (New York: Doubleday,
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Chapter Four
I. Miriam Leranbaum, Alexander Pope~ 'Opus Magnum'
172 9-1 744 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
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poems, see Ralph Cohen, "Pope's Meanings and the Strategies
of Interpretation," in English Literature in the Age of Disguise,
ed. Maximillian E. Novak (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,
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Pope (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1983).
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in January 1733, To Cobham in January 1734, and To a Lady
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edition of his Works, giving them the order now universally
a~opted: Cobham,_ To a Lady, Bathurst, and Burlington. See
Leranbaum, Alexander Pope's 'Opus Magnum' 1729-1744 and
- III.ii (Epistles to Several Persons) in the Twickenham Edition of
the Poems.
4. For a recent consideration of interpretation as a major con-
cern in the Moral Essays, see Fredric ~ Bogel, Acts of Knowl-
edge: Pope's Later Poems (Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell Uni~
Press, 1981). See also Max Byrd, "'Reading' in Great Expecta-
tions," PMLA, 9 1 (1976),259-65.
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caid, "Coherent Readers, Incoherent Texts," Critical Inquiry, 3
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Articulate: Comic Eschatology in Jesus and Borges (New York:
Harper and Row, 1976), p. 44.
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ground, see Douglas H. White, Pope and the Context of Contro-
versy: The Manipulation of Ideas in ';4n Essay on Man" (Chi-
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Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow [Chicago: Uni~ of Chicago Press,
1978], p. 67), Pope declares, "Ladies, like variegated Tulips,
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42). And just as Pope writes that "by submitting [woman]
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is woman because she gives, because she gives herself, while the
man for his part takes, possesses, indeed takes possession. Or
else, at other times, she is woman because, in giving, she is in
fact giving herselffor, is simulating, and consequently assuring
the possessive mastery for her own self" (p. 109). Further, Der-
rida claims that "There is no such thing as a woman, as a truth
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being that "Woman's at best a Contradiction still" (1. 270).
8. See Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Read-
ing: Otherwise, ed. Shoshana Felman (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins Univ. Press, 1982), e.g., pp. 2-10. This collection of essays
originally appeared as Yale French Studies, nos. 55-56.
9. Derrida, Positions, pp. 41-42. As Derrida makes clear, and
I noted earlier, the temporal language is misleading since "it is
not a question of a chronological phase, a given moment, or a
page that one day simply will be turned, in order to go onto
other things" (ibid.).
10. I have in mind here Derrida's sense of truth as woman as
well as the historical emergence of a quasi-liberated woman on
the seventeenth-century English stage. See Jean Gagen, The
Emergence of the New Woman (New York: Twayne, 1954), and
Culler, On Deconstruction, esp. pp. 43-64.
11. de Man, Allegories ofReading, p. 12.
12. See Culler, On Deconstruction, esp. pp. 64-83. See also
Kincaid, "Coherent Readers, Incoherent Texts."
13. Helpful critical studies include Wasserman, Pope's
"Epistle to Bathurst"; Keener, An Essay on Pope; Leranbaum,
Alexander Pope's 'Opus Magnum' 1729-1744; Bogel, Acts of
Knowledge; and Jackson, Vision and Re-Vision in Alexander
Pope.
14. Marc Shell, The Economy ofLiterature (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Uni~ Press, 1978) and Money, Language, and
Thought: Literary and Philosophical Economies from the Medie-
val to the Modern Era (Berkeley: Uni~ of California Press,
1982). See also my forthcoming essay "The Money of Stories of
Money."
15. Cf. Shell's account of Heidegger's similar hope for "a
barter or premonetary (pre-Heraclitean) economy of words as
well as wares" (Money, Language, and Thought, p. 174).
16. See, esp., Shell's chapter "The Gold Bug" in Money, Lan-
guage, and Thought, pp. 5-23.
17· Shell, Economy ofLiterature, p. 34.
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"the signs of exchange, because they satisfy desire, are sus-
tained by the dark, dangerous, and accursed glitter of metal. An
equivocal glitter, for it reproduces in the depths of the earth that
other glitter that sings at the far end of the night: it resides there
like an inverted promise of happiness, and, because metal re-
sembles the stars, the knowledge of all these perilous treasures
is at the same time knowledge of the world. And thus reflection
upon wealth has its pivot in the broadest speculation upon the
cosmos, just as, inversely, profound knowledge of the order of
the world must lead to the secret of metals and the possession
of wealth" (The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences [New York: Vintage, 1970 ], p. 173).
19. For a helpful discussion of the relation of light to being,
see Williams, Pope's "Dunciad;' p. 140. On the relation of truth
to the sun, see Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the
Text of Philosophy," in Margins ofPhilosophy, pp. 207-71.
20. Shell, Economy ofLiterature, p. 62.
21. de Man, Allegories ofReading, pp. 3-19.
22. Wasserman, Pope's "Epistle to Bathurst;'p. 31.
23. A point also made by Shell (Economy of Literature, p.
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2S. See Mack, "King Lear" in Our Time, p. Ill.
26. Johnson, "Translator's Introduction" to Derrida, Dissem-
ination, p. xiii.
27· Derrida, "Differance," pp. 133-34.
28. Ibid., p. 132.
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ested in ways of interpreting the world than in any interpreta-
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(Acts ofKnowledge, esp. pp. 37-107).
Chapter Five
1. Among the most illuminating of these studies are Robert
W Rogers, The Major Satires ofAlexander Pope, Illinois Studies
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ander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1959); Thomas E. Maresca, Pope's Horatian Poems (Columbus:
Ohio State Univ. P;ress, 1966); Peter Dixon, The World ofPope's
Satires (London: Methuen, 1968); John M. Aden, Something
like Horace: Studies in the Art and Allusion of Pope:S Horatian
Satires (Nashville: Vanderbilt Uni~ Press, 1969); Griffin, Alex-
ander Pope: The Poet in the Poems; and Howard D. Weinbrot,
Augustus Caesar in 'Jiugustan England": The Decline of a Clas-
sical Norm (Princeton: Princeton Uni~ Press, 1978) and Alex-
ander Pope and the Traditions ofFormal Jterse Satire (Princeton:
Princeton Uni~ Press, 1982).
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Moskovit, "Pope's Purposes in Sober Advice," Philological Quar-
terly, 44 (1965), 195-99·
3. Maynard Mack, The Garden and the City: Retirement and
Politics in the Later Poetry of Pope, 1731-43 (Toronto: Univ. of
Toronto Press, 1969).
4. See my "Strategy and Purpose in Pope's Sober Advice from
Horace," Papers on Language and Literature, 15 (1978),159-74.
5. See, for example, the note by "Bentley" to line 36 in the
Latin poem: "CUNNI CUPIENNIUS ALBI, Hoary Shrine. Here the
Imitator grievously errs, Cunnus albus by no means signifying a
white or grey Thing, but a Thing under a white or grey Garment,
which thing may be either black, brown, red, or parti-coloured."
6. See, for example, Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue 1.228-
47·
7. Rene Girard, "The Plague in Literature and Myth," in "To
Double Business Bound" (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press,
1978), p. 138.
8. Cf. Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue 11.212-19.
9. Cf. Stanley Fish's somewhat simpler view that irony is
"neither the property of works, nor the creation of an unfettered
imagination, but a way of reading, an interpretive strategy that
produces the object of its attention, an object that will be per-
spicuous to those who share or have been persuaded to share
the same strategy" ("Short People Got No Reason to Live:
Reading Irony," Daedalus, 112 [1983], 189).
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10. Irvin Ehrenpreis, Acts ofImplication: Suggestion and Cov-
ert Meaning in the Works of Dryden, Swift, Pope and Austen
(Berkeley: Uni~ of California Press, Ig81), p. 8g. On more than
one occasion I have tried to read the poem's "speaker" as a co-
herent persona, but, despite the strong desire to simplify, I have
not been able to make him consistent.
1 1. Cf. the doubleness associated with "patron" in An Epistle
to Dr. Arbuthnot, a point I discuss later in this chapter.
12. Joel Weinsheimer, "'London' and the Fundamental Prob-
lem of Hermeneutics;' Critical Inquiry, 9 (lg82), 314.
13. Stephen Booth, "King Lear," "Macbeth;' Indefinition, and
Tragedy (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, Ig83), pp. 85-86.
14. J. Hillis Miller, "Character in the Novel / A 'Real Illu-
sion,'" in From Smollett to Trollope: Studies in the Novel and
Other Essays Presented to Edgar Johnson, ed. Samuel I. Mintz,
Alice Chandler, and Christopher Mulvey (Charlottesville: Univ.
Press of Virginia, Ig81), p. 27g. I wish Miller had placed
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about phonocentrism here creeping into his deconstruction.
15. Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in Image /
Music / Text, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang,
Ig77), p. 145·
16. Eduard Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
Ig57), p. 78.
17. From "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety," quoted in
"Translator's Preface" to Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. xlvii.
18. Miller, "The Critic as Host."
Ig. Derrida, Spurs, pp. 49-51.
20. The poem's fictionality is apparent in the way Pope de-
picts his mother, who died in June 1733, eighteen months be-
fore Arbuthnot was published.
21. The question of homosexuality is obviously raised by
Pope's worry about his masculinity and by the threat posed by
male writers. This issue may begin to loom large when we note
that Pope writes that his friends "left me GAY" (1. 256; we at least
cannot but hear the slang term in the phrase). But the issue is
primarily one of the division within individuals, whereby, as in
Chinese philosophy, nothing is purely masculine or purely fem-
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the both/and nature of things, Sporus, for example, oscillating
between male and female.
22. Maresca, Pope's Horatian Poems, p. 71.
23. Aubrey Williams, ed., Poetry and Prose ofAlexander Pope
(Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1969), p. 207n.
24. Miller, "Critic as Host," p. 221.
25. Ibid.
26. A similar point appears in the '~dvertisement" to The
Dunciad Variorum: "it is only in this monument that [the dunces]
must expect to survive?'
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ness," Proceedings of the British Academy, 54 (1968), 23 1-63;
John Sitter, The Poetry ofPope's "Dunciad" (Minneapolis: Uni~
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6. Bogel, "Dulness Unbound," p. 846.
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17. Ibid., pp. 726-27.
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3.2 72 .
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26. Crossan, "Difference and Divinity," p. 34.
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30. See my "'Count It All Joy': The Affirmative Nature of
Deconstruction." I am at work on an extended study of decon-
struction and religion, which seems to follow logically from this
volume on Pope.
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